STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

LAURIE SOREL :

V. : A.A. 06-89

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :

D E C I S I O N

LaFAZIA, J. This case is before the Court on the appeal of Laurie Sorel (claimant) pursuant to R.I.G.L. 42-35-15 seeking judicial review from an adverse decision of the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training (Department). Benefits were denied to the claimant on the basis that she left work voluntarily without good cause under the provisions of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act (The Act).
FACTS
Claimant was employed by Friendly's Ice Cream as a part-time cook. Her last day of work was April 29, 2006. Claimant worked one day a week on Saturdays. During her shift on April 29, 2006, claimant cut her hand. She was advised to go home due to the bleeding. Claimant did not report back to work the following week nor did she contact her employer. Two weeks later, claimant turned in her uniform and picked up her last check. Claimant held other jobs before, during and after her employment with Friendly's but they were not the subject matter of this claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are 'clearly erroneous'". Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) (citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The Supreme Court, in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 200, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964), has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

DISCUSSION

The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination was supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it is clearly erroneous. The case involves the application and interpretation of the following provision of the Act.
28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. - An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the voluntary quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 - 44 of this title. For the purposes of this section, "voluntarily leaving work with good cause" shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. For the purposes of this section, "voluntarily leaving work without good cause" shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work unless good cause is shown for that failure; provided, that the temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work.

Claimant, in her appeal, states that she is seeking moneys owed as a result of her work at other places of employment; she is not, according to her appeal seeking benefits as a result of her part-time employment at Friendly's (see letter of appeal dated September 25, 2006). Her prior appeal to the Board of Review as well as her appeal to the District Court for judicial review make it clear that she intended to file for benefits as a result of her full-time employment. Although that may now be the position of the claimant, that is not consistent with the information initially provided to the Department. In a telephone interview dated June 29, 2006, the claimant stated the following:
"I am requesting benefits effective 6/18/06. My last day of work was 4/22/06. I quit. On 4/22/06, I cut my hand at work. There was nothing in the first aid kit to bandage my cut. This was the final incident in my mind. I had completely had enough of that place. I went to Miriam Hospital that day to get my hand bandaged. They gave me papers to file for Worker's Compensation, but I have not bothered to send them back. I was scheduled to work on 4/29/06. I called and quit. I never got breaks when I worked there. I worked at the restaurant in the past and quit a couple of times. I only worked on Saturdays because I worked for Aramark the other six days during the week. I just couldn't take it anymore."

Notice of this claim was duly provided to Friendly's Ice Cream. No notice was provided to any other employer.
During the hearing on August 1, 2006, the complainant had the following exchange with the hearing officer:
CLAIMANT: "You can't delete Friendly and include the other … other employers?
HEARING No, I can't, I'm only here to hear this particular case,
OFFICER: the reason why you left this particular job … that's the only thing before me … contact Administrative Benefits if you have any further questions regarding other matters related to your claim.
CLAIMANT: Do you have that number?
HEARING Yes, we'll give it to you upon completion of the
OFFICER: hearing." (Tr. pp. 30-31).

CONCLUSION

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record and that said decision was not arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted abuse of discretion.

The issues raised by the claimant on appeal were not the subject matter of this claim. If the claimant wishes to pursue other avenues of benefits, she was properly advised to contact the Administration Benefits Department. Accordingly, the decision of the Board is affirmed.