COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
 
 
 Present:  Judges Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Overton
 
 
 PAUL E. GROVES
 			MEMORANDUM OPINION* 
 v.	Record No. 1908-01-2	PER CURIAM
 								   DECEMBER 11, 2001
 VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION AND
  NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION d/b/a
  INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND ENGINE CORPORATION 
 
 
 	FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
 Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge
 
 		(Paul E. Groves, pro se, on briefs).
 
 		(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General; 
 Richard B. Zorn, Senior Assistant Attorney 
 General; John B. Purcell, Jr., Assistant 
 Attorney General, on brief), for appellee 
 Virginia Employment Commission.
 
 		No brief for appellee Navistar International 
 Transportation d/b/a International Truck and 
 Engine Corporation.
 
 
 	Paul E. Groves appeals a final order of the Circuit Court of 
 Chesterfield County affirming the decision of the Virginia 
 Employment Commission (VEC) to disqualify him from receiving 
 unemployment benefits.  Based upon the administrative record of 
 proceedings and argument, the circuit court held that evidence 
 supported the VEC's findings of fact and that the VEC correctly 
 concluded, as a matter of law, that Groves was discharged for 
 misconduct in connection with his work for Navistar International 
 Transportation d/b/a International Truck and Engine Corporation 
 (Navistar) and disqualified for benefits under Code  60.2-618(2).  
 Groves appeals that decision, and he contends the circuit court 
 erred in finding that the VEC properly relied upon Exhibit 9 as 
 part of the record.  Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of 
 the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.  
 Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision.  See 
 Rule 5A:27.
 ISSUES BARRED ON APPEAL
 	Grove lists ten issues on appeal.  However, most of those 
 issues were not presented to the circuit court for its review.  
 Those issues are:  whether the deputy of the VEC erred in finding 
 Groves was qualified for benefits in November 1999; whether the 
 appeals examiner of the VEC erred in affirming the deputy's 
 decision; whether the VEC special examiner erred in allowing a 
 hearing to re-open the case on appeal; whether Navistar showed 
 good cause to re-open the hearing; whether the appeals examiner 
 erred in affirming the deputy's decision; and whether the appeals 
 examiner controlled the order of proof at the April 27, 2000 
 hearing pursuant to 16 VAC 5-80-20.  The record shows that these 
 issues were not raised in the circuit court.  Accordingly, these 
 issues are procedurally barred on appeal.  Whitt v. Race Fork Coal 
 Corp. and Virginia Employment Comm'n, 18 Va. App. 71, 74, 441 
 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1994); Rule 5A:18.  
 BACKGROUND
 	Groves was terminated from employment with Navistar in 
 October 1999 for violating the company's sexual harassment policy.  
 Groves applied for unemployment benefits, and a deputy determined 
 Groves was qualified to receive unemployment benefits.  Navistar 
 appealed that decision, and on December 27, 1999 a hearing was 
 held before an appeals examiner.  Navistar did not appear at the 
 hearing.  The appeals examiner affirmed the decision of the 
 deputy.
 	Navistar appealed the decision of the appeals examiner and 
 requested to re-open the hearing before the appeals examiner.  By 
 letter dated March 10, 2000 the special examiner granted 
 Navistar's request and remanded the case to "First Level Appeals" 
 for the purpose of conducting another hearing "so as to take 
 additional testimony and evidence."  The letter stated, "[T]he 
 record of both hearings shall then constitute the record for the 
 issuance of a new decision." 
 	On April 27, 2000 the second hearing was held before the 
 appeals examiner.  On May 15, 2000, the appeals examiner affirmed 
 the deputy's determination that Groves was qualified to receive 
 unemployment benefits.  Navistar appealed the decision of the 
 appeals examiner to the Commission.  The Commission reversed the 
 decision of the appeals examiner, finding that Groves was 
 disqualified for unemployment compensation.  Groves appealed the 
 Commission's decision to the circuit court, and the circuit court 
 affirmed the decision of the Commission.  Groves filed a motion 
 for reconsideration in the circuit court, which the court denied.  
 Groves appeals the decision of the circuit court.
 	"On review, [we] must consider the evidence in the light most 
 favorable to the finding by the Commission."  Virginia Employment 
 Comm'n v. Peninsula Emergency Physicians, Inc., 4 Va. App. 621, 
 626, 359 S.E.2d 552, 554-55 (1987).  Code  60.2-625 sets forth 
 the standard of "judicial review" for appeals from the decisions 
 of the VEC.  "[I]n such cases . . . the Commission's findings of 
