STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
MICHAEL
TECZAR
V.
: A.A. 02-51
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW
D E C I
S I O N
DEROBBIO,
C.J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Michael Teczar, filed
pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the
respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the
finding of the Referee that the claimant, Michael Teczar was not entitled to
receive employment security benefits.
The
travel of the case is as follows. The
claimant had worked for this employer for approximately seven months.
His last day of work was December 1, 2001. The claimant filed his new claim for Employment Security
benefits on January 28, 2002. In a
decision dated March 13, 2002, the Director determined the claimant voluntarily
left his job without good cause, as provided for under Section 28-44-17 of the
Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The
claimant filed a timely appeal of this decision. A hearing on this appeal was held on April 3, 2002, at which
the claimant appeared and provided testimony.
The claimant was represented by an attorney at the hearing. Three
representatives of the employer appeared and provided testimony.
The
Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security
benefits, based on the determination that claimant left work voluntarily without
good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
28-44-17.
Thereafter,
a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The
Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the
facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision.
Thereafter, Michael Teczar filed a complaint for judicial review;
jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District
Court by Rhode Island General Laws §
28-44-52.
The
standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which
provides as follows:
42-35-15.
Judicial review of contested cases.
(g)
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand
the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have
been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(1)
In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2)
In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3)
Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4)
Affected by other error of law;
(5)
Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative,
and substantial evidence on the
whole
record; or
(6)
Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus,
on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”
Guarino v. Department of
Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island
General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact. Cahoone
v. Board of Review of the
Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968).
Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though
a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See
also D’Ambra v. Board of Review,
Department of Employment Security,
517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The
Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
.
. . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” G.L.1956, §
28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction,
this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its
humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances.
Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an
extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not
intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither
does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed
restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the
act. Harraka v. Board of Review
of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597
(1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that
the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the
claimant left work voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was
clearly erroneous.
The
Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:
“The
claimant had been working as a full-time meat cutter for a local market last on
December 1, 2001. The claimant
voluntarily left that day with notice to his employer.
The claimant voluntarily left this job as he felt that the complaints
which he had registered with his immediate supervisor, the meat market manager,
and the grocery operations manager were not being listened to and that he felt
that he could not continue to work under certain conditions.
The claimant alleges that the employer was guilty of cross contamination
of different types of meat, which is a health code violation.
The claimant indicated that when the grocery operations manager did not
respond to a note containing suggestions on how to improve the conditions within
the meat department, he left his job. On
the last day in question, again the claimant was instructed by the head meat
cutter to perform a duty which the claimant felt was not proper and potentially
illegal. The claimant did not
approach the store manager with his complaints, nor did he approach the Human
Resource Manager with his concerns. Further,
the claimant did not file any complaint with either the Department of Labor or
the Health Department.”
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:
“The
issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with
good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment
Security Act.
Section
28-44-17 reads as follows:
‘28-44-17.
Voluntary leaving without good cause. --
An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be
ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits until he or she establishes to
the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving
had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has
had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in
chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more
employers subject to chapters 42 – 44, of this title.
For the purposes of this section, voluntary leaving work with good cause
shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex.
For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good
cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join
or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement
of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the
temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek
additional work unless good cause
is shown for said failure; provided, however, that the temporary help agency
gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact
the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment
to seek additional work.’
In
the instant case, the claimant last worked for the employer on December 1, 2001.
The claimant voluntarily left his job with notice, but abruptly, over
what he felt were unhealthy work conditions.
The claimant worked as a meat cutter at a local market and felt that he
was being asked to perform certain duties which were in violation of the health
code. While the claimant may have
had some concerns about what he was being asked to do by the head meat cutter,
he did have a responsibility to address these problems with his department head.
The claimant did do this. The
claimant also went outside the chain of command addressing his complaints to the
grocery operations manager, who does not concern himself with these types of
problems. However, the claimant did
approach an individual, the groceries operations manager, who had the authority
to pass the claimant’s alleged complaints to the proper department.
While it is felt the claimant did make a legitimate attempt to discuss
his concerns with management, awarding benefits solely because of this would
give absolute credence to the claimant’s allegation that the employer was
committing illegal acts and health code violations.
