IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
RUBY L. GAINES, )
) No. 58664-5-I
Appellant, )
) DIVISION ONE
v. )
) PUBLISHED OPINION
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT )
SECURITY, )
) FILED: September 17, 2007
Respondent. )
GROSSE, J. -- Under the Employment Security Act (Act), chapter 50.01
RCW, an otherwise eligible individual is not to be denied unemployment benefits
while in commissioner approved training (CAT), or while satisfactorily
progressing in a training program with the approval of the commissioner, for
reasons relating to the availability for work, or by the failure to apply for or refuse
to accept suitable work. Under the required liberal interpretation of the Act and
the specific facts of this case, the commissioner erroneously concluded the
employee/trainee was disqualified from receiving benefits by voluntarily leaving
work without good cause. We reverse the decision of the commissioner and
reinstate the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ).
FACTS
Ruby Gaines worked for King County for over 21 years. She lost her job
due to a reduction in force. She applied for and received unemployment
benefits from the Employment Security Department (the Department). Gaines
was also granted a year of CAT. To continue to receive unemployment benefits
No. 58664-5-I/2
CAT trainees are not required to (1) be available for work, (2) actively seek work
while in training, or (3) accept offers of suitable work.1 Gaines received a notice
approving her application for CAT. This notice set forth a number of
responsibilities, including a warning that if she took a job and quit it while in
training she "could be denied benefits under the voluntary quit provisions of
state law." Gaines began a course at Edmonds Community College, did well,
and satisfactory progress was reported to the Department.
To gain additional income while attending CAT, Gaines undertook a part-
time job with the Downtown Emergency Service Center (DESC). She worked for
11 days as a part-time, on-call shelter counselor. Gaines reported the income to
the Department and her benefits were reduced accordingly.
Within days of starting this work, DESC offered Gaines full-time work at a
rate of approximately half of what she was making when she left the employ of
the county. Gaines never accepted this job and also quit the part-time position.
Gaines left the position because she could not continue to make progress as a
full-time student and work a part- or full-time job. She also decided the job was
unsuitable. When Gaines told DESC of her decision to discontinue working,
DESC reported the decision to the Department, and it then denied the benefits
she already was receiving, including the CAT grant, and assessed an
overpayment to her in benefits received in a range of approximately $1,000 to
1 RCW 50.20.043 (training provision of the unemployment compensation
statute).
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$1,200.
Gaines appealed the denial of benefits and the assessment. The ALJ for
the Department overturned the holding and determined that Gaines' attempt at
the part-time job for 11 days did not disqualify her from receiving benefits. The
ALJ concluded that Gaines departure from the part-time job constituted a job
refusal of an unsuitable position as opposed to a voluntary quit situation.
DESC appealed the ALJ's decision to the commissioner. The
commissioner accepted the ALJ's findings of fact but rejected the ALJ's
conclusions. The commissioner concluded that Gaines' part-time, on-call
employment at DESC for 11 days constituted acceptance of an offer of
employment and that she voluntarily quit that employment. The commissioner
determined that in order for Gaines to keep her benefits she could only quit for
good cause. Applying the 10 exclusive circumstances considered to be "good
cause" at the time of his decision,2 the commissioner determined that Gaines
voluntarily quit the position without good cause.
Gaines appealed to the King County Superior Court. The superior court
affirmed the decision of the commissioner. From that decision, Gaines appeals.
The facts of this case are unusual and we limit our holding to those
presented. Here, the ALJ found and the commissioner agreed to the following
paraphrased facts:
2 RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(i)-(x). Susbsequent to the commissioner's decision, this
section of the statute has been declared unconstitutional. See discussion as set
forth later in this opinion.
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1. Ruby Gaines received a determination that her training at
Edmonds Community College was approved as CAT. Based on
that determination, she was not required to be available for work or
to actively seek work so long as she remained in the approved
training and met the requirements of CAT. She was not obligated
to accept offers of suitable work.
2. Gaines was enrolled at Edmonds Community College on a full-
time basis in a basic office skills program. She had a 3.75 grade
average. Prior to enrollment in school she earned between $17.69
and $24.60 per hour in her 21 years of employment.
