PROVIDENCE, Sc. (V SIXTH DIVISION
CARLTON INGERSON
VS.
_Fill A.A. No. 99-18
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW
JUDGMENT
This cause came on before Cenerini, J. on Administrative Appeal, and upon review of the record and memoranda of counsel, and a decision having been rendered, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
The decision of the board is hereby affirmed.
Dated at Providence, Rhode Island this 21st day
July 1999.
BY ORDER:
ENTER:
July 21, 1999
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, Sc. DISTRICT COURTON INGERSON BOARD
V. A.A. 99-18
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW
D E C I S 1 0 N
CENERINI, J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Carlton Ingerson, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws S 42-35- 15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the r.laimant, Carlton Ingerson, was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.
The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant last worked on November 14, 1998. He filed a claim for Employment Security benefits on November 18, 1998. In a decision dated November 27, 1998, the Director determined the claimant voluntarily left his job without good cause, within the meaning of
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Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal. A hearing on this appeal was held on December 17, 1998, at which time the claimant and his witness both appeared and testified. An employer representative appeared, and also testified.
The Referee held the claimant, Carlton Ingerson, was not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant left work voluntarily without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws S 28-44-17.
Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was decided by the Board of Review without any further hearing as is set forth in R.I.G.L. 28-44-47. The Board determined that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee's decision. Thereafter, Carlton Ingerson filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws S 28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws S 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or
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modify the decision if substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm
the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly
erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I.
583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws
5 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on ques
tions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of
Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated
differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even
though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment
Security,
104 R.I. 503,, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v..
Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d
1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation
shall
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be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L. 1956, S 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly errone
ous.
The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:
"The claimant was employed for approximately 26 months as a meat cutter. His last date of work was November 14, 1998. On November 9, 1998, the claimant gave notice to his employer that as of November 14, 1998, he was leaving his job for other employment. The claimant testified that at the time he gave his notice, he had no job assurance in a new position.
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Four days later, after learning that the new position was not going to be offered to him, the claimant called his employer asking to return to his employment. The claimant was told by the employer that another employee had been promoted to that position, and the position was filled. on November 14, 1998, the claimant met with the owner and the manager, and it was again confirmed that the position had been filled after steps were taken to promote another individual after the employer received and accepted the claimant's notice on November 9, 1998.11
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of
the
Referee:
"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17.
In order to show good cause for leaving one's employment, an individual must prove the job had become unsuitable, or show that he was placed in a position which left him no reasonable alternative than to leave his employment. The credible testimony presented at the hearing indicates the claimant gave his notice to the employer that he was leaving his employment for other employment but did not have a definite offer of work. After giving his notice to leave his employment, the claimant attempted to rescind the notice with the employer but was informed that in the interim, the position had already been filled by promoting another coworker to the claimant's former position. The claimant voluntarily placed himself in a position of leaving his employment without any definite assurance of work with another employer. In addition, there was no evidence presented to indicate that the claimant's work was unsuitable. Under the circumstances, it must be determined that the claimant voluntarily left his employment without good cause since he gave his notice without any job assurance and, therefore, must be denied benefits under the above provisions of the Act."
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An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17, which provides:
28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. -on and after July 2, 1978, an individual who leaves work voluntarily without crood cause shall be ineligiz ble for waitincr Period credit or benefits until he establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he has subsequent to that leaving had at least four weeks of work, and in each of those four weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 42 of this title; . . . For purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. (Emphasis added.)
The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:
To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enact
ment.
In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions thereof
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are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.
The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be "under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling nature."
The transcript of the December 17, 1998 hearing before the Referee indicates that the plaintiff is a resident of Warren and began employment as a meat cutter with the respondent employer in its Bristol store approximately three years ago. The plaintiff maintains that he informed his employer that he was dependent upon his wife for transportation to and from work since the plaintiff did not have a driver's license due to a debilitating eye condition. The plaintiff was thereafter transferred to the employer's New Bedford store and continued to work there as a meat cutter for approximately six months. The New Bedford work site was burdensome in light of the plaintiff's need for transportation to and from work from his home. While working in New Bedford, the plaintiff began seeking alternative employment closer to his home. While seeking alternative employment, the plaintiff was transferred as a meat cutter to the employer's Fall River store which was located approximately ten miles from his residence. The Fall River assignment did not cause any undue burdens upon the plaintiff or his wife regarding transportation to and from work. The plaintiff though continued in his seeking alternative employment and believed that he was
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to be offered a position as a meat cutter in a Barrington market. The plaintiff's interest in the Barrington job was based upon its close proximity to his home, greater benefits and increased salary. The plaintiff gave his employer his resignation notice on November 9, 1998 detailing his last day of work as November 14, 1998. The employer filled the resulting vacancy by promoting a part-time meat cutter to the plaintiff's full-time position for the work day of November 15, 1998. On November 12, 1998, the plaintiff attempted to rescind his resignation since the Barrington position did not materialize. The employer refused to rescind the plaintiff's earlier resignation which resulted in the plaintiff's last day of work being November 14, 1998.
The plaintiff's Brief in his instant appeal maintains that the Board committed reversible error by refusing the plaintiff the opportunity to submit sufficient evidence on his debilitating medical condition which caused him to seek employment closer to his residence. According to the plaintiff, the Board further committed reversible error when the plaintiff was not granted an opportunity to submit evidence on his employment history with the employer in an attempt to establish that the employee had a vested interest in working in the Bristol location solely. Additionally, the plaintiff maintains that he did not voluntarily leave his employment since he rescinded his resignation and thereupon his termination of employment on November 14, 1998 was a result of the employer's unilateral act.
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The plaintiff apparently never requested an evidentiary hearing before the Board itself. Contrary to the plaintiff's assertions, a review of the record of the hearing before the Referee is not supportive of the plaintiff's contentions, while there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact and the decisions of the Board of Review.
on findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws S 42-35-15 (g)(5)(6)
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.
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