Case 03-09 Rosa vs. State of RI

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

YANGTSE L. ROSA

V. A.A. 03-09

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND : TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW

D E C I S I O N

DEROBBIO, C.J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Yangtse L. Rosa, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws з 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Yangtse L. Rosa was not entitled to receive employment security benefits. The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant had been in receipt of Employment Security benefits during the periods at issue; weeks ending March 2, 2002 through August 24, 2002. Subsequently in two separate decisions dated September 26, 2002, the Director determined that the claimant did not meet the availability requirements under the provisions of Section 28-44-12 and the claimant was declared overpaid under the provisions of Section 28-42-68 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal. A hearing on the appeal was scheduled. A notice of hearing was sent to all interested parties. The hearing was held on October 30, 2002. The claimant appeared and testified. The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant failed to meet the availability requirements of the Act and was overpaid benefits and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws зз 28-44-12 and 28-42-68. Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The Board determined that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee's decision. Thereafter, Yangtse L. Rosa filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws з 28-44-52. The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws з 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows: 42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases. (g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; (4) Affected by other error of law; (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws з 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986). The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act: . . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, з 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant failed to meet the availability requirements of the Act and further that the claimant was overpaid was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous. The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee: "The claimant had filed her claim for Employment Security benefits and was in receipt of benefits during this period at issue. Initially the claimant was disqualified from eligibility because she did not provide a medical and because she did not provide the Department of Labor and Training with proof of a work search. In her appeal she did provide a medical indicating she was fully able and available for work pending the delivery of her child. However, at the hearing the claimant could not provide specific evidence or a specific list of place [sic] contacted during her work search activities or specific dates of contact. During these periods at issue the claimant utilized the Tele-Serve-system indicating that she was seeking full-time work during each of these weeks at issue."

The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:

"The first issue in this case is whether or not the claimant meets the availability requirements under the provisions of Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. In order to be eligible for Employment Security benefits an individual must be able and available for work and demonstrate that availability by conducting an active independent search for work during each week in which benefits are claimed. The evidence presented establishes that although the claimant is able and available for work she has not demonstrated that availability by conducting an active independent search for work. The burden of establishing an active independent search for work rests solely upon the claimant. In the absence of evidence to establish that she was conducting an active independent search for work during each of these weeks at issue, I must find that she does not meet the availability requirements under the provisions of Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

The second issue in this case is whether or not the claimant is overpaid and subject to recovery of the overpayment under the provisions of Section 28-42-68 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

The evidence presented on this issue establishes that the claimant is in fact overpaid as she indicated she was conducting an active independent search for work. She could not provide evidence of that active independent search for work during this five months period at issue. I hold that the claimant is overpaid in the amounts at issue and subject to recovery of the overpayment in accordance with provisions of Section 28-42-68 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act."

The issue in this case is a question of fact.

A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review. On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides: 28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws з 42-35-15(g)(5)(6). Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.