STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

JOHNSON BROTHERS OF RHODE ISLAND :

V. : A.A. 00-19

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW 

D E C I S I O N

McLOUGHLIN, J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Johnson Brothers of Rhode Island, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which reversed the finding of the Referee that the claimant was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.

The travel of the case are as follows. The employer employed the claimant for approximately 14 years. Her last day of work was November 12, 1999. On November 16, 1999 the claimant filed a claim for Employment Security benefits.

On December 8, 1999 the Director decided that the claimant was discharged under disqualifying circumstances under the provisions of Section 28-44-18 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. Benefits were denied. On December 11, 1999 the claimant filed an appeal from the Director's decision.

A hearing was held before a Referee on January 4, 2000. The claimant, his attorney and an employer representative were present and provided testimony and argument. On January 7, 2000 the Referee affirmed the decision of the Director. The claimant filed an appeal to the Board of Review on January 7, 2000.

A hearing was held before the full Board of Review on February 2, 2000 at which time the claimant, her counsel and an employer representative (the employer's sales manager) were present.

The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was not a proper adjudication of the facts, and reversed the Referee’s decision. Thereafter, employer filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.

The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:

42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of

fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency

or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may

reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of

the appellant have been prejudiced because the

administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or

decisions are:

 

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence on the

whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse

of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion.

 

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court " . . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).

The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:

. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that the Referee’s decision was not a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.

The Board found the following findings of fact:

"During a sales related event, sponsored by a customer, the claimant and her sales manager engaged in a conversation that led to a conflict. This conversation took place at a table which included guests. The sales manager and the employer believed that the claimant's conduct was inappropriate. The employer asked that the claimant apologize to the sales manager and refrain from similar type of conduct in the future. The claimant refused to apologize for the incident. The claimant was terminated for insubordination.

The issue in this case is whether the claimant was discharged under disqualifying circumstances within the provisions of Section 28-44-18 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

The aforementioned statute defines misconduct "as a deliberate conduct in willful disregard of the employer's interest." This definition has been interpreted in our Supreme Court in Turner vs. Department of Employment and Training, Board of Review, 479 A2d 740, 741-42 (R.I. 1984).

Under Turner, misconduct does not include isolated instances of inadvertent action or lapses in judgment. Under the Act the employer has the right to terminate an employee, who it deems to be unsatisfactory or, in this case, untrustworthy. However, in order to deny the claimant Employment Security benefits, the employer must prove that the claimant knowingly violated a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer or that the claimant engaged in deliberate misconduct in willful disregard of the employer's interest.

In the instance under consideration before the Board, the claimant's conduct, while objectionable, does not rise to the level of misconduct as defined by Section 28-44-18. Based on the record, the claimant's conduct was motivated by personal reasons rather than intent to harm the employer's interest. During a social occasion, she elected or took it upon herself to address a personal issue. The time and occasion to advance a personal grievance were clearly inappropriate. Although she placed her personal interest before the employer's interest during the social event, the claimant's conduct does not constitute misconduct. The claimant's record over 14 years discloses no similar type of conduct. The claimant's conduct is an isolated incident of poor judgment. The record of proceedings does not establish misconduct."

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.