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Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 33003-2-II
Title of Case: Dennis A. Starr, Appellant v. Employment
Security Dept., Respondent
File Date: 11/22/2005
SOURCE OF APPEAL
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Appeal from Superior Court of Thurston County
Docket No: 04-2-01525-9
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 02/11/2005
Judge signing: Hon. Gary R Tabor
JUDGES
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Authored by J. Robin Hunt
Concurring: Marywave Van Deren
Elaine Houghton
COUNSEL OF RECORD
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Counsel for Appellant(s)
Deborah Maranville
U. of Washington, School of Law
PO Box 85110
Seattle, WA 98145-1110
Counsel for Respondent(s)
Jamie Neshera Jones
WA Attorney General's Office
1125 Washington St SE
PO Box 40110
Olympia, WA 98504-0110
Bruce L. Turcott
Ofc of The Aty General
1125 Washington St SE
PO Box 40110
Olympia, WA 98504-0110
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
DENNIS A. STARR, No. 33003-2-II
Appellant,
v.
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLISHED OPINION
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Respondent.
Hunt, J. Dennis Starr appeals denial of his claim for unemployment
compensation benefits after he voluntarily quit his job and traveled to
Alaska to care for his daughters and grandchildren in dire circumstances.
He argues that (1) RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(i)-(x)'s list of non-disqualifying
reasons for voluntarily leaving employment is not exclusive; and (2) 'good
cause' for voluntarily quitting under RCW 50.20.050(2)(a) includes
compelling personal reasons, such as his daughters' and grandchildren's
circumstances.
Holding that RCW 50.20.050(2)(b) provides an exclusive list of 'good
cause' reasons for voluntarily quitting employment without being
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits, we affirm dismissal of
Starr's claim.
FACTS
I. Starr's Unemployment
Beginning February 24, 2003, Dennis Starr worked five months as a full-
time fuel salesman. On July 26, 2003, he left his employer a telephone
message that he was going to Alaska to assist his daughters: One daughter
had been arrested and incarcerated for murder;1 the other had been in a
serious car accident and was also incarcerated. Starr did not indicate
when or whether he might return to his job. Starr's employer paid him
through July 31 and recorded him as a 'voluntary quit.'
Starr and his wife stayed in Alaska to take custody of their
daughter's children while their daughter was incarcerated and to assist
with her legal problems. Starr did not return to work for his Washington
employer.
II. Procedure
In February 2004, while still in Alaska, Starr applied for
unemployment compensation with the Washington State Employment Security
Department (Department). On February 25, the Department denied Starr's
claim because he 'did not have good cause to quit work.' Commissioner's
Record (CR) at 35 (emphasis added).
After an administrative hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
concluded that (1) 'good cause' for voluntarily leaving employment is
limited to the enumerated provisions of RCW 50.20.050(2)(b); and (2)
'{e}ven though {Starr} had very compelling reasons to quit his job, these
reasons were personal in nature, not work related and did not otherwise
fall under any qualifying 'good cause' category.' CR at 60. Starr
petitioned for review.
On review, the Department's Commissioner affirmed the ALJ's decision,
and adopted the ALJ's findings of fact2 and conclusions of law, with one
exception: The Commissioner modified the ALJ's conclusion of law five 'to
show that the revisions to RCW 50.20.050 . . . do not require that a
claimant's voluntary separation from employment be work-related to
constitute good cause pursuant to RCW 50.20.050(2)(a). See, for example,
RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv).' CR at 71-72. Starr sought
judicial review in superior court.
Sitting in its appellate capacity, the superior court affirmed the
Commissioner's decision denying Starr unemployment benefits.
Starr appeals.
ANALYSIS
This appeal presents a single issue of first impression: Under RCW
50.20.050(2)(a), can non-enumerated compelling personal reasons constitute
good cause for voluntarily quitting a job or is good cause limited to the
factors enumerated in RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(i)-(x)? We hold that good cause
is limited to the factors enumerated in RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(i)-(x).
