STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT , SIXTH DIVISION  

TIMOTHY E. MURPHY 

V.      :    A.A. 03-54

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW 

D E C I S I O N

DEROBBIO, C.J.   This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Timothy E. Murphy, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Timothy E. Murphy, filed a late appeal without good cause and therefore the claimant’s appeal was denied.

            The travel of the case is as follows.  The claimant was employed six months by the employer.  His last date of work was June 27, 2002.  He filed a claim for Employment Security benefits on August 10, 2002.  In a Director’s decision dated September 19, 2002 it was determined the claimant was discharged under disqualifying circumstances under the provisions of Section 28-44-18 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.  The claimant filed a late appeal of this decision on February 14, 2003.  A hearing on the appeal was held on March 6, 2003 at which time the claimant appeared and testified.  The employer, who was properly noticed of the hearing, failed to appear.

            The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant failed to file his appeal within the statutory time and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-39(b).

            Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review.  The Board determined that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee's decision.  Thereafter, Timothy E. Murphy filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.

            The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:

            42-35-15.  Judicial review of contested cases.

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

            (2)            In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

            (3)            Made upon unlawful procedure;

            (4)            Affected by other error of law;

            (5)            Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

                        probative, and substantial evidence on the

                        whole record; or

            (6)            Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse

                        of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

                        discretion.

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”  Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).  The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968).  Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result.  Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968).  See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).

The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:

. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family.”  G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances.  Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act.  Harraka v. Board of Review of  Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

      The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant filed an appeal out of time without good cause was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.

      A majority of the Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:

“A Director’s decision disqualifying the claimant from receipt of Employment Security benefits was mailed to the claimant’s address of record on September 19, 2002.  He received this decision.  He decided not to file an appeal of this decision after being rehired by his previous employer. The claimant has since become unemployed from this employer and filed an appeal of this decision on February 14, 2003.”

      A majority of the Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:

“The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant filed an appeal out of time with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-39(b) of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

Section 28-44-39(b) reads, in part, as follows:

(b) 'Unless the claimant or any other interested party who is entitled to notice shall request a hearing within fifteen (15) days after the notice of determination has been mailed by the director to the last known address of the claimant and of any other interested party, the determination shall be final; provided, however, that for good  cause shown the fifteen (15) day period may be extended; and provided, further, however, that the director, on his or her own motion, may at any time within one year from the date of the determination set forth in subsection (a)(1) reconsider the determination, if he or she finds that an error has occurred in connection therewith, or that the determination was made as a result of a mistake, or the nondisclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact.'

A Director’s decision disqualifying the claimant from receipt of Employment Security benefits was mailed to the claimant on September 19, 2002.  This decision clearly reads, “If you disagree with this determination, you must file a written appeal within 15-days of the mailing date indicated on this decision or IT WILL BECOME FINAL”.  The claimant received this decision but decided not to file an appeal because he had returned to work for the same employer.  He made a personal decision not to file an appeal.  No evidence was presented at this hearing to show the claimant was either prevented or deterred from filing a timely appeal of this decision.  If he disagreed with the decision, he was required to file his appeal within the 15-day appeal period provided for by law.  Since the claimant has failed to show that he had good cause for the late filing of his appeal, he is not entitled to a late appeal under the above Section of the Act.”

            A review of the record shows that there is evidence that the Director mailed a notice of disqualification on September 19, 2002.  The decision also gave notice that an appeal to this decision should be filed within fifteen days of the mailing date of the notice.  The claimant filed his appeal on February 14, 2003.  The record shows that the claimant was rehired by a previous employer in the meantime.

This Court finds that the fact that there was intervening employment does not give rise to good cause for filing a late appeal.

            A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review. 

            On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

            The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:

28-44-54.  Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

            Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."  Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).