COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
 
 Present:  Judges Koontz, Willis and Senior Judge Hodges
 Argued at Salem, Virginia
 
 DONNA WHITT
 
 v.   Record No. 0969-94-3                                                  OPINION BY
                                                                                                                                             JUDGE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
 ERVIN B. DAVIS & COMPANY, INC. and          MAY 30, 1995
  VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION
 
             FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY
                     Nicholas E. Persin, Judge
 
      Martin Wegbreit (Client Centered Legal Services of Southwest
      Virginia, Inc., on briefs), for appellant.
 
      Thomas R. Scott, Jr. (Terrence Shea Cook; Street, Street,
      Street, Scott & Bowman, on brief), for appellee Ervin B.
      Davis & Company, Inc.
 
      James W. Osborne, Assistant Attorney General (James S.
      Gilmore, III, Attorney General; John Paul Woodley, Jr.,
      Deputy Attorney General; Richard L. Walton, Jr., Senior
      Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee Virginia
      Employment Commission.
 
 
      Donna Whitt (claimant) appeals a decision of the Circuit
 Court of Buchanan County affirming a denial of unemployment
 compensation benefits by the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC)
 on the ground that she had been discharged for misconduct
 connected with her employment with Ervin B. Davis & Company
 (employer).  See Code  60.2-618(2).  Claimant asserts that the
 circuit court erred in finding that the VEC properly determined
 that her poor job performance was the result of a willful
 disregard for the interests of employer.  We disagree and affirm
 the decision of the circuit court.
      Claimant worked as a secretary for employer and during the
 initial term of her employment her job performance was
 satisfactory.  In the final six to eight months of her
 employment, employer noticed a "significant deterioration" in the
 quality of claimant's work product.  Claimant repeatedly made
 similar errors when performing routine duties, which she had
 previously accomplished without error.  Claimant was repeatedly
 counseled about her job performance during this period.
      Three months prior to her termination, claimant was advised
 that her continued employment was contingent upon improvement in
 her job performance.  Claimant's work product continued to be
 unsatisfactory.  On August 20, 1992, claimant's supervisor gave
 her written instructions concerning a specific assignment to be
 performed.  Claimant completed the assignment later that day and
 her work product was checked by the supervisor.  The supervisor
 discovered that claimant had not followed the instructions she
 had been given.  Claimant was offered the opportunity to resign
 or be discharged.  She elected to resign.  
      Claimant's initial application for unemployment benefits was
 denied.  On appeal, the appeals examiner determined that
 claimant's actions were not deliberate, but that her work product
 had deteriorated for "some unknown reason" and awarded benefits. 
 Employer appealed to the VEC, which reversed this determination. 
 The VEC relied primarily upon Craft v. Virginia Employment
 Comm'n, 8 Va. App. 607, 383 S.E.2d 271 (1989), in which this
 Court upheld the denial of benefits following the discharge of a
 bookkeeper, who was subsequently charged with embezzling funds,
 after having been warned by her employer that her performance was
 unacceptable and would need to improve.  The VEC further found
 that no mitigating circumstances of the employment explained the
 decline in claimant's work product.  
      On claimant's appeal, the circuit court affirmed the
 decision of the VEC, finding that Borbas v. Virginia Employment
 Comm'n, 17 Va. App. 720, 440 S.E.2d 630 (1994), distinguished
 unintentional behavior not constituting misconduct from repeated
 or long-term acts of neglect constituting misconduct.  This
 appeal followed.
      The issue presented by this appeal, as it was before the
 circuit court, is whether as a matter of law the VEC properly
 determined that claimant's poor job performance constituted
 misconduct justifying a denial of unemployment benefits.  The
 parties do not dispute that the VEC's findings of fact are
 supported by credible evidence in the record.  Accordingly, those
 facts are conclusive on appeal.  Code  60.2-625; see also Lee v.
 Virginia Employment Commission, 1 Va. App. 82, 85, 335 S.E.2d
 104, 106 (1985).  Under well settled principles, we consider the
 evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of the VEC
 to determine whether employer met its burden of proving that
 claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with her work. 
 See Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Cooper, 14 Va. App.
 701, 704-05, 419 S.E.2d 278, 280 (1992); Virginia Employment
 Comm'n v. Peninsula Emergency Physicians, Inc., 4 Va. App. 621,
 626, 359 S.E.2d 552, 554 (1987).
      In Branch v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 219 Va. 609, 249
 S.E.2d 180 (1978), the Supreme Court established a two-pronged
 test for determining the type of employee misconduct that
 justifies a denial of employment benefits pursuant to Code
  60.2-618:
      [W]hen [the employee] deliberately violates a company
      rule reasonably designed to protect the legitimate
      business interests of his [or her] employer, or when
      [the employee's] acts or omissions are of such a nature
      or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of
      those interests and the duties and obligations he [or
      she] owes his [or her] employer [denial of unemployment
      benefits is proper].
 Id. at 611, 249 S.E.2d at 182.
      The parties agree that our concern here involves only the
 second prong of the Branch definition of misconduct.  A
 deliberate violation of a company rule is not involved.  In this
 context, we agree with claimant that under Branch, when an
 employee is discharged for poor performance, he or she is
 entitled to unemployment compensation unless the employer shows
 that the conduct resulting in the employee's discharge
 constituted acts or omissions of such a nature or so recurrent as
 to manifest willful disregard for the employer's interests.  Id. 
 Moreover, the record must establish that an employee's poor
 performance did not result merely from inexperience or an
 inability to perform the task assigned.  See Borbas, 17 Va. App.
 at 723, 440 S.E.2d at 632 (holding that the record should contain
 evidence that the employee had demonstrated an ability to perform
 adequately).
      We further agree with claimant that in construing Branch,
 this Court has held that absent direct proof of willfulness, the
 VEC must consider both the nature and frequency of the acts from
 which willfulness is inferred.  Israel v. Virginia Employment
 Comm'n, 7 Va. App. 169, 176, 372 S.E.2d 207, 211 (1988).  We
 disagree, however, that both the nature and the frequency of the
 conduct must be detrimental to the employer's interests.  Rather,
 in Israel we held that the facts of the individual case would
 dictate whether individually or in combination, the nature and
 frequency of poor performance were sufficient to support the
 inference of willfulness.  Id.
      Accordingly, we will assume, without deciding, that the
 nature of claimant's conduct was not alone sufficient to support
 an inference of willfulness.  However, in light of claimant's
 prior satisfactory performance of identical duties and the
 provision of counseling and warnings received from employer, we
 hold that the nature of claimant's lapses in satisfactory
 performance, combined with their frequency, supports the VEC's
 determination that the decline in her job performance was the
 result of a willful disregard of the interests of her employer
 and, thus, constituted misconduct connected with her employment.
      Finally, we turn to claimant's further assertion, at oral
 argument of this appeal, that the absence of evidence in the
 record negating alternative explanations for her decline in
 performance prohibited the VEC from concluding that such decline
 was attributable to willfulness rather than some other
 unexplained cause.  We disagree.  Employer established its prima
 facie case by showing that the nature and frequency of claimant's
 lapses in performance were contrary to its interests and, thus,
 inferentially willful.  
      "'[A p]rima facie [case consists of] evidence which on its
 first appearance is sufficient to raise a presumption of fact or
 establish[ed] the fact in question unless rebutted.  It imports
 that the evidence produces for the time being a certain result,
 but that the result may be repelled.'"  Commonwealth v. Dalton,
 11 Va. App. 620, 623, 400 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1991)(habitual
 offender adjudication appeal citing standard for civil
 proceedings)(quoting Babbit v. Miller, 192 Va. 372, 379-80, 64
 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1951)).  Where the party having the burden of
 proof presents a prima facie case, the burden of going forward
 with the evidence shifts to the opposing party.  While the burden
 of proof remains unchanged, the party against whom a prima facie
 case exists can avoid the presumed result only by producing
 evidence to explain to the satisfaction of the trier of fact why
 the prima facie evidence is in error or is otherwise not subject
 to the appropriate standard of law applicable to such facts. 
 Such countervailing evidence is sufficient if it outweighs the
 prima facie case or leaves the ultimate question in equipoise. 
 See Pullen v. Fagan, 204 Va. 601, 604, 132 S.E.2d 718, 720
 (1963)(standard applicable to civil proceedings); Interstate
 Veneer Co. v. Edwards, 191 Va. 107, 113-14, 60 S.E.2d 4, 7-8
 (1950)(same).  
      We hold that the evidentiary rule shifting the burden of
 going forward with the evidence to the opposing party upon
 establishment of a prima facie case by the party with the burden
 of proof applies in quasi-judicial administrative proceedings
 before the VEC.
      Here, the record shows that claimant in fact attempted to
 rebut the employer's claim that her decline in performance was
 attributable to willful indifference to her duties by asserting
 that her duties had become more onerous.  The VEC expressly
 rejected that assertion, finding that her duties had been the
 same throughout her employment.  
      Claimant argues that other explanations, such as personal
 problems, illness, or family problems, might also explain her
 decline in performance and that the absence of evidence in the
 record disproving such explanations defeats the inference of
 willfulness.  We disagree.  It was not part of employer's burden
 of proof to disprove the existence of such causes.  Rather, once
 the burden of going forward with the evidence had shifted to her,
 claimant was required to produce credible evidence of such causes
 to rebut employer's prima facie case.  On appeal, she cannot rely
 on the mere possibility that such explanations might have been
 proven before the commission.  Cf. Fordham v. Commonwealth, 13
 Va. App. 235, 239, 409 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1991)(reasonable
 hypothesis presented on appeal to disprove result of a criminal
 trial must flow from the evidence adduced at trial rather than
 the imagination of the appellant). 
      For these reasons, the decision of the circuit court
 upholding the determination of the VEC is affirmed.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Affirmed.