STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

DEROBBIO, C. J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Eric J. Lambert, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Eric J. Lambert was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.

The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant was employed for eighteen months by the employer. The claimant's last day of work was February 2, 2001. He filed for Employment Security benefits on February 7, 2001. In a decision dated February 22, 2001 the Director determined the claimant left his job without good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal of the decision on February 26, 2001. A hearing on the appeal was held on March 15, 2001 at which time the claimant and the employer appeared and testified.

The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant left his employment without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-17.

Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision. Thereafter, Eric J. Lambert filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.

The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:

42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of

fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or

remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse

or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant

have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

 

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence on the

whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterize by abuse

of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion.

 

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court " . . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).

The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:

. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant left his job without good cause was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.

The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:

"I find by a preponderance of testimony and evidence the following findings of fact: The claimant worked as a chef in the employer's retirement home facility. On January 31, 2001 the claimant was in his supervisor's office during his break and read a letter partially enclosed in an envelope found on his supervisor's desk. The letter-detailed complaints by the five wait staff. The wait staff made accusations about the claimant. The claimant had the next day off from work. The claimant returned to work on Friday, February 2, 2001. He felt ill, believing himself to have the stomach flue. [sic] The claimant was in his supervisor's office once again and read his status change form that had a posted note addressed to the food service manager. The claimant left work after approximately one hour. The claimant left a message that he felt sick. Later that night the claimant contacted the employer and called in sick for the following day, Saturday, February 3, 2001. The employer contacted the claimant on Saturday to establish the claimant's status. The claimant advised the food service manager that he had spoken with a nurse who suggested that he not handle food for five to seven days. The claimant's supervisor called him on Sunday night. The claimant told his supervisor that he would be out for an additional three days. During a conversation with his supervisor on or about Tuesday, February 6, 2001 the claimant advised her that he had found the letter the previous Saturday and was resigning his position. The claimant's supervisor told him that the employer did not consider the accusations in the letter substantial and no action had been taken or planned. The claimant followed through with his resignation."

The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:

"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17.

In order to establish that he had good cause for leaving his job, the claimant must show that the work he [sic] had become unsuitable or that he was faced with such a situation that left him no reasonable alternative but to terminate his employment. The burden of proof in establishing good cause rests solely on the claimant. There has been insufficient testimony and no evidence presented to establish that the work itself had become unsuitable or that the claimant [sic] faced with a situation that left him no reasonable alternative but to terminate his position.

In the instant case, on two occasions the claimant was in his supervisor's office unauthorized and investigating and reading company documentation not addressed to him. This unauthorized investigation on the part of the claimant caused the claimant to leave his employment. The claimant indicates that he was on his break during the first incident in spite of the fact that a break room is available for employees. No explanation has been given as to what the claimant was doing exploring in his supervisor's office during the first hour of work during the second incident. Although the claimant is being treated for [sic] and obsessive-compulsive disorder, no reasonable explanation has been given as to why the claimant, after having had several days between the discovery and his resignation, felt it necessary to resign his position. The claimant took no timely action to ask his employer about either the complaint or the status change letter. When the claimant finally brought his concern to the employer, it was during his resignation. In spite of the fact that the employer advised the claimant that the complaint letter had no standing, the claimant decided to leave his job.

Therefore, I find and determine that the claimant left his job without good cause and benefits are denied."

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17, which provides:

28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. -- On and after July 2, 1978, an individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits until he establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he has subsequent to that leaving had at least four weeks of work, and in each of those four weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 42 of this title; . . . For purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. (Emphasis added.)

The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:

To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.

In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.

The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be "under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling nature."

In this matter, the Board of Review adopted the findings of fact of the Referee which in detail outlined the reasons that the claimant submitted his resignation. The claimant has the burden of proving that his leaving was with good cause. The issue in this case is one of fact and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.

A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.

On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:

28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.