STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

DEROBBIO, C.J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Joseph E. Letourneau, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Joseph E. Letourneau was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.

The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant was employed for one week. The claimant's last day of work was April 29, 2002. The claimant filed for Employment Security benefits on May 2, 2002. In a decision dated May 20, 2002, the Director determined that the claimant left his job without good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.  The claimant filed a timely appeal of the decision on May 24, 2002. A hearing notice on the appeal was sent to all interested parties on May 31, 2002. A hearing on the appeal was held on June 13, 2002 at which time the claimant appeared and testified. The claimant was represented by counsel during the hearing. The employer, having been sent proper notice, failed to appear and testify.

The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant left work voluntarily without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-17.

Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision. Thereafter, Joseph E. Letourneau filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.

The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:

42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of

fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or

remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse

or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant

have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

 

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence on the

whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterize by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

 

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court " . . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).

The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:

. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

 

The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.

A majority of the Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:

"I find by a preponderance of testimony and evidence the following findings of fact: The claimant was released by his physician to return to work following the week ending April 20, 2002. The claimant applied for work with McLaughlin and Moran. Without interview the claimant was contacted approximately 7:00 a.m. on April 23, 2002 and offered immediate work as a driver’s helper. The claimant reported for work approximately 7:30 a.m. that same day and worked the full day. The claimant was advised that he must report to the warehouse manager on a daily basis for further assignment. After realizing he was an on-call employee the claimant requested full-time work. The employer told him that he would have to work the night shift. Night shifts are between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 3:30 a.m. Monday through Friday and from 10:00 p.m. to be underdetermined time on Sunday. The claimant began the night shift and became aware that the employer has mandatory overtime that customarily caused the employees to remain at work on Thursday and Friday mornings until as late as 11:30 a.m. The claimant confirmed the mandatory overtime with the employer. The claimant resigned from the position on April 29, 2002 based on his caring for his child on those mornings when his unemployed wife has job interviews."

 

A majority of the Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:

"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

 

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17.

 

In order to establish that he had good cause for leaving his job, the claimant must show that the work had become unsuitable, or that he was faced with such a situation that left him no reasonable alternative but to terminate his employment. The burden of proof in establishing good cause rests solely on the claimant. There has been insufficient  testimony and no evidence presented to establish that the work itself had become unsuitable, or that the claimant had no reasonable alternative but to terminate his employment. In the instant case, the claimant accepted employment lacking any specifics from the employer relative to the position. As the claimant became aware of the job requirements he determined to continue employment until the issue of mandatory overtime became apparent. Although the possibility of lengthy overtime might be required on Thursday and Friday shifts, nothing has been established to support the claimant’s need to resign his position based on the possibility that his wife might have an early morning job interview. The job did not become unsuitable based on the potential of a spouse’s interview. The reasonable alternative would be to continue employment until such time as childcare became a real issue. A resignation for the potential of conflict in scheduling between the claimant’s employment, childcare responsibilities, and spouse’s job interviews is not found to be good cause. An additional reasonable alternative would be for the claimant to work with his spouse in scheduling job interviews on Thursdays and Friday afternoons. Therefore, I find and determine that the claimant left his job without good cause and benefits are denied."

 

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17, which provides:

28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. -- An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the voluntarily quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 – 44 of this title. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work unless good cause is shown for said failure; provided, that the temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work.

 

The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201,  200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:

To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.

 

In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.

 

The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be "under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling nature."

The Court, in reviewing the record, finds that the basic facts are essentially uncontradicted. The record is clear that the claimant started his employment on April 23, 2002. He reported to work at 7:30 a.m. and worked with a driver of the employer. Upon return to the warehouse, the claimant asked the manager what time to report to work the following day and was told he would have to ask if he would be working the next day. The claimant asked if he could work full time and he was given a nighttime shift. The claimant accepted this employment without full knowledge of the specific requirements of the employment. When the requirement of mandatory overtime arose, especially the requirement of Thursdays and Fridays, the claimant resigned from this employment; the last day of employment being on April 29, 2002.

The claimant argues that there was a lack of meeting of the minds between the employer and the claimant, and therefore the terms of employment were such that there was no employment, and the claimant was justified in leaving his job.

Notwithstanding the fact that there were no specifics known by the claimant, he entered into an employer-employee relationship and was entitled to such benefits that resulted therefrom. This lack of specifics regarding employment requirements does not give rise and justification for leaving one’s employment, and does not amount to good cause for leaving.

The claimant, when hired on April 23, 2002, accepted the employment for daytime employment, and only accepted nighttime employment when offered full time employment. If he continued on his daytime employment, the care for his child would not have been an issue. The record shows that the claimant did not seek nighttime employment. However, this Court, in its review based upon the record, finds that there was not sufficient evidence on the record that the Board could conclude that the job became unsuitable and that the claimant had no other reasonable alternative than to resign. The record shows that a possibility of lengthy overtime might affect his wife’s ability to attend job interviews, which would create a problem of the parties’ child care.

The burden to establish good cause rests with the claimant. Based upon the evidence on the record, the Court agrees that a resignation for the potential conflict in scheduling between the claimant’s employment, child care responsibilities, and spouse’s interview is not found to be good cause for leaving one’s employment.

A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.

On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in

its pertinent part provides:

28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

 

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.