. -- At issue is a ruling denying unemployment compensation. The claimant, laid off from a full time job, received reduced benefits while he continued at his part-time job. When he quit the part-time job to look for work elsewhere, the claimant lost his benefits entirely for having voluntarily quit without good cause. Because the record establishes that work was still available and that the claimant left it for personal reasons, we affirm.

Under RCW 34.05.558, judicial review of disputed issues of fact is conducted by the court and must be confined to agency record. The standard applied to a review of facts is the "substantial evidence" test, which requires that the commissioner's factual findings be upheld unless "{t}he order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court".1 By contrast, this court applies a de novo review of an administrative agency's application of the law, but "substantial weight is accorded the agency's view of the law."2 Review of mixed questions of law and fact requires "establishing the relevant facts, determining the applicable law, and then applying that law to the facts."3

The following facts are undisputed. John Macuk worked at Snoqualmie Pass as a ski instructor during ski seasons from November, 1993 until April, 1995. In the summer of 1994, Macuk worked part-time as a cashier and food service worker for Time Wise, a convenience store on the Pass. When the 1994-95 ski season began, Macuk quit his job at Time Wise and began working again as a full-time ski instructor.

When the ski season began to wind down, the manager of Time Wise, experiencing a labor shortage, asked Macuk to come back to work. Macuk agreed to help out on a temporary basis, but explained that he was going to be looking for full time work in Seattle.

Macuk began working again at Time Wise on March 15, 1995. At that time, he was still working as a ski instructor and living nearby. On April 3, Macuk was laid off from his full-time position at the ski school because of lack of work. He applied for and began to receive unemployment benefits. Macuk reported his income from Time Wise to the State, and his weekly unemployment checks were reduced in view of his part-time earnings. Macuk could have worked at Time Wise full-time, but Time Wise allowed him to maintain a part-time schedule, accommodating his desire to take time to look for work in Seattle.

Macuk quit his job with Time Wise in mid-May so he could stay in Seattle while looking for work instead of commuting back and forth to the Pass. In July, the State notified him that he was disqualified for unemployment benefits because he voluntarily quit his job at Time Wise without good cause.

Macuk requested a hearing to argue the denial of benefits was unfair. He claimed that when he applied for unemployment benefits, he specifically asked whether being employed at Time Wise on a part-time temporary basis would interfere with his receipt of benefits, and was told it would not.

The administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the denial of benefits. He told Macuk he had received the correct answer: being employed part-time does not terminate benefits. Leaving the job at Time Wise was what had made him ineligible to continue receiving benefits.

Macuk appealed to the Commissioner of Employment Security Department, and the King County Superior Court, both of which affirmed the ALJ's order denying benefits. On appeal to this court, Macuk contends that his separation from a temporary, part-time job should not disqualify him from receiving unemployment compensation.

The purpose of the unemployment compensation laws is to reduce the impact of involuntary unemployment on persons "unemployed through no fault of their own".4 An employee who leaves work voluntarily without good cause is disqualified from receiving benefits.5 In order to be eligible for unemployment compensation, the claimant's reason for leaving the job must be "external and separate from the claimant."6

Macuk argues in his brief that he did not voluntarily quit because the position had ended. He claims the ALJ determined the job at Time Wise was temporary. Although the findings do say at one point that Macuk "quit the temporary job", it is plain from the context that the judge was using the word "temporary" to reflect Macuk's testimony about his own view of the job,7 not as a finding that the job itself had a definite ending point. The judge told Macuk at the hearing that a temporary job is defined as one which is of a temporary nature based on the employer's viewpoint, not the employee's. Although Macuk himself planned to work at the job only temporarily, the judge found that Time Wise "could have used his services full-time."

Macuk unilaterally terminated his employment with Time Wise when work was still available there. The facts, therefore, are not the same as in those cases relied on by Macuk in which the claimant accepted a job assignment lasting for a finite time. In two such cases, Henry v. Dolphin Temporary Help Services8 and Smith v. Employer's Overload Co.9, the Minnesota courts reinstated the claimants' unemployment benefits after they had been denied for voluntarily quitting temporary work. In Smith, employees were hired for one day jobs.10 In Henry, the claimant worked temporarily for a company on specific secretarial assignments for a fixed period of time.11 As the trial court concluded, Washington courts might well follow such cases, but they do not apply here because Macuk has not established that his employment at Time Wise ended for reasons external to himself.

Macuk also argues that quitting a part-time job should not completely disqualify him from receiving the benefits his former full-time employment made him eligible to receive. He relies on an Illinois case, Butler v. Board of Review,12 involving a claimant who had been driving a commuter bus back and forth to work in addition to holding a full-time job. The claimant was laid off from the full-time job and then quit the bus driving job too. The State determined that he had voluntarily quit the part-time job without good cause, and denied all benefits. On appeal, the court concluded that the State was correct in its determination that the claimant's separation from the part-time job was a voluntary quit without good cause. But although the claimant had not addressed the point in his brief, the court also concluded that the claimant potentially remained eligible to receive benefits based on being laid off by the full-time employer.13 Interpreting a statute that appears to be similar to RCW 50.04.310, the court stated: "The fact that he held a part-time job did not preclude him from receiving benefits. Consequently, the circumstances of his leaving his part-time job should not affect the receipt of benefits due to him as a result of being laid off by {the full-time employer}."14 Because the full-time employer had not been involved in the administrative hearing for reasons unclear to the court, the court remanded the case for further findings regarding eligibility for benefits based on his work for the full- time employer.