The claimant has not presented any documentation to verify this.
The employer, under oath, indicated that they have not been cited for
said violations in the past as described by the claimant. I find that the claimant has not demonstrated good cause in
this instance for leaving his job. I
find that the claimant cannot be allowed benefits on this issue as he has not
shown that he was left without any reasonable alternatives other than to
terminate his employment.”
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for
taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions
of Section 28-44-17, which provides:
“28-44-17.
Voluntary leaving without good cause. --
An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be
ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits until he or she establishes to
the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving
had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has
had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in
chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more
employers subject to chapters 42 – 44, of this title.
For the purposes of this section, voluntary leaving work with good cause
shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex.
For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good
cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join
or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement
of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the
temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek
additional work unless good cause
is shown for said failure; provided, however, that the temporary help agency
gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact
the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment
to seek additional work.”
The approach to be taken in defining “good cause” was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:
To
view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he
terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination
thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act.
This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision
that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.
In
excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate
their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public
interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion
by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer.
However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation
sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to
employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the
conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or
aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.
The
court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be
“under compulsion” or that the reason therefor must be of a “compelling
nature.”
A
review of the entire record demonstrates that there is evidence that is
probative, substantial and reliable that although there were concerns by the
claimant of cross contamination, there is absolutely no other evidence on the
record that gives credence to claimant’s concerns that this condition existed.
The employer was not cited for any violations of the health code.
Claimant did not seek any alternatives when he was asked by the head meat
cutter to clean up everything on the bench.
Transcript
pages 8 and 9:
“Q.
Okay. How come -- what
present -- what -- what precipitated you to quit then?
A.
Um, the head meat cutter came in, and he was in his -- one of his moods,
and, uh, he told me that I was grinding the hamburg, and he told me to clean up
everything that was on the bench, with the hamburg, and there was also pork on
the bench, and you’re not suppose to do that.
Q.
Okay, Well, why did you do -- why did you mix them?
You’re the person doing it. Why
did you mix them?
A.
I didn’t.
Q.
Okay.
A.
I said I’m not doing it.
Q.
What did you tell him?
A.
That’s when I said I quit. I
walked out.
Q.
Did you explain why you weren’t going to do it?
A.
No, I explained it to him before in the past.
Q.
Okay.
A.
And he -- most of the time, he didn’t push me.
(INAUDIBLE) he said fine. I’ll
go do the hamburg. You go do this
then.”
The record shows that the store manager was not advised of
cross-contamination of the meat products. See
pages 21 and 22.
“Q. Okay. You just said this
is the first you heard of it?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Mr. Fabiano ever come to you?
A. No.
Q. Hint that there was a problem in the Meat Department?
A. The only thing he hinted to me was that, uh, Mike was upset that, uh,
the wrapper was leaving early. She
wasn’t working the schedule.
Q. This Michael?
A. This Michael.
Q. Okay. The wrapper, in
the Meat Department, was leaving early?
A. Was leaving early.
Q. Okay.
A. That was the only thing that, um, Bob Fabiano mentioned to me.
Q. Did Mr. Fabi -- Fabiano ever say to you let’s -- let’s -- you
know, save some time, in a couple of weeks, we want to sit down with Michael,
maybe you, him, the head meat cutter; not -- and maybe the head of the Meat
Department to discuss a few things that are going on in that Meat Department?
A. No.”
The issue presented is a question of fact as to the health conditions of
the meat department. However, the
reasons for the claimant’s leaving his employment, without pursuing other
reasonable alternatives at the time he was asked to grind hamburger, did not
rise to a level of good cause for his quitting his employment.
A
review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative
and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision
of the Board of Review.
On
findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The
scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in
its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54.
Scope of judicial review -
Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings.
- The jurisdiction of the reviewing
court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the
findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence
regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision
of the Board was not “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record,” and that said decision was not
“arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.” Rhode
Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Referee
Hearings | Filing an
Appeal | Search Past
Cases | Contact Us |
Board of Review Home
 |
Rhode
Island Board of Review 275 Westminster St., Providence, R.I. 02903-3434 Phone (401) 222-3533 Fax (401) 222-3514 email BOR@dlt.state.ri.us |