3. In an effort to supplement her income, while attending school,
Gaines took a part-time on-call position as a shelter counselor and
was paid $9.75 an hour.
4. After 11 days it became clear to Gaines that her studies were
suffering as a result of the job. Her priority was to complete her
CAT program and obtain necessary skills to further her
employment opportunities. It took her the period of almost two
weeks to realize that the position was interfering with her studies.
As noted above, from these facts the ALJ and the commissioner reached
different conclusions regarding whether Gaines is entitled to a continuation of
benefits.
Standard of Review
The Washington Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), chapter 34.05
RCW, governs review of a final decision by the commissioner of the Employment
Security Department.3 A party will be provided relief from an adverse
administrative decision if the law is erroneously interpreted or applied by the
agency or if the order is not supported by substantial evidence on the record.4
3 RCW 34.05.510; Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 122 Wn.2d 397, 402, 858
P.2d 494 (1993).
4 RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), (e).
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In reviewing an administrative decision, this court sits in the same position
as the trial court, applying the WAPA standards directly to the record considered
by the agency.5 An agency's findings of fact and regulatory interpretations are
granted appropriate deference.6 However, questions of law are reviewed de
novo. Whether the law was correctly applied to the facts as found by the agency
is also a question of law that this court reviews de novo.7 As stated in Overton v.
Economic Assistance Authority:8
Where an administrative agency is charged with administering a
special field of law and endowed with quasi-judicial functions because of
its expertise in that field, the agency's construction of statutory words and
phrases and legislative intent should be accorded substantial weight
when undergoing judicial review. . . . We also recognize the
countervailing principle that it is ultimately for the court to determine the
purpose and meaning of statutes, even when the court's interpretation is
contrary to that of the agency charged with carrying out the law.
In other words, courts retain the ultimate responsibility for interpreting a statute
or regulation.9
ANALYSIS
The legislature specifically sets forth that the Act is to be interpreted
liberally. After accidentally removing the liberal interpretation language of the
5 Tapper, 122 Wn.2d at 402.
6 Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 159 Wn.2d 868, 879, 154 P.3d
891(2007) (citing Everett Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 109
Wn.2d 819, 823, 748 P.2d 1112 (1988)).
7 Tapper, 122 Wn.2d at 403.
8 96 Wn.2d 552, 555, 637 P.2d 652 (1981).
9 Washington Cedar & Supply Co., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 137 Wn. App.
592, 598, 154 P.3d 287 (2007) (citing Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of
Health, 95 Wn. App. 858, 864, 975 P.2d 567 (1999)).
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statute while amending the Act in 2004, in 2005 the legislature reinstated the
language. The new section states in part that
the legislature further finds that the system is falling short of [the
Act's] goals by failing to recognize the importance of applying
liberal construction for the purpose of reducing involuntary
unemployment, and the suffering caused by it, to the minimum, and
by failing to provide equitable benefits to unemployed workers.[10]
The legislature also added to the preamble of the Act that "this title shall be
liberally construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment and
the suffering caused thereby to the minimum."11 As a commentator on state laws
regarding unemployment compensation statutes has said:
Unemployment compensation statutes were enacted for the
purpose of relieving the harsh economic, social and personal
consequences resulting from unemployment. If these statutes are
to accomplish their purpose, they must be given a liberal
interpretation.[12]
The ALJ determined Gaines had good cause to refuse the employment,
and that although Gaines initially undertook a part-time, on-call job with DESC, it
only took her a short time to determine it was unsuitable for her, especially as a
student in the CAT.13 The ALJ concluded Gaines was not even obligated to
10 Engrossed H.B. 2255, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 377 (Wash. 2005).
11 RCW 50.01.010; Engrossed H.B. 2255, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 377 (Wash.
2005) (emphasis omitted).
12 3A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 74.7, at 921-23 (6th
ed. 2003) (footnotes omitted) (citing cases from 35 states, including Employees
of Pac. Maritime Ass'n v. Hutt, 88 Wn.2d 426, 562 P.2d 1264 (1977)).