 fact, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, are 
 conclusive."  Lee v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 1 Va. App. 82, 
 85, 335 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1985).  Upon our review, we conclude that 
 the VEC's findings of fact are supported by evidence and are 
 therefore binding on appeal.
 	The evidence showed that Navistar had a written policy 
 prohibiting sexual harassment by employees in the workplace.  
 Groves acknowledged he was aware of the policy.  
 	Groves was a parts sales manager for Navistar.  He had been 
 employed with the company for fifteen years.  On September 29, 
 1999 Misty Gray, who also worked in parts sales, accompanied 
 Groves on a series of sales calls.  Gray had been employed with 
 Navistar for about one and one-half years.  When Groves and Gray 
 returned from the sales calls, other employees of Navistar could 
 see that Gray was upset.  Gray reported that Groves made verbal 
 and physical sexual advances toward her that day.  Gray reported 
 that Groves told her he didn't "mind watching [her] bend over."  
 Gray also stated that Groves later parked the car, kissed her, and 
 touched her despite her protests.
 	John Martinicky, the manager of corporate security for 
 Navistar, interviewed Groves concerning Gray's allegations.  
 Groves admitted to Martinikcy that he told Gray he liked to "watch 
 her bend over."  Gray had indicated that this remark made her feel 
 uncomfortable.  Groves testified at the hearing that he did not 
 recall making the statement to Martinicky that he told Gray he did 
 not mind seeing her bend over.  
 	The special examiner found Groves' credibility was  
 "substantially compromised" and that Gray's testimony was credible 
 concerning the incidents.  He based that finding not only on 
 Gray's testimony at the April 27, 2000 hearing, but also on the 
 fact that she took prompt steps to bring the matter to the 
 attention of management and the police.  The special examiner 
 found that Groves was disqualified for unemployment compensation 
 because he was discharged from work due to misconduct in 
 connection with work.  The special examiner also referenced 
 Exhibit 9, a copy of Martinicky's notes concerning interviews he 
 conducted with Groves and Gray after the incident, in his 
 decision.
 	At the hearing in the circuit court, Groves argued that 
 Exhibit 9 was not properly part of the record for consideration by 
 the special examiner.  In its May 15, 2001 letter opinion, the 
 circuit court found that the issue of whether the special examiner 
 erred in considering Exhibit 9 was not properly before the court 
 because Groves had not pled this issue in his Petition for 
 Judicial Review.  In an alternative finding, the circuit court 
 found that Exhibit 9 was properly part of the record because 
 Groves had ample opportunity to review the documents and because 
 Groves' counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Martinicky, 
 the author of the documents, at the hearing.  Accordingly, the 
 circuit court held that the VEC did not err in considering Exhibit 
 9 as part of the record. 
 ANALYSIS
 I.  Exhibit 9
 	Appellant argues Exhibit 9 was not properly considered by the 
 VEC as part of the record in the case because the page in the 
 transcript of the April 27, 2000 hearing on which the exhibits are 
 listed states:  "(None of the exhibits were officially entered 
 into the record.)."  However, assuming the issue was properly 
 before the circuit court, the record indicates that the documents 
 were accepted by the appeals examiner and that Groves did not 
 object to the admission of Exhibit 9 into the record at the April 
 27, 2000 hearing.  Moreover, Groves' counsel indicated he had "had 
 a chance to review" the document, and he relied on the document in 
 his cross-examination of Martinicky.  At the end of the hearing, 
 the appeals examiner asked Groves' counsel if he had any 
 objections to information that was submitted at the hearing.  
 Groves' counsel replied, "My only objection to . . . the summation 
 of the conversation with Mr. Martinicky is his opinion at the 
 bottom of the last page."  Counsel indicated that he believed the 
 last page of the exhibit contained a sentence regarding 
 Martinicky's opinion that Groves was being untruthful in the 
 interview.  Groves' counsel asked that the appeals examiner 
 disregard that statement only.  When the appeals examiner asked 
 Groves' counsel if he had any other objections, counsel replied, 
 "No, Sir."  The appeals examiner then stated, "I'm going to submit 
 that entire document as Exhibit Number 9 . . . ."  Accordingly, 
 Groves did not object to the exhibit becoming part of the record 
 in the case.  See Rule 5A:18.  
 	Moreover, despite the notation in the transcript that no 
 exhibits were "officially" made part of the record, Exhibit 9 was 
 placed in the VEC's file and became part of the VEC record for 
 purposes of the VEC's determination of the claim.  Furthermore, 
