STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
JOSEPH
SIRAVO :
V. : A.A. 02-127 and A.A. 02-128
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :
D E C I S I O N
QUIRK, J. This
matter is before the Court on the complaints of Joseph Siravo, filed pursuant
to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of the
final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor
and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Joseph
Siravo was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.
The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant was employed for approximately
one year. His last day of work was May 30, 2002. In a Director's decision dated
August 5, 2002, it was determined that the claimant voluntarily left his job
without good cause, within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island
Employment Security Act. A second decision was issued the same day in which
it was determined that the claimant failed to meet the availability requirements
of Section 28-44-12 of the Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal of these
decisions. A hearing on the appeals was held on September 12, 2002 at which
time the claimant, his mother, and three employer representatives appeared and
testified.
The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security
benefits, based on the determination that claimant voluntarily left his job
without good cause and was unavailable for work for medical reasons from May
31, 2002 to July 1, 2002 and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island
General Laws § 28-44-17 and § 28-44-12.
Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board
of Review. The Board determined that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication
of the facts and applicable law, and upheld the Referee's decision. Thereafter,
Joseph Siravo filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review
of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island
General Laws § 28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g),
a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions,
or decisions are:
(1) In violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
Thus, on questions
of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings
are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I.
583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department
of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently,
the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might
have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of
Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra
v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I.
1986).
The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared
a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek
to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may
in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does
not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class
of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act;
but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of
expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions
of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
The issue before
the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's decision was
a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant voluntarily left his
job without good cause and did not meet the availability requirements was supported
by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or
not it was clearly erroneous.
The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:
"The claimant was employed for approximately one year as a custodian by
the Pawtucket School Department. As an accommodation to the needs of the claimant,
a position was created at a certain school where his duties would not be so
demanding. The claimant made no complaints to his employer regarding any inability
to perform those duties prior to his last day of work. Though the claimant alleged
he became ill on his last day of work, he did not report that fact to his supervisor
or anyone else in the employ of the school department.
As a result of becoming frustrated with his job duties, the claimant went to
the administration office in order to advise he was leaving his employment.
Although he wanted to speak to the Director, he decided he did not wish to wait
for him or arrange another date. The claimant represented to the secretary that
he was resigning his position. He was advised that it was necessary to have
a letter in writing, at which time he requested the secretary to prepare it.
Prior to signing the document, the claimant was asked if he was certain, that
he wanted to do that, to which he responded "yes". The resignation
was brought to the superintendent's office where it was accepted and a confirmation
of the resignation was sent to the claimant.
The claimant subsequently attempted to rescind the resignation on Monday, June
3, 2002, but the employer refused to rescind. The claimant returned to the office
approximately a week later with a letter prepared in his own handwriting thanking
the school department for the opportunity and confirming that he was unhappy
working as a janitor.
Medical documentation submitted by the claimant indicates he was under medical
care from May 31, 2002 through July 1, 2002 and unable to work."
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee with regard
to the issue of whether the claimant voluntarily quit his job without good cause:
"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily
with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment
Security Act.
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking
that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section
28-44-17.
In order to show good cause for leaving one's employment, an individual must
either show the job was unsuitable, or that he was placed in a situation which
left him no reasonable alternative but to leave that employment. Based on the
credible testimony, evidence and findings of fact, I find that the claimant
has failed to establish good cause for leaving his employment.
The claimant made no complaints to his employer about the conditions of his
employment prior to leaving that job. No evidence was presented to indicate
that the job was unsuitable, or that the claimant had no reasonable alternative
but to leave that employment. He was dissatisfied with his duties and did not
wish to continue in that employment.
Testimony indicated that he unequivocally had no desire to return to that employment.
Testimony and demeanor indicated that he fully understood the contents of the
letter of resignation which he requested the secretary to prepare. He signed
it even after he was asked if he was certain that that was what he wanted to
do. The claimant made an informed decision to leave his employment but without
good cause.
After due consideration of this matter, I find that the claimant voluntarily
left his job without good cause, within the meaning of the above Section of
the Act and is not entitled to benefits on this issue."
The Board also adopted the following conclusions of the Referee regarding the
issue of whether the claimant met the availability requirements:
"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant is subject to disqualification
under the provisions of Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island Employment Security
Act.
Section 28-44-12 reads as follows:
'28-44-12. Availability and registration for work. - (a) An individual is not
eligible for benefits for any week of his or her partial or total unemployment
unless during that week he or she is physically able to work and available for
work. To prove availability for work, every individual partially or totally
unemployed registers for work and:
(1) Files a claim for benefits within the time limits and with the frequency
and in such manner, in person or in writing, as the director may prescribe;
(2) Responds whenever called for work through the employment office; and
(3) Makes an active, independent search for suitable work.
