DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h).
Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 46011-1-I
Title of Case: Donald R. Woods, Appellant
v.
Employment Security Department, Respondent
File Date: 11/13/2000
SOURCE OF APPEAL
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Appeal from Superior Court of King County
Docket No: 99-2-09453-1
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 01/06/2000
Judge signing: Hon. Richard M. Ishikawa
JUDGES
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COUNSEL OF RECORD
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Counsel for Appellant(s)
Donald R. Woods (Appearing Pro Se)
15264 N.E. 11th St.
Apt. 232
Bellevue, WA 98007
Counsel for Respondent(s)
Laura J. Watson
900 Fourth Avenue
Ste 2000
Seattle, WA 98164-1012
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
)
DONALD R. WOODS, ) No. 46011-1-I
)
Appellant, ) DIVISION ONE
)
v. )
)
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF )
WASHINGTON )
)
) FILED:
Respondent. )
PER CURIAM. -- Donald Woods established that he quit his job because
of work-related factors that were compelling enough to cause a reasonably
prudent person to quit. But Woods failed to show that he exhausted all
reasonable alternatives to preserve his employment or that such efforts
would have been futile. Therefore, he was not entitled to receive
unemployment benefits. The decision to deny him those benefits is
affirmed.
Woods worked at United Parcel Service (UPS). His job was to wash the
company's brown delivery trucks. But Woods developed allergies and a
sensitivity to chemicals, and the exhaust from the trucks bothered him. He
presented a note about his problem to the company and in April 1998 was
moved to a truck wash tunnel that was open to the outside on either end.
Nevertheless, Woods continued to be bothered by exhaust fumes.
Additionally, working in the outside tunnel required him to stand more than
he was required to previously. Standing caused him to have problems with
his feet and back.
Woods complained verbally to his supervisor, but he was not given a
new job. In September 1998, he decided he might need to quit. He went to
the human resources manager, Nancy Klein, and asked if there was a position
available in the office, away from the fumes, where he did not need to
stand for a long time. She said there was nothing available at that time.
Klein, however, told Woods he would have a better chance of finding a new
position if he pursued accommodation under the Americans With Disabilities
Act (ADA).
But Woods did not proceed under the ADA. He instead gave one month's
notice to his supervisor that he was quitting. She agreed to check with
human resources to see if they could find another position for him, but she
was not successful. Woods' last day of work at UPS was October 8, 1998.
Woods applied for unemployment compensation benefits and the
Employment Security Department initially granted them. But UPS appealed
the initial decision to a commissioner. A hearing was held, and the
initial decision was reversed. In relevant part, the commissioner found as
follows:1
Woods informed UPS as early as April 1996 that he had difficulty with his
job because of his allergies and sensitivity to chemicals. He was allowed
to close the doors of the vehicles at the start of his shift to reduce his
exposure to exhaust.
In April 1998, Woods was assigned to an out-of-doors car wash facility.
The move was intended to reduce his exposure to exhaust fumes because fresh
air could blow through the tunnel.
After being assigned to the outdoor facility, Woods began experiencing pain
in his back and feet because he was required to stand for 95 percent of his
workday.
Woods complained to his supervisor, but was told there were no other jobs
within the company he could be assigned to. Woods claims he provided UPS
with a written statement from his doctor about his condition in May 1998,
but UPS did not have a copy of the doctor's statement in its files and had
no record of receiving it. Woods also was unable to locate a copy of the
statement. Moreover, Woods gave conflicting testimony about what the May
1998 statement said.
In early September 1998, Woods decided he could no longer perform his job.
He went to the human resources department and announced his intention to
leave the company. He was informed of the process for making a request for
accommodation for his health problems. He was told there were
possibilities for continuing employment if he made a request for
accommodation rather than quitting. Woods, however, chose not to request
an accommodation because he did not want to be labeled as handicapped.
Because UPS was not on notice of a request for an accommodation, it was not
given an opportunity to accommodate Woods' health and employment needs.
The commissioner entered the following relevant conclusions of law:
The Employment Security Act was enacted to award unemployment benefits
to individuals who are unemployed through no fault of their own. A
claimant who voluntarily resigns from his employment must establish he had
good cause for quitting. Good cause means his reason for leaving the job
was primarily work-related, his reason for quitting was so compelling it
would cause a reasonably prudent person to terminate his employment, and he
exhausted reasonable alternatives that might preserve his employment before
quitting unless exercising those alternatives would have been futile.
In some cases, the claimant's testimony alone may be sufficient to
establish medical reasons that establish good cause for quitting.
Woods demonstrated that he had an illness or disability, he left work
due to that illness or disability, and a reasonably prudent person would
find it necessary to leave his job because of that illness or disability.