I. Standard of Review
In reviewing an administrative action, we apply the standards of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) directly to the record before the
agency.3 Tapper v. Employment Sec., 122 Wn.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494
(1993). We presume the commissioner's decision to be 'prima facie
correct.' Employees of Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Employment Sec. Dep't,
128 Wn. App. 121, 126, 114 P.3d 675 (2005).
We grant relief from an agency order in an adjudicative proceeding if
the agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law, RCW 34.05.570(3)(d),
and the person seeking judicial relief has been substantially prejudiced.
RCW 34.05.070(1)(d). The burden is on the party challenging the
Commissioner's ruling to satisfy these two prerequisites. Employees of
Intalco Aluminum Corp., 128 Wn. App. at 126.
Construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de
novo under the error of law standard. Pasco v. Public Employees Relations
Comm'n, 119 Wn.2d 504, 507, 833 P.2d 381 (1992). When the statute falls
within an agency's area of expertise, we give substantial weight to that
agency's construction of statutory language and legislative intent. Hensel
v. Dep't of Fisheries, 82 Wn. App. 521, 525-26, 919 P.2d 102 (1996).
Nonetheless, the courts retain the ultimate authority to interpret a
statute. Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 325-
26, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983). A reviewing
court's obligation is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Lacey
Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wn.2d 40, 53, 905 P.2d 338
(1995). Our review begins with the statute's plain language. Lacey
Nursing Ctr., 128 Wn.2d at 53. When, as here, a statute is unambiguous, we
determine legislative intent from the statutory language alone. Waste
Mgmt. of Seattle v. Util. & Transp. Comm., 123 Wn.2d 621, 629, 869 P.2d
1034 (1994).
II. 'Good Cause' Under RCW 50.20.050
Starr argues that RCW 50.20.050(2)(b) does not establish an exclusive
list of non-disqualifying circumstances. He argues instead that the
Legislature intended to include other more general 'compelling personal
reasons' such that leaving his employment to care for his grandchildren in
Alaska would not disqualify him from receiving unemployment compensation.
We disagree.
RCW 50.20.050 is titled 'Disqualification for leaving work voluntarily
without good cause.' By its plain language, subsection (1) applies to
'claims that have an effective date before January 4, 2004.' RCW
50.20.050(1). By its parallel plain language, subsection (2) applies to
'claims that have an effective date on or after January 4, 2004.' RCW
50.20.050(2). Because Starr filed for unemployment benefits after January
4, 2004, subsection (2) applies to his unemployment benefits claim.
Holding that the language of RCW 50.20.050 is unambiguous, we look to other
portions of the statute's plain language to determine its scope and the
Legislature's intent for unemployment benefits coverage when a worker
voluntarily leaves employment.
A. Plain Language
Subsection (2) of RCW 50.20.050 first provides, 'An individual shall
be disqualified from {unemployment} benefits beginning with the first day
of the calendar week in which he or she has left work voluntarily without
good cause. . . .' RCW 50.20.050(2)(a). This subsection goes on to
explain additional aspects of disqualifying circumstances, which do not
pertain here.
Next, subsection (b) lists ten circumstances that will not disqualify
a worker from receiving unemployment benefits, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(b) An individual is not disqualified from benefits under (a) of this
subsection when:
(i) He or she has left work to accept a bona fide offer of bona fide
work as described in (a) of this subsection;
(ii) The separation was necessary because of the illness or
disability of the claimant or the death, illness, or disability of a member
of the claimant's immediate family if:
(A) The claimant pursued all reasonable alternatives to preserve his
or her employment status by requesting a leave of absence, by having
promptly notified the employer of the reason for the absence, and by having
promptly requested reemployment when again able to assume employment.
These alternatives need not be pursued, however, when they would have been
a futile act, including those instances when the futility of the act was a
result of a recognized labor/management dispatch system; and
(B) The claimant terminated his or her employment status, and is not
entitled to be reinstated to the same position or a comparable or similar
position;
(iii) He or she: (A) Left work to relocate for the spouse's
employment that, due to a mandatory military transfer: (I) Is outside the
existing labor market area; and (II) is in Washington or another state
that, pursuant to statute, does not consider such an individual to have
left work voluntarily without good cause; and (B) remained employed as long
as was reasonable prior to the move;
(iv) The separation was necessary to protect the claimant or the
claimant's immediate family members from domestic violence, . . . or
stalking . . .
