STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH
DIVISION
TORAY
PLASTICS (AMERICA), INC.
:
V.
: A.A. 03-121
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND
D
E C I S I O N
LAFAZIA,
J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Toray Plastics
(America) Inc. (hereinafter Toray), filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the
Respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training (hereinafter the
Department), which reversed the decision of the Referee, and thereby awarded
benefits to the claimant Janet Cambra (hereinafter claimant).
The decision is hereby affirmed.
TRAVEL
The claimant was employed for approximately
nine years. She was discharged on July 22, 2003. On July 23, 2003, the claimant
filed for Employment Security benefits.
On
August 8, 2003, the Director determined that the claimant was discharged under
disqualifying circumstances pursuant to the provisions of Section 28-44-18 of
the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The
claimant filed a timely appeal.
A
hearing was held on September 8, 2003 before a Referee. The claimant, her
attorney, and two employer representatives were present.
On September 10, 2003, the Referee affirmed the decision of the Director
concluding that the claimant’s failure to follow the employer’s policy
regarding safety procedures constituted misconduct as claimant was on “Final
Warning.” The Referee denied
benefits. The claim was appealed to
the Board of Review on September 11, 2003.
As
no transcript was available, a de novo hearing was held before the
Board of Review on October 7, 2003. The
claimant, her attorney, the employer’s human resource representative,
production manager and senior production supervisor were present and provided
testimony.
The
Board reversed the Referee and found that the claimant was discharged under
non-disqualifying circumstances and thereby allowed benefits.
Thereafter, Toray filed a complaint for judicial review. Jurisdiction
for review is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The
standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures
Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15.
Judicial review of contested cases.
(g)
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1)
In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2)
In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3)
Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4)
Affected by other error of law;
(5)
Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6)
Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise
of
discretion.
Thus,
on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”
Guarino v. Department of
Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island
General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
Cahoone v. Board
of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503,
246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated
differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable
mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See
also D'Ambra v. Board of Review,
Department of Employment Security,
517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The
Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
.
. . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of
liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as
broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the
circumstances. Of course,
compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of
eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the
legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this
court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on
eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment
Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
DISCUSSION
The
Board of Review made the following findings of fact:
“The
claimant was employed as a machine operator.
On July 22, 2003, the claimant and a co-worker engaged in squirting water
at each other. A supervisor
witnessed her actions. The employer
has a policy, which prohibits certain conduct in the workplace. The policy provides for the termination of the employee in
aggravated cases or in light of an employee’s total employment record.
The co-worker was terminated. The
claimant had previously received a warning from the employer regarding a job
performance issue. That warning
provided that future infractions would constitute grounds for termination. The
claimant was terminated because of her employment record and her actions on July
23, 2003.”
The Board of Review adopted the following
conclusions:
“An
employer has the right to terminate an unsatisfactory worker. In the employer’s view, the claimant was an unsatisfactory
worker. The claimant’s conduct on
July 22, 2003 violated the employer’s safety policy. Violation of safety rules is a ground of separation from the
employer.
However,
the issue in awarding or denying Employment Security benefits is whether the
claimant’s conduct constitutes misconduct…
The burden is on the employer to prove misconduct under §
28-14-18 of the Act. Therefore,
the focus is on whether the claimant’s actions are deliberate in willful
disregard of employers interest or a knowing violation of an enforced rule.”
The
Board of Review went on to conclude:
“The
record …. established that the claimant’s actions were a spontaneous
response to a co-worker’s action …. her response was not proper … however,
it has not been proven that her response was intended to harm the employer’s
interest or that she acted knowingly against the employer safety policy ….
We conclude that the claimant’s conduct was an isolated incident of bad
judgment rather than misconduct…”
The
issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination was supported by
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not
it was clearly erroneous.
Toray
alleges that the legal standards applied by the Board represent a revolutionary
departure from the requirements of the Act and that as a result, the Board’s
decision was affected by an error of law which prejudiced the rights of Toray.
The
standard for defining "misconduct" under section eighteen was provided
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Turner v. Department of Employment
Security, 479 A.2d 740, 741-42 (R.I. 1984), in which the Court quoted from Boynton
Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 259-60, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1940):
'[M]isconduct'
. . . is limited to conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an
employer's interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of
standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his
employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to
manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an
intentional and substantial disregard of the employee's duties and obligations
to his employer. On the other hand
mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the
result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in
isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be
deemed 'misconduct' within the meaning of the
statute.
In all cases of discharge, the burden of
proof to show misconduct in connection with the work on the part of the claimant
rests solely with the employer.
This Court does not accept the analogies put
forth by Toray in its memorandum to reverse the Board’s decision.
A
review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative
and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions, and decision
of the Board of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54.
Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of
proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the
reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of
fraud, the findings of fact by the Board of Review, if supported by substantial
evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.