STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

McLOUGHLIN, J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Patricia Sherman, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which reversed the finding of the Referee that the complainant, Patricia Sherman was entitled to receive employment security benefits.

The facts and travel of the case are as follows. The claimant's last day of work for this employer was May 15, 1998. On July 2, 1998 the Director determined that the claimant had refused an offer of work without good cause under the provisions of Section 28-44-20 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. On July 3, 1998 the claimant filed an appeal.

A hearing was held before a Referee on August 6, 1998. The claimant, her witness, the employer and employer's witness were present. On August 12, 1998 the Referee found that the claimant had not refused suitable work and, therefore, the claimant was not subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-20 of the Act. On August 13, 1998 the employer appealed to the Board of Review.

A hearing was held before the full Board of Review on October 14, 1998. The claimant, her attorney, two employer representatives and the employer's attorney were present.

On June 8, 1998 the claimant was contacted in the late afternoon and offered an assignment to begin on June 9, 1998. The employer advised the claimant that the wage was $8.00 per hour and that she would be starting the following day at 8:00 a.m. The claimant indicated she would accept the assignment. The employer informed the claimant that the employer would call her right back after confirming the arrangement with the client.

The employer called the client company to inform it that the claimant had accepted the position, and to see if the claimant was acceptable to the client. At the completion of the telephone conversation with the client, the claimant was deemed acceptable. The employer then attempted to contact the claimant to inform her that she had been accepted by the client. For the next three hours the employer attempted to call the claimant, but the claimant's line was busy. The employer's last call on June 8, 1998 was at approximately 7:30 p.m. On the morning of June 9, 1998 the employer called the claimant's phone, but the call went unanswered. The employer canceled the assignment with the client. On June 9, 1998 at approximately 2:15 p.m. the claimant called the employer to inform it that her phone had malfunctioned and that she was not interested in any position paying less than $11.00 an hour.

The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the complainant was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record or whether or not it was clearly erroneous.

The Board held:

The issue whether the claimant refused an offer of suitable work without good cause under the provisions of Section 28-44-20 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act is the gravamen to be decided.

 

Although there is conflicting testimony, the credible evidence established that the claimant accepted a position subject to the condition that she was acceptable to the client employer. Shortly after accepting the position, the claimant had second thoughts about the compensation and, thereafter, made herself available to the employer.

 

The claimant was aware that the employer would call her back shortly. However, the claimant's phone malfunctioned until approximately 2:30 p.m. the following day. When she finally called the employer about the position, she informed the employer that she would not accept a position for less than $11.00. Based on the record before the Board, the Board concludes that the claimant purposely avoided the employer's calls because she did not want to work for a wage of $8.00 per hour. The claimant refused an offer of suitable work.

 

The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:

42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of

fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or

remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse

or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant

have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

 

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence on the

whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse

of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion.

 

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).

The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:

. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.