STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
SUSAN
ROZZERO
V.
: A.A. 03-88
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND TRAINING,
BOARD OF REVIEW
D
E C I S I O N
DEROBBIO,
C.J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Susan Rozzero, filed
pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the
respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the
finding of the Referee that the claimant, Susan Rozzero, was not entitled to
receive employment security benefits and that recovery of wrongfully paid
benefits would not defeat the purposes of the Act.
The
travel of the case is as follows. The
claimant had previously been in receipt of Employment Security benefits. She subsequently reopened her claim and continued to receive
Employment Security benefits. In a
decision dated May 9, 2003, the Director determined that the claimant did not
meet the availability requirements under the provisions of Section 28-44-12, and
the claimant was declared overpaid under the provisions of Section 28-42-68 of
the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The
claimant filed a timely appeal. A
hearing on the appeal was scheduled. A
Notice of Hearing was sent to all interested parties.
The hearing was held on June 2, 2003.
The claimant appeared and testified. The claimant’s testimony is in
conflict with her prior statements of record and evidence of record.
The
Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security
benefits, based on the determination that claimant did not meet the requirements
of availability; and further, benefits were subject to recovery pursuant to
28-42-68.
Thereafter,
a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review.
The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper
adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision.
Thereafter, Susan Rozzero filed a complaint for judicial review;
jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District
Court by Rhode Island General Laws §
28-44-52.
The
standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which
provides as follows:
42-35-15.
Judicial review of contested cases.
(g)
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand
the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have
been prejudiced because the administrative findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2)
In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3)
Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4)
Affected by other error of law;
(5)
Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative,
and substantial evidence on the
whole
record; or
(6)
Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus,
on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”
Guarino v. Department of
Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island
General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact. Cahoone
v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503,
246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated
differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable
mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See
also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department
of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The
Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
.
. . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” G.L.1956, §
28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction,
this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its
humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances.
Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an
extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not
intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither
does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed
restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the
act. Harraka v. Board of Review
of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597
(1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that
the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the
claimant did not meet the availability requirements of 28-44-12, and that
benefits paid were subject to recovery pursuant to 28-42-68 was supported by
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not
it was clearly erroneous.
The Board of Review adopted the
following findings of fact of the Referee:
“The
claimant was hired by Contenti Company and worked for this employer one day on
March 31, 2003. She was scheduled
to work for the remainder of that week. The
claimant, however, was disenchanted with the job and notified the employer that
she needed time off for personal reasons. The
claimant took the time off in order to seek other employment.
She reopened her claim for Employment Security benefits during this
period at issue indicating that she was unemployed from this employer due to a
lack of work status. The employer
instead notified the Department that the claimant had taken time out on her own. The claimant had an interview with the Department of Labor
and Training and during that interview, indicated that she took the time out due
to family illness. The claimant now
alleges that that representation was false and she was actually seeking other
employment. The claimant
subsequently returned back to this employer on April 21, 2003 when she was not
successful securing other employment.”
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:
“The
first issue in this case is whether or not the claimant meets the availability
requirements under the provisions of Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island
Employment Security Act for the period at issue.
The
evidence presented establishes that in this particular case, work was available
to the claimant with this employer but it was the claimant that decided not to
work for this employer because she desired to seek other employment.
The claimant, therefore, does not meet the availability requirements
under the provisions of Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island Employment Security
Act.
The
second issue in the case is whether or not the claimant is overpaid and subject
to recovery of the overpayment under the provisions of Section 28-42-68 of the
Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
28-42-68.
RECOVERY OF ERRONEOUSLY PAID BENEFITS. -
(a) Any individual who, by reason of a mistake or misrepresentation made by
himself or another, has received any sum as benefits under chapters 42 -- 44, in
any week in which any condition for the receipt of the benefits imposed by those
chapters was not fulfilled by him or her, or with respect to any week in which
he or she was disqualified from receiving those benefits, shall in the
discretion of the director be liable to have such that sum deducted from any
future benefits payable to him or her under those chapters, or shall be liable
to repay to the director for the employment security fund a sum equal to the
amount so received, plus, if the benefits were received as a result of
misrepresentation or fraud by the recipient, interest thereon at the rate set
forth in section 28-43-15. That sum shall be collectible in the manner provided in
section 28-43-18 for the collection of past due contributions.
All interest received hereunder shall be credited to the unemployment
security interest fund created by section 28-42-75.
(b)
There shall be no recovery of payments from any person who, in the
judgment of the director, is without fault on his or her part and where, in the
judgment of the director, that recovery would defeat the purpose of chapters 42
-- 44 of this title.
In
order for an overpayment to be not recoverable from the claimant it must be
established that: (1) the overpayment is not as a direct result of fault on the
part of the claimant, and (2)
recovery of the amount would defeat the purpose of the Rhode Island Employment
Security Act. Both aspects must be
satisfied in order for the department to be barred from recovery.
The
evidence presented on this issue establishes that the claimant is in fact
overpaid and that the overpayment is as a result of misrepresentation on the
part of the claimant when she first reopened her claim indicating that she was
unemployed due to a lack of work status from this employer. In addition, that situation was further compounded when the
claimant gave false statements to the Department of Labor and Training regarding
her reason for not working for this employer.
I hold that the overpayment is subject to recovery in accordance with the
provisions of Section 28-42-68 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.”
In the appeal from the decision of the Board of Review, the claimant
alleges that she was unhappy with the job because she was not paid the hourly
wages agreed upon, and that the working conditions were unsatisfactory.
There
is evidence on the record to substantiate the findings of fact of the Referee,
as adopted by the Board of Review, that the claimant worked for her employer for
one (1) day, March 13, 2003, and was scheduled to work for the remainder of the
week. The following day the
claimant notified the employer that she needed time off for personal reasons.
During this period of time, she reopened her claim for unemployment
benefits and indicated that her leaving was due to family illness.
During the hearing, she indicated that this allegation was false and that
she was seeking other employment.
The
record shows that she returned to her employer on April 21, 2003.
A
review of the entire record supports the findings and conclusions that the
claimant left her employment voluntarily to seek other employment; however, work
was available to her during this period of time.
Since work was available and, as a matter of fact is demonstrated by her
return to the same employer, the facts demonstrate that she did not meet the
availability requirements of Section 28-44-12.
On
the second issue of recovery of wrongfully paid benefits pursuant to 28-42-68,
the findings and conclusions, supported by the evidence, are that the claimant
knowingly gave false and misleading statements to the Department of Labor and
Training for her not working for this employer.
Therefore, the overpayment is as a direct result of fault on the part of
the claimant.
In
this case, recovery of wrongfully paid benefits would not defeat the purposes of
the Act.
A
review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative
and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision
of the Board of Review.
On
findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The
scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in
its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54.
Scope of judicial review -
Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. -
The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law,
and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if
supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules,
shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision
of the Board was not “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record,” and that said decision was not
“arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.” Rhode
Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.