Present:  Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis

v.   Record No. 2373-94-3       PER CURIAM
              JUNE 27, 1995

     Roy B. Willett, Judge

           (Burton L. Albert, on brief), for appellant.

           (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General;
           Patricia H. Quillen, Assistant Attorney General;
           Lisa J. Rowley, Assistant Attorney General, on
           brief), for appellee Virginia Employment

           (W. Fain Rutherford; Elizabeth L. Niles; Woods,
           Rogers & Hazelgrove, on brief), for appellee
           Roanoke College.

     The Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) found that Brenda
Bower was terminated for misconduct and was not entitled to
unemployment benefits.  Bower appeals the judgment of the trial
court affirming that decision and contends that the VEC erred
when it determined that she was discharged for misconduct.  Upon
reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that
this appeal is without merit.  Accordingly, we summarily affirm
the decision of the trial court.  Rule 5A:27.
               Under Code  60.2-625(A), "the findings of the [VEC] as to
the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud,
shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be
confined to questions of law."  See Shifflett v. Virginia
Employment Comm'n, 14 Va. App. 96, 97, 414 S.E.2d 865, 865
(1992).  "The VEC's findings may be rejected only if, in
considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would
necessarily come to a different conclusion."  Craft v. Virginia
Employment Comm'n, 8 Va. App. 607, 609, 383 S.E.2d 271, 273
(1989).  "Whether an employee's behavior constitutes misconduct,
however, is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable by this
court on appeal."  Israel v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 7 Va.
App. 169, 172, 372 S.E.2d 207, 209 (1988).
     The VEC found that Bower, the manager of the Roanoke College
bookstore, received permission to purchase a used computer for
the bookstore in June 1991.  When the computer had operational
problems in 1991, Bower took it to her son's place of business to
have it repaired.  Although Bower did not intend to steal the
computer or to convert it to her personal use, the computer
remained at her son's place of business for nearly a year and was
used by employees at that business.  
     While completing an inventory in the spring of 1992, Bower
listed the computer as faculty supply, despite the objection of
her subordinate that the computer should be classified as a
capital asset.  The computer had been tagged as a capital asset. 
College procedure placed the responsibility for conversion of
assets at the cabinet level.  
     In January 1993, Bower was questioned by campus security
concerning the missing computer.  When Bower admitted that she
had removed the computer, she was directed to return it.  She
returned the computer after her offer to purchase it was
rejected.  She was later terminated for removing property and
falsifying records.
     Under Code  60.2-618(2), an employee who has been
discharged for work-related misconduct is disqualified for
unemployment benefits.
          [A]n employee is guilty of "misconduct
          connected with his work" when he 
          deliberately violates a company rule
          reasonably designed to protect the legitimate
          business interests of his employer, or when
          his acts or omissions are of such a nature or
          so recurrent as to manifest a willful
          disregard of those interests and the duties
          and obligations he owes his employer.  Absent
          circumstances in mitigation of such conduct,
          the employee is "disqualified for benefits,"
          and the burden of proving mitigating
          circumstances rests upon the employee.
Branch v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 219 Va. 609, 611, 249
S.E.2d 180, 182 (1978).  
     Although the VEC found that the initial decision to remove
the computer in order to seek repairs was a mistake in judgment,
it found that Bower intentionally miscategorized the computer
during the inventory and reported that the computer was
physically present on campus when Bower knew it was not.  As the
bookstore manager for over twenty years, Bower had a
responsibility to ensure inventories were correctly completed. 
Her actions violated her employer's rules concerning inventories
and were contrary to her employer's legitimate business
     While Bower argues in mitigation that she classified the
computer as faculty supply to ensure the computer was properly
accounted for, the evidence proved that the computer was a
capital asset and should have been so designated.  Bower's
subordinate testified that erroneously listing the computer as
faculty supply indicated that an additional computer existed. 
Moreover, Bower told campus security that the computer had been
taken to her son's place of business in November of 1992, not
1991, creating the appearance that the computer had been on
campus more recently than had been the case.
     In light of the evidence presented before the VEC, we cannot
say the record as a whole would lead a reasonable mind
necessarily to a different conclusion than that reached by the
VEC.  Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily