In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-02-01595-CV
............................
LORETTA ANDERSON, Appellant
V.
THE TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION AND THE CITY OF DALLAS, Appellees
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 298th District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 00-10122-M
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Whittington, Richter and Rosenberg See Footnote 1
Opinion By Justice Richter

This is a summary judgment case. Loretta Anderson appealed the Texas Workforce Commission's (TWC) See Footnote 2 denial of her unemployment benefits by filing suit in district court. The TWC and the City of Dallas filed a joint motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. In a single issue, the appellant argues that she presented substantial evidence to preclude the granting of summary judgment. The facts of this case are well known to the parties, and we do not recite them in detail. Because the issue is well settled, we issue this memorandum opinion. See, Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

The TWC denied appellant's claim for unemployment compensation benefits due to work- related “misconduct”. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 201.012, 207.044 (Vernon 1996). The misconduct included failure to follow direct orders and insubordination. Appellant then properly petitioned for judicial review in the district court. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.201 (Vernon 1996). The trial court granted summary judgment for appellees, the TWC and the City of Dallas.

Standard of Review

The standards for reviewing a “traditional” summary judgment under rule 166a(c) are well established: (1) the movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true; and (3) every inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in its favor. National Cas. Co. v. Lane Exp., Inc., 998 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied), citing Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). A defendant who moves for summary judgment under rule 166a(c) must show that the plaintiff has no cause of action. Id. Once the movant establishes that it is entitled to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show why summary judgment should not be granted. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Seigler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.1995).

Applicable Law

TWC decisions regarding benefit payments are subject to de novo review in which the trial court determines whether substantial evidence supports the TWC's ruling. See, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.202(a) (Vernon 1996); Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 988 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1998)(citing Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986)); Direct Communications, Inc. v. Lunsford, 906 S.W.2d 537, 541 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, no writ); Potts v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 884 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ). The TWC ruling carries a presumption of validity, and the party seeking to set aside the TWC's decision has the burden to show that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Collingsworth, 988 S.W.2d at 708. Under the substantial evidence standard of review, the issue is whether the evidence introduced before the trial court shows facts in existence at the time of the TWC's decision that reasonably support the decision. Id. The reviewing court may not set aside a TWC decision merely because it would reach a different conclusion. Id. It may do so only if it finds that the TWC's decision was made without regard to the law or the facts and therefore was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Id.
The decision of whether the TWC's decision was supported by substantial evidence is a question of law. Direct Communications, Inc., 906 S.W.2d at 541. We review the TWC's decision against the evidence presented to the trial court and the governing law. Direct Communications, Inc., 906 S.W.2d at 542; Potts, 884 S.W.2d at 882. We determine whether the summary judgment evidence established as a matter of law that substantial evidence existed to support TWC's decision. Direct Communications, Inc., 906 S.W.2d at 542; Potts, 884 S.W.2d at 883.

Application of Law to the Facts

Upon review of the record in this case, the evidence of misconduct is clear. The City of Dallas ordered Anderson to sign a medical authorization without any alteration. The evidence is substantial that Anderson signed the authorization, but indicated in writing that she was doing so under protest. The evidence indicates that Anderson noted on the authorization that she was signing not of her own will, but only pursuant to a direct order of her employer which she attached to the authorization. These actions amounted to insubordination, and a failure to follow direct orders.

Conclusion

        Because the record contains substantial evidence that appellant violated a direct order and was insubordinate, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.


                                                          MARTIN RICHTER
                                                          JUSTICE

021595F.P05

Footnote 1 The Honorable Barbara Rosenberg, Former Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, sitting by assignment.

Footnote 2 “TWC” as used in this opinion refers to the administrative agency as a whole, not the three individuals who form the Texas Workforce Commission. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 301.002 (Vernon 1996).

File Date[06/10/2003]
File Name[021595F]
File Locator[06/10/2003-021595F]