(v) The individual's usual compensation was reduced by twenty-five
percent or more;
(vi) The individual's usual hours were reduced by twenty-five percent
or more;
(vii) The individual's worksite changed, such change caused a
material increase in distance or difficulty of travel, and, after the
change, the commute was greater than is customary for workers in the
individual's job classification and labor market;
(viii) The individual's worksite safety deteriorated, the individual
reported such safety deterioration to the employer, and the employer failed
to correct the hazards within a reasonable period of time;
(ix) The individual left work because of illegal activities in the
individual's worksite, the individual reported such activities to the
employer, and the employer failed to end such activities within a
reasonable period of time; or
(x) The individual's usual work was changed to work that violates the
individual's religious convictions or sincere moral beliefs.
RCW 50.20.050(2)(b) (emphasis added). This subsection contains no
additional open-ended circumstance of any type; and it clearly contains no
general category entitled 'compelling personal reasons,' as Starr would
have us read into the statute.
On the contrary, RCW 50.20.050(2)(b) lists the following
circumstances, although not categorized as such, which could be deemed non-
disqualifying 'compelling personal circumstances' causing a claimant to
quit work: (i) accepting another bona fide job offer; (ii) illness or
disability of the claimant or a family member; (iii) the claimant's spouse
was transferred by the military; (iv) domestic violence; and (v) conflict
between the claimant's religious or moral beliefs and the work place.
Nothing in this subsection or anywhere else in RCW 50.20.050 even hints
that there could be other non-disqualifying circumstances.
B. Exclusive List
Nonetheless, Starr argues that RCW 50.20.050(2)(b) does not establish
an exclusive list of non-disqualifying circumstances.4 He argues instead
that the Legislature intended to include other undefined 'compelling
personal reasons.'5 We disagree.
Where a statute specifically designates the things or classes of things
upon which it operates, an inference arises in law that all things or
classes of things omitted from it were intentionally omitted by the
legislature under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius specific
inclusions exclude implication.
Wash. Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 77 Wn.2d 94, 98, 459 P.2d
633 (1969). Thus, because the Legislature specified in section (2)(b) ten
circumstances that will not disqualify an individual from unemployment
benefits under section (2)(a), we infer that RCW 50.20.050(2)(b) comprises
the Legislature's exclusive list of circumstances6 that will not defeat a
claim for unemployment compensation when a worker voluntarily quits
employment.
C. Starr's Related Arguments
Relying extensively on In re Bale, 63 Wn.2d 83, 385 P.2d 545 (1963),
Starr compares the RCW 50.20.050 version in effect at the time Bale was
decided to the version in effect when he filed his claim. In Bale, our
Supreme Court noted that our Legislature removed from former RCW 50.20.050
the language that limited 'good cause' (for quitting employment) to
'reasons related to the work in question'; the Court held that, in so
doing, the Legislature intended to remove the work connected limitation and
instead to allow 'good cause' to include 'compelling personal reasons.' 63
Wn.2d at 89-90. Contrary to Starr's argument, however, it does not follow
that the Legislature intended the same result under the subsequently
amended statutory scheme in section (2)(b), applicable here.
Rather, an alternative reasonable explanation for claims filed after
January 4, 2004, under section (2)(a), is that the Legislature replaced
section 1(c)'s 'work connected' restriction with section (2)(b)'s
exhaustive list of 'good cause' circumstances, not all of which are work
connected and some of which describe compelling personal reasons.
The Commissioner apparently relied on this interpretation of the
statute when he revised the ALJ's conclusion of law number five to state
that 'the revisions to RCW 50.20.050 . . . do not require that a claimant's
voluntary separation from employment be work-related to constitute good
cause pursuant to RCW 50.20.050(2)(a).' CR at 72. In so revising the
ALJ's conclusion, the Commissioner cited RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(i)-(iv), which
provides several circumstances that are personal in nature, unrelated to
work conditions.