13 RCW 50.20.043 is an eligibility section for those in CAT programs. It states in
pertinent part:
No otherwise eligible individual shall be denied benefits for
any week because the individual is in training with the approval of
the commissioner, nor shall such individual be denied benefits with
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accept suitable positions while in CAT, so given the circumstances, the ALJ
found that Gaines certainly was not obligated to accept an unsuitable position.
Therefore, the ALJ held Gaines was not disqualified from receiving benefits
pursuant to former RCW 50.20.10014 and RCW 50.20.080.15
The commissioner disagreed. In reversing the decision of the ALJ, the
commissioner concluded that by working for 11 days, Gaines accepted an offer
respect to any week in which the individual is satisfactorily
progressing in a training program with the approval of the
commissioner by reason of the application of RCW
50.20.010(1)(c), 50.20.080, or 50.22.020(1) relating to availability
for work and active search for work, or failure to apply for or refusal
to accept suitable work.
14 Former RCW 50.20.100 provides in relevant part:
(1) Suitable work for an individual is employment in an
occupation in keeping with the individual's prior work experience,
education, or training. . . . In determining whether work is suitable
for an individual, the commissioner shall also consider the degree
of risk involved to the individual's health, safety, and morals, the
individual's physical fitness, the individual's length of
unemployment and prospects for securing local work in the
individual's customary occupation, the distance of the available
work from the individual's residence, and such other factors as the
commissioner may deem pertinent, including state and national
emergencies.
15 RCW 50.20.080 provides in pertinent part:
An individual is disqualified for benefits, if the commissioner
finds that the individual has failed without good cause, either to
apply for available, suitable work when so directed by the
employment office or the commissioner, or to accept suitable work
when offered the individual, or to return to his or her customary self-
employment (if any) when so directed by the commissioner. Such
disqualification shall begin with the week of the refusal and
thereafter for seven calendar weeks and continue until the
individual has obtained bona fide work in employment covered by
this title and earned wages in that employment of not less than
seven times his or her suspended weekly benefit amount.
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of employment, at which point RCW 50.20.080 (disqualification for refusal to
work), and the suitability factors of RCW 50.20.100, were no longer applicable.
Because Gaines accepted employment and then quit, the commissioner
determined that the case must necessarily be decided under RCW
50.20.050(2).16 That statute provides that unless good cause is established for
quitting work, a claimant is disqualified from benefits. The commissioner noted
there were 10 exclusive circumstances providing good cause for quitting work
under the statute, none of which admittedly were in play for Gaines. Thus, the
commissioner concluded that good cause was not established, and Gaines was
disqualified from receiving benefits under the disqualification for voluntarily
leaving work without good cause provision of RCW 50.20.050(2)(a).17 The
commissioner remanded the case to the Department to determine the proper
amount of overpayment.
16 RCW 50.20.050(2) states in pertinent part:
With respect to claims that have an effective date on or after
January 4, 2004:
(a) An individual shall be disqualified from benefits beginning with
the first day of the calendar week in which he or she has left work
voluntarily without good cause . . . .
17After the commissioner's decision issued in this case, Batey v. Employment
Sec. Dep't, 137 Wn. App. 506, 513-14, 154 P.3d 266 (2007) invalidated, as
unconstitutional, the Laws of 2006 (Laws of 2006, ch. 12, § 1) reenacting the
Laws of 2003 (Laws of 2003, 2d Spec. Sess., ch 4, § 4) amending RCW
50.20.050 to establish the 10 exclusive good cause reasons for voluntarily
quitting employment without becoming disqualified for unemployment benefits.
Thus, even if we were to agree with the commissioner that this case must only
be decided under the voluntary quit rules, which we do not, the case would have
to be remanded for a determination under RCW 50.20.050 as it existed in 2002.
Considering our decision, a remand is unnecessary.
