STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION
RAYMOND SMITH :
:
:
V. : A.A. 06-68
:
:
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW
DECISION
LaFAZIA,
J. These cases are before the Court on the appeal of Raymond Smith (claimant)
pursuant to R.I.G.L. 42-35-15. Claimant was found ineligible for benefits by
the Director of Labor and Training, the Referee, and the Board of Review (the
Department).
Although both of these cases arise out of one set of facts, the Department scheduled
two hearings and rendered two decisions. Each decision addresses distinct legal
issues as a basis for the denial of benefits. In #06-22906-1, the claimant was
found ineligible based upon the unavailability requirement of § 28-44-12
of the Rhode Island Employment Act (The Act). In #06-2111001, the claimant was
found to have left work voluntarily without good cause within the meaning of
§ 28-44-17 of The Act.
In #06-22906-1 the Board decision is affirmed in part and reversed in part for
the reasons discussed below.
In #06-2111001 the Decision of the Board is affirmed for reasons set forth below.
Benefits are therefore denied.
TRAVEL
The claimant was employed for three years at the Institute for the Practice
and Study of Non-Violence. He earned $35,000 per year. His last day of work
was February 27, 2006. He filed a claim for benefits on March 8, 2006. Benefits
were denied. Appeals were timely filed. On May 1, 2006, hearings on the appeals
were held, at which time the claimant testified on his own behalf. The employer
did not participate. Both decisions were affirmed by the Referee and by the
Board of Review.
RE: 06-2111001
The Board incorporated the following findings of fact:
"The claimant last worked on February 27, 2006, pursuant to a two week
notice of resignation. Because of the number of hours he was working and because
of marital problems and other personal matters
he decided to leave his employment
for stress. The claimant did not consult with any medical doctor prior to leaving
and there is no medical documentation to indicate that he was advised to leave
his job for stressful reasons. He made no attempt to secure a temporary leave
of absence
."
RE: 06-22906-1
The Board incorporated the following findings of fact:
"As of the filing of his claim on March 8, 2006, he was able and available
for full time work. The claimant, however, has failed to demonstrate that he
has been conducting an adequate constant search for suitable work during the
period in which he seeks benefits."
STANDARD OF
REVIEW
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g),
a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision
of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
Thus, on questions
of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings
are 'clearly erroneous'". Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122
R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) (citing Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5)). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board
of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213
(1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though
a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of
Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215
(1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security,
517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The Supreme Court, in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment
Security, 98 R.I. 197, 200, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964), has recognized that a
liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment
Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family." G.L. 1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared
a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek
to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may
in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does
not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class
of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act;
but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of
expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions
of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
The issue before this court is whether the Board's determination was supported
by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or
not it is clearly erroneous.
FACTS
This Court has reviewed the record in its entirety and will address each case
issue separately.
The transcript indicates that the claimant was initially hired as a Providence
Street Worker. When he left, he held the title of Program Manager. According
to the claimant, his initial position "just evolved into" the latter
position. (Tr. p. 2 May 1, 2006). Claimant testified that the job got "extremely
stressful
running to 60, 70, 80 hour weeks". (Tr. p. 7 lines 4-7). Claimant
however, did not seek a reduction in hours nor did any medical doctor advise
him to leave. (Tr. p. 8 lines 5-12).
Eighteen months prior, the claimant had been denied a request for a leave of
absence. (Tr. p. 9 lines 9-19).
Claimant further testified: "There's a high burnout in this particular
job
I'm on crime scenes
24 hours call
any act of violence
I get a phone
call
1:30 in the night
these were not the duties of the Program Manager
for which I had been hired." (Tr. p. 11-12).
DISCUSSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has indicated that employment conditions that
cause or aggravate nervous reactions or produce psychological trauma may constitute
good cause for voluntary termination and receipt of benefits. Harraka v. Board
of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595,
597 (1964).
In Harraka, the Court also emphasized that the Act was intended to provide benefits
to those who leave employment due to circumstances beyond their control. Conversely,
an employee was denied benefits when the Board determined that he did not present
sufficient evidence to establish that he left his job because of work related
stress and tension. D'Ambra v. Board of Review, 517 A.2d 1039, 1040 (R.I. 1986).
In D'Ambra, evidence existed that a physician treated the employee for nerves
and tension but did not advise him to leave his company. Id.
The question of what circumstances constitute good cause for leaving employment
is a mixed question of law and fact. Id. Although Rhode Island has not specifically
addressed the nature of proof necessary to establish stress in a claim under
the Employment Security Act, certainly the claimant must establish proof of
medical treatment and a resulting inability to work. The Court has addressed
the need for physical manifestation and medical treatment in claims for the
negligent infliction of mental distress. (See Plummer v. Aldsol Laboratories,
et al., 568 F.Supp. 920 (1983 U.S. Dist.). In Beulah Seitz v. L & R Industries,
Inc., 437 A.2d 1345 (1981) the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty in screening
claims of psychiatric injuries and the problems caused by a lack of objective
standards. Generally, in other jurisdictions, courts have held that an employee
must present some form of medical evidence that he or she is experiencing sufficient
work related stress in order to qualify for benefits. (See Ohio Valley Medical
Center In. v. Gatson, 996 S.E. 181, W.Va. 1997; Kansas City Power & Light
Co. v. Searcy, 28 S.W.2d 891 Mo.App. 2000); In the Matter of the Claim of Susan
Donnelly, 764 NYS2d 211 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
A review of the undisputed facts would certainly support that the claimant's
job became extremely demanding and stressful and that it was more than the claimant
originally signed on for. Equally undisputed however, is the lack of medical
treatment or documentation indicating that the claimant had to leave his position
because of stress. The indication by claimant, that he had previously treated
with a physician and that he had previously requested a leave of absence is
not sufficient for claimant to meet his burden of proof on this occasion.
Upon careful review, this Court finds that the decision of the Board is supported
by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record and that
said decision was not arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion.
R.I.G.L. 42-35(g)(5)(6). Accordingly, the decision of the Board in case #06-2111001
is hereby affirmed.
In 06-22906-1 the Board found that the claimant had not made a sufficient search
for employment. The record indicates that as of the date on which the claimant
filed for benefits, he was able and available for full-time work. (Tr. p. 18
lines 2-9). In a telephone interview on March 8, 2006, claimant indicates that
he "was researching a program because he was thinking of doing his own
program". (Tr. p. 18, lines 18-25). I am not looking for work because I
want to work on doing my own outreach program. (Tr. p. 19 lines 5-8). At the
subsequent hearing, clamant responded to the following inquiry:
Q. "
so at that point, you were not conducting a job search?"
A. "No
I was so stressed . I wasn't doing anything. (Tr. p. 19). It was
3 to 4 weeks and then I began to search for work." (Tr. p. 20).
Although the record is unclear as to the specific day on which he began his
search for work, it is clear that he had filed several job applications throughout
the month of April. Claimant was actively seeking work as of April 7, 2007.
(See letter dated April 7, 2007).
Upon a careful review of the record the decision of the Board denying benefits
prior to April 7, 2006 is affirmed. The record establishes however that the
claimant was available and was actively seeking employment as of April 7, 2006
and the claimant was therefore eligible for benefits under § 28-44-12 of
the Rhode Island Employment Security Act as of April 7, 2006. As the claimant
was otherwise found ineligible however under § 28-44-17 of the Act, benefits
are denied accordingly.