STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION
BRENDON M. McCOY :
V. : A.A. 02-87
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :
D E C I S I O N
DEROBBIO, C.J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Brendon M. McCoy, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Brendon M. McCoy was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.
The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant had worked for this employer last on December 19, 2001. The claimant filed his new claim for Employment Security benefits on March 12, 2002. In a decision dated May 6, 2002, the Director determined the claimant voluntarily left his job without good cause, as provided for under Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal of this decision. A hearing on this appeal was held on June 5, 2002, at which the claimant appeared and provided testimony. A friend for the claimant appeared as a witness and provided testimony. Two employer representatives appeared and provided testimony. This employer was represented by an employer agent at the hearing.
The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant left work voluntarily without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-17.
Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision. Thereafter, Brendon M. McCoy filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court " . . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.
The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:
"The claimant had been working as a cashier at a local convenience store. The claimant’s last day of work was December 19, 2001. The claimant became upset over a note he read which mentioned his name. This note was written by a fellow employee to the store manager and contained threatening language toward the claimant. The claimant was concerned over this note and had complained to the Human Resource and the Area Manager but not to his store manager. Additionally, the claimant had received notification that he was to serve on a grand jury. It is further noted that the claimant was told to report for the first meeting of this grand jury on December 3, 2001. The claimant was informed at that time that he would be an alternate and was not selected to be on the jury itself. The claimant, at the time of notification, asked his employer for every Tuesday and Thursday off so that he could be in attendance on this grand jury. At best, the claimant would have only been required to serve one day per week and not two. As an alternate, the claimant was not required to serve at all beyond December 3, 2001. However, the claimant continued to take Tuesdays and Wednesdays off. The employer became suspicious of this arrangement and conducted an investigation. When the employer was informed that the claimant was not a regular juror, rather an alternative, and that he was not required to attend jury duty because of his status, this information was presented to the Human Resource Department. In conjunction with the threatening letter and the information concerning the alleged jury duty, the claimant was summoned to the Human Resource Department on December 19, 2001. The Human Resource representative indicated to the claimant that an investigation of both issues had to be made. The Human Resource representative indicated that because the claimant was taking time out of work under false pretenses, that he would be suspended as a result of this pending the investigation. The claimant, rather than accept the suspension, voluntarily left at that time."
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:
"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
Section 28-44-17 reads as follows:
‘28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. -- An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the voluntarily quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 – 44 of this title. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work unless good cause is shown for said failure; provided, that the temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work.’
In the instant case, the claimant last worked on December 19, 2001. The claimant voluntarily left his job when he was faced with a suspension by his employer for taking time out of work under false pretences. The claimant’s leaving in this instance is considered to be without good cause. The claimant has not demonstrated that his job was unsuitable, or that the action by the employer was unreasonable. Therefore, the claimant cannot be allowed benefits on this issue."
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17, which provides:
28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. -- An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the voluntarily quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 – 44 of this title. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work unless good cause is shown for said failure; provided, that the temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work.
The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:
To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.
In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.
The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be "under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling nature."
The Court reviewed the entire record and finds that there is credible evidence that the claimant had deceived the employer. He indicated that he was on jury duty and that it was necessary for him to take off each Tuesday and Thursday to perform this service. However, the record shows that he was an alternate and not required to be in attendance on those days that he requested to be on leave. This revelation prompted the employer to indicate to the claimant that he would be suspended. There further is evidence that his voluntary leaving, quitting, was due to this investigation. There is no evidence to show that this employment was unsuitable.
A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.