STATE
OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
KEITH
B. RAYMOND
V.
: A.A. 03-38
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF
REVIEW
D
E C I S I O N
DEROBBIO,
C.J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Keith B. Raymond,
filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the
respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the
finding of the Referee that the claimant, Keith B. Raymond was not entitled to
receive employment security benefits.
The
travel of the case is as follows. The
claimant last worked on October 5, 2001. The
claimant reopened his claim for Employment Security benefits on November 7,
2002. In a decision dated December
9, 2002, the Director determined the
claimant voluntarily left his job without good cause, as provided for under
Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. It was further noted that the claimant was declared overpaid
for benefits received for the weeks ending March 2, 2002 through November 16,
2002 in the amount of $5,472.00 for which restitution is sought under Section
28-42-68 of the Employment Security Act. The
claimant filed a timely appeal of this decision.
A hearing on this appeal was held on January 14, 2003, at which the
claimant appeared and provided testimony. The
employer testified by telephone.
The
Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security
benefits, based on the determination that claimant left work voluntarily without good cause and was liable for repayment of overpaid
benefits to the claimant and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island
General Laws Sections 28-44-17 and 28-42-68.
Thereafter,
a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review.
The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper
adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision.
Thereafter, Keith B. Raymond filed a complaint for judicial review;
jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District
Court by Rhode Island General Laws §
28-44-52.
The
standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which
provides as follows:
42-35-15.
Judicial review of contested cases.
(g)
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand
the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have
been prejudiced because the administrative findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2)
In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3)
Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4)
Affected by other error of law;
(5)
Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative,
and substantial evidence on the
whole
record; or
(6)
Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus,
on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”
Guarino v. Department of
Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island
General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact. Cahoone
v. Board of Review of the
Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968).
Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though
a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See
also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department
of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The
Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
.
. . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” G.L.1956, §
28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction,
this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its
humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances.
Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an
extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not
intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither
does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed
restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the
act. Harraka v. Board of Review
of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597
(1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that
the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the
claimant voluntarily left his employment without good cause and was erroneously
paid unemployment compensation benefits was supported by reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly
erroneous.
A
majority of the Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the
Referee:
“The
claimant had been working as an oiler for an out-of-town employer last on
October 5, 2001. At that time the
claimant was arrested and incarcerated for a previous legal issue. The claimant was released February 7, 2002.
The claimant did not inform his employer of his absence, however he did
have a relative contact his local union business agent/hiring hall to notify
them that he would be unable to report to work.
When the claimant was released from [sic] in February 2002, he did not
report back to this previous employer, rather he reported to his hiring hall and
was not given any referrals.
When
the claimant reopened his claim on February 2, 2002, the claimant indicated he
was laid off due to a lack of work, as he had not received any referrals from
his union hiring hall in February 2002. As
a result of this information, his claim was processed and he received benefits
in the amount of $5,472.00 for weeks ending March 2, 2002 through November 16,
2002. The claimant had not informed
the Department of Labor and Training at the time of his filing in February 2002
concerning the issue of his separation in October 2001.
The Department feels the claimant is at fault in creating this
overpayment and as such, is requesting restitution in said amount, as provided
for under Section 28-42-68 of the Employment Security Act.”
A majority of the Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of
the Referee:
“The
first issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily
with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island
Employment Security Act.
Section
28-44-17 reads as follows:
‘28-44-17.
Voluntary leaving without good cause.
--
An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be
ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the
voluntary quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of
the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight
(8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at
least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this
title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to
chapters 42 -- 44 of this title. For
the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall
include sexual harassment against members of either sex.
For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good
cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join
or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement
of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the
temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek
additional work unless good cause is shown for said failure; provided, that the
temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual
is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most
recent work assignment to seek additional work.’
In
the instant case, the claimant last worked on October 5, 2001. The claimant was incarcerated shortly thereafter and remained
so through February 7, 2002 upon his release.
The claimant did not notify the employer as to the reason why he could
not return to work. He did notify
his union hall concerning this issue. I
find that the claimant’s separation in this instance is considered to be
without good cause. The claimant in
effect contributed to his own separation because of previous legal matters
resulting in his arrest and subsequent incarceration and an inability to report
to work. The claimant’s leaving
in this instance is considered to be a voluntary quit without good cause, as he
has not demonstrated job unsuitability. Therefore,
the claimant cannot be allowed benefits in this issue.
The
second issue in this case is whether or not the claimant is overpaid Employment
Security Benefits and subject to recovery under the provisions of Section
28-42-68 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
28-42-68. Recovery of erroneously
paid benefits. -- (a) Any individual who, by reason of a mistake or
misrepresentation made by himself, herself, or another, has received any sum as
benefits under chapters 42 -- 44, of this title, in any week in which any
condition for the receipt of the benefits imposed by those chapters was not
fulfilled by him or her, or with respect to any week in which he or she was
disqualified from receiving those benefits, shall in the discretion of the
director be liable to have that sum deducted from any future benefits payable to
him or her under those chapters, or shall be liable to repay to the director for
the employment security fund a sum equal to the amount so received, plus, if the
benefits were received as a result of misrepresentation or fraud by the
recipient, interest thereon at the rate set forth in subsection 28-43-15.
That sum shall be collectible in the manner provided in subsection
28-43-18 for the collection of past due contributions.
All interest received hereunder shall be credited to the unemployment
security interest fund created by subsection 28-42-65.
(b)
There shall be no recovery of payments from any person who, in the
judgment of the director, is without fault on his or her part and where, in the
judgment of the director, that recovery would defeat the purpose of chapters 42
-- 44 of this title.
In
determining whether an individual is overpaid requiring restitution a finding of
fault must be made. Fault is
establishing on the part of the claimant that they in some way contributed to
the creation of the overpayment. The
claimant became unemployed in October, 2001 because of an incarceration and a
subsequent inability to report to work. When
the claimant was released in February 2002 he filed his claim for benefits checking with his hiring hall, and
since he did not receive any job referrals the claimant indicated he was laid
off due to a lack of work. The
claimant was not completely forthcoming with the information concerning his
separation in October 2001 and as a result his claim was processed and he was
paid benefits in the amount of $5,472.00. I
find that since the claimant did not fully disclose the information surrounding
his separation in October 2001, the claimant is considered to be at fault in
this matter and, as such, is liable to make restitution in the amount of
$5,472.00, as provided for under Section 28-42-68 of the Employment Security
Act.”
A review of the entire record demonstrates that the issue in this case is
one of fact. There is sufficient
evidence to demonstrate on the record that a majority of the Board concluded
that the leaving was voluntary. Incarceration
is not good cause. His voluntary
actions caused this incarceration.
A
review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative
and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision
of the Board of Review.
On
findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The
scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in
its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54.
Scope of judicial review -
Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. -
The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law,
and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if
supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules,
shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision
of the Board was not “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record,” and that said decision was not
“arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.” Rhode
Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly,
the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.