But Woods failed to demonstrate that he made reasonable efforts to preserve
his employment before quitting or that such efforts would have been futile.
He may have believed that efforts to preserve his employment would have
been futile, but the record did not support the conclusion that his efforts
would have been futile.
Based upon those findings and conclusions, the commissioner reversed the
previous award of benefits. Woods appealed to the superior court, but the
court affirmed the commissioner's decision. This appeal followed.
Judicial review of a final decision by the commissioner of the
Employment Security Department is governed by the Washington Administrative
Procedure Act (WAPA).2 Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 122 Wn.2d 397,
402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). A reviewing court may reverse an administrative
decision if the decision (1) was based on an error of law, (2) was not
based on substantial evidence, or (3) was arbitrary and capricious. RCW
34.05.570(3); Tapper, 122 Wn.2d at 402. When reviewing an administrative
action, this Court sits in the same position as the superior court and
applies the standards of the WAPA directly to the record before the agency.
Tapper, 122 Wn.2d at 402.
An agency action is arbitrary and capricious if it was made willfully,
without consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances.
Heinmiller v. Dep't of Health, 127 Wn.2d 595, 609, 903 P.2d 433 (1995).
Evidence is substantial if is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person
of the truth of the declared premise. Heinmiller, 127 Wn. 2d at 609.
Unemployed workers generally are entitled to unemployment benefits under
the Employment Security Act unless they are disqualified by statute from
receiving them. Terry v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 82 Wn. App. 745, 749, 919
P.2d 111 (1996). A worker may be disqualified from receiving benefits if
the commissioner determines he voluntarily left work without good cause.
RCW 50.20.050(1). Woods has the burden to establish his right to benefits.
RCW 50.32.150; Terry, 82 Wn. App. at 749.
To establish he had good cause to leave a job, an employee must show
that (1) he left because of work-related factors, (2) the factors were
compelling enough to cause a reasonably prudent person to quit, and (3) he
exhausted all reasonable alternatives to preserve his employment unless
those efforts would have been futile. Terry, 82 Wn. App. at 749.
The commissioner concluded that Woods demonstrated he left his job
because of his illness or disability and that a reasonably prudent person
would find it necessary to leave the job because of the illness or
disability. The commissioner concluded, however, that Woods did not show
he had made reasonable efforts to preserve his employment before quitting
or that those efforts would have been futile. Hence, only the third factor
is at issue.
Whether or not Woods demonstrated that any effort to preserve his
employment before quitting would have been futile is a mixed question of
law and fact. To resolve a mixed question of law and fact, the court must
establish the relevant facts, determine the applicable law, and apply that
law to the facts. Tapper, 122 Wn.2d at 403.
Woods asserts that there were no jobs within the company that would meet
his health needs and, therefore, any effort to preserve his employment
before quitting would have been futile. He claimed in the hearing before
the commissioner that he spoke to his supervisor, his union, and the human
resources manager to try to find another job within the company. But there
is no evidence other than Woods' testimony of his asking for another
position because of his foot or back pain. In fact, neither he nor the
company had a record of his having notified the company of those problems.
Moreover, although Woods asserted that the human resources manager told him
there were no jobs available within the company that would satisfy his
health needs, he acknowledged that she told him a suitable position would
be more likely to be found if he proceeded under the ADA. However, he did
not follow that advice.
But Woods contends that the record does not support the commissioner's
finding that he did not ask for accommodation under the ADA because he did
not want to be labeled as handicapped. He claims that in making that
finding, the commissioner ignored substantial evidence in the record.
When asked why he did not proceed with a request for accommodation under
the ADA, Woods responded as follows:
Because I--I'm not--because I am capable of working and able to work,
and I don't want to be a handicap to anyone, if I don't have to, and I
don't want to have to carry that label the rest of my life when I am able
to work just fine, just have to get into the right area.
Woods asserts that the commissioner ignored the testimony indicating he did
not want to seek accommodation because he was capable of working.
But allowing employees with illnesses or disabilities to continue working
when they are capable of doing so is the purpose of the ADA. Moreover, the
manager's suggestion that he proceed under the ADA indicated there could be
another position for him within in the company although she could not
immediately identify one. Under these circumstances, Woods' failure to ask
for accommodation established that he did not make a reasonable effort to
preserve his employment. The decision to deny Woods unemployment benefits,
therefore, was not arbitrary and capricious.
The commissioner's decision, which was affirmed by the superior court, is
affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
1 The Commissioner's findings and conclusions are paraphrased.
2 The Commissioner is the final authority for Employment Security
Department determinations regarding unemployment compensation. Tapper, 122
Wn.2d at 404.