While Macuk's case is in a similar posture to the claimant's in Butler, we find that case distinguishable on the basis that the claimant there voluntarily quit what was indisputably a part-time job from the perspective of the employer as well as the employee. Here, the record establishes that Macuk could have worked full-time at Time Wise if he wanted to. If Macuk's only option at Time Wise had been to continue to work eight or ten hours a week, he may have been in a position to argue that remaining employed constituted an unreasonable hardship.15 But since the record reflects he had the opportunity to work full-time, it cannot be said that his reason for leaving was external or that he became unemployed through no fault of his own.

Even if the Time Wise job was clearly only a part-time job, it is not clear that Macuk, upon quitting it, would have necessarily remained eligible for all or any portion of his benefits. Under RCW 50.04.310, Macuk was able to receive a portion of his unemployment compensation while working part-time.16 But the statutes do not provide that benefits based on the former full-time job will automatically resume when the claimant quits the part-time job. To the contrary, our case law suggests that the appropriate inquiry in such circumstances is the same as when the claimant has quit a full-time job: was there good cause to quit?

This court observed in Wallace v. Department of Employment Security17 that low wages, minimal hours, and a lack of promotional opportunities may, depending on the case, constitute good cause for leaving one's employment. But the court in Wallace did not find good cause where the conditions of employment, including shorter hours than her previous job, were known to the claimant at the outset, and the claimant did not prove the conditions of employment had substantially deteriorated or created an unreasonable hardship. The court concluded the claimant "could have remained employed, received a portion of her unemployment benefits and continued to search for other employment."18

Macuk was not able to satisfy any of the recognized "good cause" reasons for leaving his job. In order to establish good cause for leaving work, the employee must demonstrate on the facts, "(a) That he or she left work primarily because of a work connected factor(s); and (b) That said work connected factor(s) was (were) of such a compelling nature as to cause a reasonably prudent person to leave his or her employment; and (c) That he or she first exhausted all reasonable alternatives prior to termination".19 A compelling reason or factor is one that forces or constrains a person to quit his employment against his will.20

Macuk cites Vergegyle v. Department of Empl. Sec. 21 to argue he acted as a reasonably prudent person because the work at Time Wise was not suitable for him and was preventing him from pursuing more appropriate work. But in Vergegyle, the standard of prudence applies in response to unreasonable actions by the employer. 22 Macuk does not show that Time Wise acted unreasonably in any way.

Finally, Macuk asserts that the ruling on good cause was based on the erroneous assumption that he was still living on Snoqualmie Pass, when in fact, by the time he quit at Time Wise, he had actually relocated to Seattle and it was impractical to keep on traveling to the Pass to go to work. Macuk's actual residence at the time he quit was not pivotal to the decision. The ALJ concluded Macuk had not established good cause because his own actions brought about the increased distance to work. Substantial evidence supports the determination that Macuk voluntarily relocated to Seattle and could have remained living on the Pass if he had wanted to. RCW 50.20.050(2) does provide good cause for leaving work to accept a "bona fide offer of bona fide work", but there is no provision for leaving a job to seek other employment.

Because Macuk left Time Wise for personal reasons, not work-related reasons, he did not have good cause for quitting under the law.

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

1 RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

2 Franklin Cy. Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 325, 646 P.2d 113 (1982).

3 Tapper v. Department of Empl. Sec., 122 Wn.2d 397, 403, 858 P.2d 494 (1993).

4 RCW 50.01.010.

5 RCW 50.20.050(1).

6 Cowles Pub'g Co. v. Department of Empl. Sec., 15 Wn. App. 590, 593, 550 P.2d 712 (1976).

7 Macuk stated in his Petition for Review: "I always considered Time Wise as a temporary part time position. In fact I only agreed to work for Time Wise because they needed help."

8 Henry v. Dolphin Temporary Help Services, 386 N.W.2d 277 (Minn. App. 1986).

9 Smith v. Employer's Overload Co., 314 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 1981).

10 Smith, 314 N.W.2d at 221.

11 Henry, 386 N.W.2d at 278.

12 Butler v. Board of Review, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 484 N.E.2d 318, 320, 91 Ill. Dec. 759 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).

13 Butler, Ill. App. 3d at 1082.

14 Butler, Ill. App. 3d at 1081.

15 See Grier v. Department of Empl. Sec., 43 Wn. App. 92, 715 P.2d 534 (1986).

16 In 1994 the Legislature initiated a pilot project calling for the employment security department to allow claimants engaged in part-time or temporary employment to keep an even greater portion of their weekly benefit. The purpose of the project was to find out whether the expanded benefit would provide an incentive to claimants to get back into full-time work. RCW 50.40.060, 070.

17 Wallace v. Department of Empl. Sec., 51 Wn. App. 787, 755 P.2d 815 (1988).

18 Wallace, 51 Wn. App. at 795.

19 WAC 192-16-009; Johns v. Department of Empl. Sec., 38 Wn. App. 566, 569, 686 P.2d 517 (1984).

20 Terry v. Department of Empl. Sec., 82 Wn. App. 745, 751, 919 P.2d 111 (1996).

21 Vergegyle v. Department of Empl. Sec., 28 Wn. App. 399, 403, 623 P.2d 736 (1981), disapproved on other grounds by Davis v. Department of Empl. Sec., 108 Wn.2d 272, 737 P.2d 1262 (1987).

22 Vergegyle, 28 Wn. App. at 403.