STATE
OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
VANESSA
C. RICHARDS
V.
:
A.A. 03-59
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF
REVIEW
D E C I
S I O N
DEROBBIO,
C.J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Vanessa C. Richards,
filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the
respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the
finding of the Referee that the claimant, Vanessa C. Richards was not entitled
to receive employment security benefits.
The
travel of the case is as follows. The
claimant was employed for two and one-half years.
Her last day of work was January 9, 2003. She filed a claim for
Employment Security benefits on January 15, 2003.
In a Director’s decision dated February 24, 2003, it was determined
that the claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause within the meaning
of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal of that decision.
A hearing on the appeal was held on March 20, 2003, at which time the
claimant appeared and testified.
The
Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security
benefits, based on the determination that claimant voluntarily left her job
without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General
Laws §
28-44-17.
Thereafter,
a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review.
The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper
adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision.
Thereafter, Vanessa C. Richards filed a complaint for judicial review;
jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District
Court by Rhode Island General Laws §
28-44-52.
The
standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which
provides as follows:
42-35-15.
Judicial review of contested cases.
(g)
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand
the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have
been prejudiced because the administrative findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2)
In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3)
Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4)
Affected by other error of law;
(5)
Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative,
and substantial evidence on the
whole
record; or
(6)
Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus,
on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”
Guarino v. Department of
Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island
General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact. Cahoone
v. Board of Review of the
Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968).
Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though
a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See
also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department
of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The
Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
.
. . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” G.L.1956, §
28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction,
this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its
humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances.
Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an
extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not
intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither
does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed
restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the
act. Harraka v. Board of Review
of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597
(1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that
the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the
claimant left work voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was
clearly erroneous.
The
Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:
“The
claimant was employed for two and one-half years as a telemarketer. During her
shift on January 9, 2003 several supervisors were discussing the need for
increased sales and made certain remarks that the claimant felt were directed at
her concerning her lack of productivity. There
were approximately 25 sales people in the room besides the claimant.
One of the supervisors stated in the claimant’s immediate area that it
had 25 sales but they needed a 26th sale.
The claimant believes the statement was directed at her since she had no
sales at that point during the shift. The
claimant made no direct complaint to those supervisors or any supervisor on the
floor during that shift. The
claimant indicated to her immediate supervisor that she had a headache and left
early. The claimant contacted her
general manager on January 11, 2003 before her shift indicating that she had a
complaint. The claimant was asked
to come to the office to discuss her complaint.
In the meantime the manager discussed the situation with the supervisors
who were present at the shift. Both
persons denied the allegations made by the claimant and after further discussion
the manager indicated she did not believe the matter to be serious and advised
the claimant to return to work, whereupon the claimant asked for her check and
left the premises but did not report to her scheduled shift.
Prior to this incident the claimant had no other complaints except for
one incident which occurred several months previous, which incident was resolved
at that time.”
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:
“The
issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with
good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment
Security Act.
An
individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that
action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section
28-44-17.
In
order to show good cause for leaving one’s employment an individual must
either show the job was unsuitable or that she was placed in a situation which
left her no reasonable alternative but to leave that position. The burden of proof to show good cause rests solely upon the
claimant. Based on the credible
testimony, findings of fact, and the circumstances in this case, I find that the
claimant has not met her burden of proof. I
do not find that the incident in question was an issue of such a nature as to
cause the claimant’s job to become unsuitable or present her with no
alternative but to leave that employment. I,
therefore, find that the claimant voluntarily left her employment without good
cause within the meaning of the above Section of the Act and is, therefore, not
entitled to benefits.”
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for
taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions
of Section 28-44-17, which provides:
“28-44-17.
Voluntary leaving without good cause. --
An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be
ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the
voluntary quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of
the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight
(8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at
least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this
title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to
chapters 42 – 44 of this title. For
the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall
include sexual harassment against members of either sex.
For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good
cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join
or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement
of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the
temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek
additional work unless good cause
is shown for said failure; provided, that the temporary help agency gave written
notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact the
temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment to
seek additional work.”
The approach to be taken in defining “good cause” was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:
To
view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he
terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination
thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act.
This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision
that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.
In
excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate
their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public
interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion
by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer.
However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation
sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to
employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the
conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or
aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.
The
court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be
“under compulsion” or that the reason therefor must be of a “compelling
nature.”
A
review of the entire record demonstrates there is substantial, reliable, and
probative evidence that the claimant left work and did not report to work for
the following schedule. The record
does not demonstrate the employment became unsuitable or that she had no other
reasonable alternatives.
A review of the
entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable
evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board
of Review.
On
findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The
scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in
its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54.
Scope of judicial review -
Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. -
The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law,
and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if
supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules,
shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision
of the Board was not “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record,” and that said decision was not
“arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.” Rhode
Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5)(6).