Not only is it appropriate for us to defer to the Commissioner's
reasonable interpretation of the statute,7 Hensel, 82 Wn. App. at 525-26,
but also, as we point out earlier in this opinion, the statute's plain
language supports this interpretation. Therefore, we hold that RCW
50.20.050(2)(b)(i)-(x) provides the exclusive list of good cause reasons
for voluntarily quitting employment that will not disqualify a claimant
from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.
III. Conclusion
While Starr's situation and his personal sacrifices for his family are
compelling, inclusion of this type of personal circumstance as a
nondisqualifying circumstance, for purposes of
unemployment compensation benefits, is a decision for the Legislature, not
the courts. At this time, however, the Legislature has expressly chosen to
include only the ten nondisqualifying circumstances in RCW
50.20.050(2)(b)'s exclusive list. And, no matter how compelling, Starr's
personal circumstances do not fit within any of these ten 'good cause'
reasons for voluntarily quitting employment without being disqualified from
receiving unemployment compensation. Thus, we affirm the Commissioner's
denial of Starr's claim, and we deny Starr's request for attorney fees.
Hunt, J.
We concur:
Houghton, J.
Van Deren, A.C.J.
1 Police accused Starr's daughter, Denni, of murdering the father of her
two children.
2 The Commissioner adopted the ALJ's findings, to which Starr does not
assign error. Thus, these findings are verities on appeal. Davis v. Dep't
of Labor & Indus., 94 Wn.2d 119, 123, 615 P.2d 1279 (1980).
3 'The appellate court reviews the findings and decision of the
commissioner, not the superior court decision or the underlying ALJ order.'
Employees of Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 128 Wn. App.
121, 126, 114 P.3d 675 (2005).
4 We note Starr does not argue that he qualifies under RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)
subsections (ii), disability of a family member, or (iv), domestic
violence.
5 Starr compares subsection (2) with subsection (1) of RCW 50.20.050. He
points to RCW 50.20.050(1)(c), which provides, in pertinent part:
In determining under this subsection whether an individual has left work
voluntarily without good cause, the commissioner shall only consider work-
connected factors such as the degree of risk involved to the individual's
health, safety, and morals, the individual's physical fitness for the work,
the individual's ability to perform the work, and such other work connected
factors as the commissioner may deem pertinent, including state and
national emergencies.
(Emphasis added.) Starr then argues that, because the Legislature omitted
this 'work-connected' limitation when it added section (2) to RCW
50.20.050, 'good cause' for voluntarily quitting work is no longer limited
to work connected factors, and good cause now also includes 'compelling
personal reasons.' We disagree.
As we explain above, RCW 50.20.050 is unambiguous; thus, there is no
need to look to legislative history to determine legislative intent.
6 This inference is further supported by language in other sections of the
statute that, in contrast, explicitly provide nonexclusive lists. See, for
example, RCW 50.04.294(1) ''Misconduct' includes, but is not limited to,
the following conduct by a claimant.' (Emphasis added).
7 The Department also points to legislative history as evidence that the
Legislature intended RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(i)-(x) to be an exhaustive list of
circumstances that would not disqualify a voluntarily quitting employee
from receiving unemployment benefits. In light of our holding based on the
statute's plain language, we need not consult legislative history.
Nonetheless, because both parties rely heavily on legislative history, we
note that it supports our holding.
The House Bill Report states: (1) 'The reasons specified in the Act
as good cause for leaving work voluntarily are limited'; and (2) '{t}he
Commissioner's discretion to determine that other work-related factors are
good cause for leaving work is eliminated.'
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/Senate/6075-6099/6097 hbr.pdf at
6 (last visited November 21, 2005) (emphasis added). The House Bill Report
supports the Commissioner's determination that the Legislature intended to
create an exhaustive list of circumstances constituting good cause for
voluntarily quitting work.
Similarly, the Senate and Final Bill Report both state: 'Effective
January 4, 2004, an individual may receive benefits if he or she leaves
work for the following reasons' (followed by nine enumerated
circumstances). http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/Senate/6075-
6099/6097 sbr.pdf at 3 (last visited November 21, 2005); 2003 Final
Legislative Report, 58th Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. at 293 (emphasis added).
This language similarly supports the Commissioner's ruling that the
Legislature intended to provide unemployment benefits only if an individual
left work for certain specified reasons.
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