STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
SHELTON W. MANN :
V. : A.A. 03-74
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :
D E C
I S I O N
DEROBBIO, C.J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Shelton W. Mann, filed pursuant
to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final
decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and
Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Shelton
W. Mann filed an appeal to the Referee out of time and failed to demonstrate
good cause for extending the time for filing an appeal.
The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant last worked on February 7,
2003. He filed for Employment Security benefits on February 28, 2003. On March
25, 2003 the Director determined that the claimant had been discharged under
disqualifying circumstances and that benefits would be denied him under the
provisions of Section 28-44-18 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
The claimant filed a late appeal on April 10, 2003. A hearing was set down on
this appeal on April 29, 2003, at which the claimant appeared and testified.
The employer failed to appear.
The Referee held the claimant failed to file an appeal within fifteen (15) days
of the mailing of the decision of the Director and was thus disqualified pursuant
to Rhode Island General Laws Section 28-44-39(b).
Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board
of Review. The Board determined that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication
of the facts, and upheld the Referee's decision. Thereafter, Shelton W. Mann
filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions
of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws §
28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g),
a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision
of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
Thus, on questions
of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings
are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I.
583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department
of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently,
the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might
have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of
Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra
v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I.
1986).
The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared
a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek
to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may
in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does
not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class
of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act;
but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of
expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions
of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's
decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant failed
to file an appeal within fifteen days of the mailing of a decision by the Director
in accordance with Section 28-44-39(b) was supported by reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.
The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:
"The claimant filed a late appeal on April 10, 2003. The claimant filed
his late appeal because he was waiting to hear on a couple of job opportunities
and also because he mistakenly interpreted the appeal notice as giving him fifteen
working days to file the appeal, although nowhere on the notice does it state
working days."
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:
"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant filed an appeal
out of time with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-39(b) of the
Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
I cannot find from the evidence before me the claimant's reasons for his late
appeal amount to good cause within the meaning of the above Section of the Act."
A review of the record demonstrates that the Director issued a decision on March
25, 2003 and that an appeal was filed on April 10, 2003. The notice on the decision
of the Director specifies thereon that an appeal must be filed within fifteen
(15) days from the date of the mailing of the decision.
The legend on the written decision is as follows:
"If you disagree with this determination, you must file a written appeal
within 15 days of the mailing date indicated on this decision or it WILL BECOME
FINAL. You may file an appeal either by Mail or by Fax. Please indicate your
name, social security number, current address, telephone number and reason(s)
you wish to appeal in your correspondence. Mail your appeal request to Central
Adjudication Unit, P.O. Box 20067, Cranston, RI 02920-0941 FAX#: 401-462-8318.
Once your appeal is received, you will receive further instructions by mail."
The language included in the notice of instructions of appeal is clear and unambiguous.
In order for the Referee to grant relief for the extension of time in which
to file a late appeal, good cause must be demonstrated by the claimant.
Section 28-44-39(b) provides:
(b) Unless the claimant or any other interested party who is entitled to notice
requests a hearing within fifteen (15) days after the notice of determination
has been mailed by the director to the last known address of the claimant and
of any other interested party, the determination is final; provided, that for
good cause shown the fifteen (15) day period may be extended; and provided,
further, that the director, on his or her own motion, may at any time within
one year from the date of the determination set forth in subsection (a)(1) reconsider
the determination, if he or she finds that an error has occurred in connection
with it, or that the determination was made as a result of a mistake, or the
nondisclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact.
The record shows that claimant testified "I didn't really know it was late.
I thought maybe that they was talking about 15 working days, not counting the
weekend …" (Transcript of Referee, Page 10)
The explanation offered at the hearing by the claimant does not support good
cause as provided by Section 28-44-39(b).
A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative
and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision
of the Board of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which
in its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings.
- The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of
law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review,
if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules,
shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review
of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the
whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious
or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.