STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

 

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

DEROBBIO, C.J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Kenneth P. Laughlin, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Kenneth P. Laughlin was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.

The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant was employed for six and a half years. His last day of work was March 21, 2002. He filed a claim for Employment Security benefits on March 27, 2002. In a Director’s decision dated April 17, 2002 it was determined the claimant was discharged from his employment under disqualifying circumstances under the provisions of Section 28-44-18 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The claimant filed a late appeal of that decision. A hearing on the appeal was held on June 3, 2002 at which time the claimant appeared and testified. No employer representative participated although duly noticed.

The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant failed to show good cause for not filing a timely appeal and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-39(b).

Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision. Thereafter, Kenneth P. Laughlin filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.

The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:

42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency

as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court

may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for

further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if

substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced

because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions,

or decisions are:

 

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence on the

whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse

of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion.

 

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).

The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:

. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant filed an appeal out of time without good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-39(b) of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.

The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:

"A notice of Director’s decision was mailed to the claimant to his address of record on April 22, 2002. The claimant acknowledged he received the notice in a timely manner, read his appeal rights thereon and understood them. He understood that unless he filed an appeal of that decision within 15 days from the mailing date thereon that the decision would become final. The claimant delayed in preparing his appeal because he was filing a grievance and thought he would be returned to his employment. He further indicated that in the meantime he was seeking employment and also gathering information for his appeal. Nothing prevented the claimant from contacting the Department of Labor and Training within the required period in order to protect his rights. He provided no valid reason for his failure to file his appeal in a timely manner."

The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:

"The 15-day appeal period provided for under the provisions of Section 28-44-39(b) can be extended if the individual who filed out of time had good cause for being late.

Based on the credible testimony of the claimant, I find that he has provided no valid reason for his not filing his claim of appeal of the Director’s decision in a timely manner. The claimant’s delay in filing a timely appeal was caused solely by matters under his control. Since he has failed to show good cause for not filing his appeal timely, I find that the claimant’s appeal cannot be allowed."

A review of the record is clear that the claimant received notice in a timely fashion, and that the appeal was filed more than 15 days after the mailing of the Decision of the Director. The claimant, in his appeal, alleges a math mistake and filed his appeal two (2) days late.

The filing of an appeal two days late, due to a math mistake or for the fact of being otherwise consumed with other activities, does not demonstrate good cause for such action.

A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.

On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:

28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

 

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.