(b) If an unemployed
individual has been determined to be likely to exhaust regular benefits and
to need reemployment services pursuant to a profiling system established by
the director, the individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect
to any week only if the individual participates in reemployment services, such
as job search assistance services, unless the director determines that:
(1) The individual has completed those services; or
(2) There is justifiable cause for the individual's failure to participate in
those services.
(c) No individual
shall be eligible for any benefits for any week in which he or she fails, without
good cause, to comply with the requirements as set forth above.'
In order to be eligible for Employment Security benefits, an individual must
be able and available for work and substantially attached to the labor market.
Medical documentation provided by the claimant indicates that he was not able
and available for work because he was under medical care as of the effective
date of his claim through July 1, 2002. Further documentation was presented
by the claimant concerning his release to full employment. Under these circumstances,
I find that the claimant fails to meet the availability requirements of the
above Section of the Act and is, therefore, not entitled to benefits."
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking
that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section
28-44-17, which provides:
28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. -- An individual who leaves
work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit
or benefits for the week in which the voluntary quit occurred and until he or
she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent
to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight
(8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly
wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment
for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 -- 44, of this title. For the
purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include
sexual harassment against members of either sex. For the purposes of this section,
voluntarily leaving work without good cause shall include voluntarily leaving
work with an employer to accompany, join or follow his or her spouse in a new
locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse in a new locality
in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary
employee to contact the temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent
work assignment to seek additional work unless good cause is shown for said
failure; provided, that the temporary help agency gave written notice to the
individual that the individual is required to contact the temporary help agency
at the completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work.
The approach to
be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964 in Harraka v.
Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200
A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause
would be adopted:
To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he
terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination
thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion,
amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not
contemplate at the time of its enactment.
In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate
their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public
interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion
by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However,
the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently
liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees
who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions
thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous
reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.
The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be
"under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling
nature."
A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative
and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision
of the Board of Review.
This case involves an adult individual who, according to his mother, is mentally
challenged due to a genetic disorder and low I.Q. It appears throughout the
period of employment the claimant had some degree of difficulty performing the
required tasks of his job. It appears the employer made certain accommodations
for the purpose of enhancing the claimant's prospect for successfully performing
his job including agreeing to allow a job coach to be provided by claimant to
supervise him on a daily basis (coach never retained) and transferring claimant
to the smallest elementary school in the system to diminish the demand placed
on claimant. This transfer was also made because the principal of the school,
and therefore one of claimant's supervisors, was a certified special education
teacher, there was a large special education population in the school and teachers
who would be aware of individual needs. The job itself did not exist but was
created specifically for claimant.
It is claimant's position, in this appeal, that the employer should not have
accepted claimant's resignation without contacting his mother first. Testimony
revealed that claimant's mother viewed her role to be claimant's advocate, that
she had spoken to a school committee member on several occasions regarding claimant's
job, and that on one occasion she had spoken to a representative of the employer,
Superintendent Dr. Hans Dellith. Although claimant stated at the time he submitted
the written resignation that he did not care what his mother thought, once she
did learn of the resignation claimant then wanted to rescind it and get his
job back.
The issue, therefore, is whether there is any legal authority to sustain claimant's
position that, under the unique circumstance of this case, the employer's acceptance
of the resignation and refusal to rescind it amounts to constructive discharge.
The claimant has not cited any such legal authority in support of this position.
The record is clear that claimant signed a resignation letter on May 31, 2002.
Later in the date the letter was reviewed by the Superintendent of Schools who
issued a written acknowledgment which was sent by mail to claimant that day.
Claimant returned to the employer the following week and attempted to obtain
his job back and also ask an employee to describe the procedure to be followed
for filing a claim for a work related injury. Subsequent to these events claimant
sent a handwritten letter to his former supervisors thanking them for the opportunity
to work for the Pawtucket School Department and indicating that although he
liked to work, the work hours of 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. were not appropriate
for him because he loved sports and the work schedule conflicted with the schedule
for televised sports. He also indicated that he needed time to reflect on his
past thirty years of life.
This evidence, along with the testimony and demeanor of claimant at the hearing,
lead the Referee to conclude the claimant "unequivocally had no desire
to return to work" and that "he fully understood the contents of the
letter of resignation which he requested" be prepared for him.
The record is devoid of any evidence that claimant's mother had any legal status
as advocate, guardian or similar status which would prohibit claimant from voluntarily
leaving his job or compel the employer to refuse to accept a resignation unless
claimant's mother was made aware that it was tendered. Lacking any such evidence
the Court is constrained to agree with the Referee and the Board of Review that
the claimant voluntarily left his job without good cause making him ineligible
for benefits.
Further, claimant presented to the employer the medical report of Dr. Frederick
S. Crisafulli dated June 5, 2002 which indicated claimant was to remain out
of work from May 31, 2002 to July 1, 2002. He was, therefore, unavailable for
work during this period and no evidence was presented to support a conclusion
that he was available for less strenuous work.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which
in its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings.
- The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of
law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review,
if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules,
shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the
Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not
"arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.