STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

DOROTHY L. PHILLIPS :

V. : A.A. 00-87

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW

D E C I S I O N

DEROBBIO, C.J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Dorothy L. Phillips, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which reversed the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Dorothy L. Phillips was entitled to receive employment security benefits.
The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant was employed for approximately 11 months. Her last day of work was March 21, 2000. She filed a claim for Employment Security benefits on March 22, 2000.
On April 7, 2000 the Director determined that the claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act and benefits were denied. On April 10, 2000 the claimant filed an appeal of this decision denying her benefits.
A hearing was held before a Referee on April 25, 2000. The claimant and the employer's general manager were present and provided testimony and argument. On April 26, 2000 the Referee reversed the decision of the Director and benefits were allowed. On April 27, 2000 the employer appealed to the Board of Review.
A hearing was held before the full Board of Review on May 31, 2000. The claimant and the employer's general manager were again present.
The Board determined that the Referee's decision was not a proper adjudication of the facts, and reversed the Referee's decision. Thereafter, Dorothy L. Phillips filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court " . . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L. 1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's decision was not a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.
A majority of the Board of Review made the following findings of fact:
"In February of 2000 the claimant was offered a promotional position to become a site supervisor, after a 30-day trial period. At the time of the offer, the claimant was paid $7.25 for the 30-day trial period. There was no offer of an amount after the 30-day trial period, but the claimant assumed that she would be making the same as the previous site supervisor.

The claimant began the 30-day trial period on February 14, 2000. On or about March 7, 2000 the claimant informed the employer that she would require compensation of $8.50 in order to assume the role of site supervisor. The employer informed the claimant that that compensation was not available. On March 8, 2000 the employer sent a letter to the claimant in which it indicated that the employer would not be able to meet her request for compensation for site supervisor but would offer the claimant employment as a security officer. The claimant did not respond and the employer did not place the claimant on any work schedule after March 21, 2000."

A majority of the Board of Review made the following conclusions:
"The issue in this case is whether the claimant left work voluntarily with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

In order to establish good cause under Section 28-44-17 of the Act, the claimant must show that the job was unsuitable or that she had no other alternative but to quit.

The record of proceedings, which includes the official file and the testimony before the Referee and Board, established that the claimant left work over a dispute in pay. The record is clear that the claimant was not made an offer of a specific wage increase when she began the 30-day trial period as site supervisor. The record showed that she assumed that she would get the same rate of pay as the previous supervisor. Her assumption was not correct and there were no further negotiations over the compensation for site supervisor.
The record is clear that she could continue employment as a security officer. She rejected this employment. The claimant has failed to show that her job of security officer was unsuitable or that she had no other choice but to resign. The claimant left work over a dispute in pay. A dispute over compensation, in this case, is not good cause for leaving her position. Therefore, she is not eligible for Employment Security benefits."

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17, which provides:
28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. - An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the voluntary quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 - 44 of this title. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work unless good cause is shown for said failure; provided, that the temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work.

The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:
To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.

In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.

The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be "under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling nature."
The record provides uncontradicted evidence that the claimant had worked for the employer for eleven months, and in February of 2000 was offered a promotional position. The claimant worked for a thirty (30) day trial period and she assumed that she would receive the same compensation as the person who previously held this position. The employer did not offer the claimant higher compensation for this promotion. The claimant informed the employer that she required additional compensation to assume this promotional role. The employer, by letter, indicated that they would not be able to meet this demand, but made an offer of employment as a security officer.
The letter dated March 8, 2000, admitted as evidence is as follows:
". . . We do extend an offer to you to remain in our employ in the capacity of a security officer at another location that would better suit your needs and ours. Please be advised that we will allow a period of two weeks from this date to make a transition from yourself to your replacement.

Your resignation does not in any way diminish our regard for your work product or your value to this company. Should you require references do not hesitate to call on me."

The claimant worked until the last date that she was scheduled. She was not scheduled for any future days beyond March 31, 2000.
There is sufficient evidence on the record to show that claimant failed to show that the job became unsuitable or that she had no other choice but to leave her employment.
A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.