 the March 10, 2000 letter remanding Groves' case to the first 
 level of appeals for the purpose of conducting the second hearing 
 on April 27, 2000 stated that the record of that hearing, in 
 addition to the record of the previous hearing, would constitute 
 the record for the issuance of a new decision.  Therefore, the 
 exhibit was a part of the record and the documents contained 
 therein were properly considered by the VEC in making its findings 
 of fact.  This action of accepting the exhibit into the record, 
 coupled with Groves' admission that he had had an opportunity to 
 review the documents, Groves' use of the documents in 
 cross-examination, and his failure to object to the admission of 
 the documents, indicates that Groves' right to a fair hearing was 
 not denied.  See Snyder v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 23 Va. App. 
 484, 488-89, 477 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1996).  If Groves had chosen to 
 do so, at the April 27, 2000 hearing he could have stated his 
 general objections to the exhibit or statements therein, and 
 offered rebuttal evidence concerning what he contended were 
 inaccuracies in the exhibit.  However, other than the objection to 
 the last page of the document, he did not object to the overall 
 admission of the evidence.  Accordingly, the circuit court did not 
 err in ruling that the VEC properly considered Exhibit 9 as part 
 of the record. 
 II.  Disqualification for Benefits
 	Code  60.2-618(2) provides for disqualification from receipt 
 of unemployment benefits if the VEC finds that the employee was 
 discharged for work misconduct.  "[T]o establish misconduct [the] 
 employer ha[s] the burden of proving that the [employee] 
 deliberately or willfully violated a company rule."  Bell Atlantic 
 v. Matthews, 16 Va. App. 741, 745, 433 S.E.2d 30, 32 (1993).  
 [A]n employee is guilty of "misconduct 
 connected with his work" when he 
 deliberately violates a company rule 
 reasonably designed to protect the 
 legitimate business interests of his 
 employer, or when his acts or omissions are 
 of such a nature or so recurrent as to 
 manifest a willful disregard of those 
 interests and the duties and obligations he 
 owes his employer.  
 Branch v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 219 Va. 609, 611, 249 
 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1978).  "[O]nce the employer has borne [this] 
 burden . . . [it] shifts to the employee to prove circumstances 
 in mitigation of his or her conduct."  Virginia Employment 
 Comm'n v. Gantt, 7 Va. App. 631, 635, 376 S.E.2d 808, 811, aff'd 
 en banc, 9 Va. App. 225, 385 S.E.2d 247 (1989).  Absent evidence 
 to "explain or justify" such misconduct and "show mitigating 
 circumstances, the commission must find that benefits are barred."  
 Id.  "'Whether an employee's behavior constitutes misconduct, 
 however, is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable by this 
 court on appeal.'"  Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., Inc. v. Virginia 
 Employment Comm'n, 24 Va. App. 377, 384, 482 S.E.2d 841, 844 
 (1997) (citation omitted).
 	 The special examiner found that Navistar's policy 
 prohibiting sexual harassment at work was reasonably designed to 
 protect legitimate business interests.  Furthermore, the special 
 examiner believed the evidence presented by Gray and the other 
 Navistar employees and did not accept Groves' testimony denying 
 the incident.  In making the credibility determination, the 
 special examiner pointed to Groves' interview with Martinicky 
 wherein Groves originally admitted that he made the comment to 
 Gray.  The determination of a witness' credibility is within the 
 fact finder's exclusive purview.  See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
 v. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 374, 381, 363 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1987).  The 
 credibility finding is supported by evidence in the record.  
 Furthermore, the special examiner found that Groves occupied a 
 supervisory position with the company which acted as an 
 aggravating circumstance for his conduct.
 	Groves presented no mitigation evidence.  He denied making 
 the comment, and he denied that he touched Gray.  Therefore, we 
 cannot say as a matter of law that Groves met his burden of 
 proving mitigating circumstances.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
 the special examiner's findings of fact as to Groves' credibility, 
 as well as Groves' failure to present sufficient evidence of 
 mitigating circumstances to avoid disqualification for 
 work-related misconduct, are supported by credible evidence.  In 
 light of the evidence presented before the VEC, we cannot say the 
 record as a whole would lead a reasonable mind necessarily to a 
 different conclusion than that reached by the VEC.  
 	Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 
 affirmed.
 											Affirmed.
 
 * Pursuant to Code  17.1-413, this opinion is not 
 designated for publication.