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But the commissioner's decision provides no authority for his
determination that once Gaines undertook work, she could quit only for good
cause. The commissioner's decision is particularly troublesome given (1) the
legislature's intent that the Act be liberally construed, (2) the fact that Gaines
was in approved training under the training section of the statute (RCW
50.20.043) and, (3) that she argued the unsuitability of the employment. The
commissioner claimed he was not required to consider the suitability of the work
under RCW 50.20.100.
On the other hand, the ALJ appropriately considered the suitability of the
work under the statute and correctly determined that Gaines refused to work as
a part- or full-time on-call counselor, after a short period, because the work was
unsuitable. The ALJ was correct in concluding that Gaines' leaving work after
11 days more properly constituted a refusal to work as allowed under the
training provisions. This refusal does not disqualify Gaines from receiving
benefits. The commissioner's argument that he did not adjudicate the matter
under the work refusal statute, RCW 50.20.080, because it does not apply once
a claimant accepts work, begs the question and the stated purposes of the Act.
It is because Gaines showed that the work was unsuitable, that the ALJ correctly
found she could refuse the work. Contrary to the commissioner's argument that
the ALJ did not make any findings as to the suitability of the job, the ALJ
specifically concluded the part-time job was unsuitable.
We point out that neither the commissioner nor the ALJ cited RCW
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50.20.118, which discusses unemployment while in approved training. The
statute sets forth:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, an
otherwise eligible individual shall not be denied benefits for any
week because he or she is in training approved under section
236(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, P.L. 93-618, nor may that
individual be denied benefits for any such week by reason of
leaving work which is not suitable employment to enter such
training, or for failure to meet any requirement of federal or state
law for any such week which relates to the individual's availability
for work, active search for work, or refusal to accept work. [18]
The position taken by the commissioner fails to recognize the statutory
scheme that an individual may not be denied benefits by reason of leaving
unsuitable employment to enter (or stay in) training, or to refuse work. At the
very least, a liberal interpretation of the overall employment security statutory
scheme requires the commissioner to determine the suitability of the
employment, especially in light of the training provision of RCW 50.20.043 and
the suitability factors of RCW 50.20.100.
The commissioner relies on the prior employment security decision of In
re Stewart,19 to support his conclusion. In Stewart, the commissioner held that
those who quit suitable employment in order to engage in approved training
were disqualified from receiving benefits. But we find Stewart to be inapposite to
this case because it does not speak to those who quit unsuitable employment.20
18 RCW 50.20.118 (emphasis added).
19 In re Stewart, Empl. Sec. Comm'r Dec. 948 (1973).
20 It is interesting to note that the Stewart decision ultimately granted benefits to
the claimant because he had good cause for quitting the job. This good cause
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Among other reasons, the commissioner's failure to consider the suitable
work factors led to an erroneous interpretation of the Act. We reverse the
decision of the commissioner and reinstate the decision of the ALJ.
Gaines seeks attorney fees and costs. She asks for fees from the
unemployment compensation administration fund. Because we agree that the
commissioner erroneously interpreted the Act, making Gaines the prevailing
party on appeal, she is entitled to reasonable attorney fees for proceedings in
the superior court and this court.21 Gaines must comply with RAP 18.1.
Contrary to the argument of counsel for Gaines, there is no award of fees from
the state fund for proceedings at the administrative level.22
The commissioner's decision is reversed and the case is remanded for
reinstatement of benefits as determined by the ALJ, and for an award of attorney
fees and costs at the superior and appellate court levels.
was the commissioner's determination that the job quit was unsuitable. There,
the commissioner indicated he was required by the suitable work factors of RCW
50.20.100 to consider prior training experience and earnings among other
factors. Thus, in Stewart the commissioner determined that the janitorial work
for an aircraft mechanic was not suitable work and to hold otherwise would be to
subvert some of the basic purposes of the Act.
21 RCW 50.32.160; Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wn.2d 255, 265-67, 461 P.2d 531
(1969); Barker v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 127 Wn. App. 588, 596, 112 P.3d 536
(2005) (citing Albertson's, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 102 Wn. App. 29, 47,
15 P.3d 153 (2000)).
22 Ancheta, 77 Wn.2d at 266-67.
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WE CONCUR:
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