STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
IAN
KOMOROWSKI :
V. : A.A. 03-39
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :
D E C I S I O N
DEROBBIO, C.J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Ian Komorowski, filed pursuant
to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final
decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and
Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Ian Komorowski
was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.
The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant had been employed in the
capacity of an instructor/General Manager for Sakonnet Boathouse for a period
of one year, ten months. His last actual day of employment was November 10,
2002. The Director determined that the claimant was not subject to disqualification,
under the provisions of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security
Act. The employer filed a timely appeal. A hearing on the appeal was scheduled.
A Notice of Hearing was sent to all interested parties. The hearing was held
on February 11, 2003. The claimant appeared and testified represented by an
attorney. The employer appeared and testified.
The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security
benefits, based on the determination that claimant voluntarily left his employment
without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General
Laws § 28-44-17.
Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board
of Review. The Board determined that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication
of the facts, and upheld the Referee's decision. Thereafter, Ian Komorowski
filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions
of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws §
28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g),
a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision
of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus, on questions
of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings
are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I.
583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department
of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently,
the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might
have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of
Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra
v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I.
1986).
The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared
a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek
to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may
in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does
not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class
of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act;
but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of
expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions
of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's
decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant left his
employment voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.
A majority of the Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of
the Referee:
"The claimant worked for this employer a period of one year, ten months.
He held the position of General Manager and instructor. Around September 10,
2002, the claimant notified the employer that he intended to leave the job in
order to relocate out of the area. No definite date was set during that conversation.
Thereafter the claimant had another conversation with the employer's wife and
during that conversation, he reaffirmed his intention to leave and that he contemplated
being available to work for this employer through the end of October, possibly
November. The employer and the claimant had additional conversation and at that
point it was decided that his last day of employment status was November 10,
2002. Although the employer set that date, the claimant at no time made any
effort to rescind his resignation as it was in fact his intent to leave the
job. During that conversation, November 10 was mutually agreed to be the last
day."
A majority of the Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:
"Although the Director had decided that the claimant was unemployed due
to a lack of work, I find that the proper issue in this case is whether or not
the claimant left work voluntarily with good cause within the meaning of Section
28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking
that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section
28-44-17.
The evidence presented at the hearing establishes that it was the claimant who
initiated the circumstance by announcing his intent to leave this employer.
Throughout the course of these events, the claimant at no time changed that
situation. The only thing that changed was the period of notice for the intended
leaving with the last agreed date of service being November 10, 2002. The claimant's
reason for leaving in order to relocate to be with family does not constitute
good cause for leaving a job and benefits must be denied on this issue."
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking
that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section
28-44-17, which provides:
"28-44-17 - Voluntary leaving without good cause. - An individual who leaves
work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit
or benefits until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director
that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of
work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty
(20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for
performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters
42 -- 44, of this title. For the purposes of this section, voluntary leaving
work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either
sex. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good
cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany,
join or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement
of his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of
his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary
help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional
work unless good cause is shown for said failure; provided, however, that the
temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual
is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most
recent work assignment to seek additional work."
The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964
in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I.
197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading
of good cause would be adopted:
To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he
terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination
thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion,
amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not
contemplate at the time of its enactment.
In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate
their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public
interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion
by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However,
the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently
liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees
who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions
thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous
reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.
The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be
"under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling
nature."
The Court reviewed the entire record which establishes that there is evidence
on the record that the claimant had demonstrated his intention of relocating
out of the area. On the September 10, 2002 date, no specific date was given
to the employer as a resignation date. A further conversation with the employer
shows that the claimant expressed his intention to leave by the end of October
or November and that he would be available for work during this period.
The record shows that on at least four occasions resignation was discussed.
The record also shows that, in conversation with the employer, the claimant
was leaving at the end of October. Board of Review Transcript page 16,
"EMPL: . . . the claimant initiated the circumstances by announcing the
intent to leave the employer. Throughout the course of the events, the claimant
at no time changed that situation. So he, he said he was going to leave. He
never came back to us and said, I'm going to stay until 2003 or I'm going to,
I'm going to do this. He always said, I'm going to leave. So being a small company
and being the general manager, my wife has a job, I have another full time job,
this guy has, ah, you know, we hired him with the intention of, you know, being
our eyes and ears of the thing. When he said he was going to leave and then
came to my wife and said yeah and gave that date, we took that as, you know,
the date. We had to move forward."
Page 17 and 18 of the Board of Review Transcript:
"ATTY: I'm just asking you a question. He never told you. Your wife's affidavit
never says I am leaving as of the end of October, does it? Yes or no?"
Page 20 of Board of Review Transcript:
"ATTY: Why didn't you let him continue working as a general manager?
EMPL: How can you have somebody that's the general manager and planning the
future, that is here on a day-to-day basis?
ATTY: Okay, so then it was your decision, because of his uncertainty, that you
were going to sever the employment relationship.
EMPL: Wrong. We would have Ian working for us today if he didn't say that he
was leaving."
Although the claimant did not leave the state until March of 2003, he unequivocally
expressed his intention of leaving.
The record further demonstrates that he was employed as a general manager and
instructor, and this position was essential to the operation of the employer's
business.
The record further shows that there is evidence that the resignation was accepted
on November 10, 2002, which was the last agreed date of notice.
There is sufficient, reliable and substantial evidence on the record that the
claimant was leaving the state and intended to resign, and that the employer
could acknowledge and depend upon those intentions to resign.
The record has sufficient evidence to conclude that the claimant voluntarily
left his job to relocate with his family in another state. This does not constitute
good cause.
A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative
and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision
of the Board of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which
in its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings.
- The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of
law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review,
if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules,
shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the
Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not
"arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.