STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

ADELITA S. OREFICE, in her capacity as Director of the RI DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING :

V. : No. A.A. 06-27

THE RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING :
BOARD OF REVIEW and JANICE WEST :

DECISION

CENERINI. J This matter is before the Court on the complaint of the Department of Labor and Training (hereinafter DLT) seeking review of a final decision rendered by the Board of Review for the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (hereinafter Board). That decision reversed the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Janice West, was not entitled to receive employment security benefits. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15.

Facts and Travel

Claimant had worked for Village House for almost three years until December 2005. Claimant's spouse is employed by the Department of the Navy. He elected to voluntarily retire from the Navy and his original retirement date was April 2006. In anticipation of the retirement, claimant terminated her employment with Village House on December 23, 2005. She and her spouse purchased a home in Massachusetts. Soon after, they moved out of government housing in accordance with applicable federal regulations and relocated to Massachusetts. Claimant filed a claim for employment security benefits and stated that on January 5, 2006, she would move to Southwick, Massachusetts. She also indicated that she had been looking for work in Massachusetts. Thereafter, the federal government extended claimant's spouse's retirement from the Navy to August 2006. On January 17, 2006, the Director determined that the claimant left work without good cause and denied her request for benefits. Claimant timely appealed the Director's decision.
A Referee heard the matter on February 6, 2006, at which time the claimant and her spouse testified by telephone. The Referee affirmed the Director's decision. The Referee held that the claimant was not entitled to receive employment security benefits because the claimant voluntarily left work without good cause and was, therefore, subject to disqualification under the provisions of G.L. § 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
Thereafter, an appeal was requested before the Board of Review, who after consultation of the hearing before the Referee issued a decision on February 21, 2006. The Board reversed the Referee's decision. DLT timely appealed the Board's decision to this Court.
Standard of Review
The standard of review is provided by G.L. § 42-35-15(g), a section of the Administrative Procedures Act, which provides:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error or law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court "…may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410, A.2d 425 (1980) (citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15 (g)(5)). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a different result. Cahoone, 246 A.2d at 215. See also, D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041(R.I. 1986).

Decision

The issue before this Court is whether the Board's reversal of the Referee's decision that the claimant was not entitled to receive employment security benefits because the claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause within the meaning of G.L. § 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record.
The Board incorporated into its decision the following findings of fact from the Referee:

The claimant was working for this employer in Rhode Island a period of almost three years. Her spouse is in the military . He elected to voluntarily retire from the military. His original retirement date was to be April 2006. While the spouse was in the military, they were residing in government housing. It was the claimant and her spouse that decided to move out of government housing to relocate to Massachusetts in anticipation of his retirement. The service subsequently extended his retirement date until August 2006. . . . . At the time of leaving, the claimant did not have other employment assured in Massachusetts. [The claimant and her spouse established a residency in Massachusetts on or about January 5, 2006.] See Board's Decision.

This Court recognizes that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act. The Rhode Island Supreme Court as stated:
…eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls on the unemployed worker and his family." G. L. 1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not, intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

With respect to leaving work, G.L. 1956 § 28-44-17 provides:

An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the voluntary quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 -- 44 of this title. For the purposes of this section, "voluntarily leaving work with good cause" shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. For the purposes of this section, "voluntarily leaving work without good cause" shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work unless good cause is shown for that failure; provided, that the temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work.

A review of the entire record demonstrates that the claimant left her job with "good cause" within the meaning of G.L. § 28-44-17. The Board interpreted the retirement exclusion to "good cause" to "apply to a claimant's spouse, who will be substantially separated from the labor market as a result of retirement." See Board's Decision. As such, the Board concluded that claimant did not fall within the retirement exclusion because the record did not indicate that her spouse intended to leave the labor market entirely as a result of his retirement from the Navy.
There is reliable evidence on the record to support the Board's conclusion. Claimant's spouse testified that they were not going to live in Newport after he retired from the Navy because there were no job opportunities in Newport. See Transcript 10: 10-11. Thus, there was an inference that claimant's spouse would continue employment upon his retirement from the Navy. Moreover, claimant testified that when she requested for employment security benefits, she indicated that she had been looking for work in Massachusetts. See Transcript 5: 1-14.
In addition, the Board relied on the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Rocky Hill School, Inc. v. State Department of Employment & Training, 688 A.2d 1241, 1244 (R.I. 1995), which held that "leaving one's employment to follow a spouse to another jurisdiction does constitute good cause . . . ." In Rocky Hill, the claimant voluntarily terminated his employment in order to be with his spouse who had secured a position in another state. Id. at 1241. The Court held that the ". . . claimant [was] entitled to benefits because of the importance of unity to an already existing family but also that public policy requires that families not be discouraged from remaining together." Id. at 1244.
In Powell, the Court noted that "the legislature, in enacting the Employment Security Act, expressed a policy of liberal construction for the declared purpose of the act, that is, to lighten the burden on the unemployed worker and his or her family." Powell v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review, 477 A.2d 93, 96 (R.I. 1984). In this case, the claimant's spouse testified that in anticipation of his April 2006 retirement from the Navy, his wife terminated her employment, they purchased a house in Massachusetts and they relocated. See Transcript 8: 6-11. Afterwards, he "got stuck in-between a rock and a hard place . . ." because he was informed that his retirement from the Navy would be extended to August 2006, apparently because of the Middle East conflict. Id. The Board's decision that claimant was entitled to receive employment security benefits effectuates the legislative intent of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. Therefore, it was not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g)(5).

Conclusion

After a review of the entire record, this Court finds that the decision of the Board to allow claimant to receive employment security benefits under G.L. §28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act was not clearly erroneous. The Board determined that the retirement exclusion to "good cause" set forth in G.L.§28-44-17 did not apply to claimant. The Board's determination was supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record, and further, its decision is not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is affirmed.