STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION
DARLENE GIARRUSSO :
:
:
V. : A.A. 06-41
:
:
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :
and MCD AIR TRANSPORT, et al.
DECISION
McLOUGHLIN, J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Darlene Giarrusso, filed
pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review
of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department
of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant,
Darlene Giarrusso was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.
The facts and travel of the case are as follows. The claimant's last day of
work was November 8, 2005. She filed a claim for Employment Security benefits
on November 15, 2005.
On December 28, 2005 the Director issued a decision denying benefits under the
provisions of Section 28-44-17 and requiring repayment in the amount of $824.00
under the provisions of Section 28-42-68 of the Rhode Island Employment Security
Act. The claimant appealed.
A hearing was held before a Referee on January 31, 2006 at which the claimant
and her husband appeared and testified. A representative of the employer also
appeared and testified at the Referee hearing.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The claimant had worked for this employer for approximately two years. On November
8, 2005 she collected her personal belongings and left her place of work and
indicated that she was "sick of it" and "sick of the crap"
and that she was going home. She told others on her way out that "it was
nice working with you guys".
She had not asked permission to leave early that day. She did not call in for
the rest of the week. She did not return any of the messages that their employer
or employer representatives left on her cell phone for the rest of that week.
The claimant testified that she was unhappy with the working conditions and
specifically unhappy about having to work with their employer's wife.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g),
a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision
of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus, on questions
of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings
are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I.
583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department
of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently,
the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might
have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of
Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra
v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I.
1986).
The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family." G.L. 1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared
a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek
to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may
in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does
not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class
of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act;
but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of
expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions
of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking
that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section
28-44-17, which provides:
28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. - An individual who leaves work
voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit
or benefits for the week in which the voluntary quit occurred and until he or
she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent
to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight
(8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly
wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment
for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 - 44 of this title. For the
purposes of this section, "voluntarily leaving work with good cause"
shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. For the purposes
of this section, "voluntarily leaving work without good cause" shall
include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join or follow
his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his
or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary help
agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional
work unless good cause is shown for that failure; provided, that the temporary
help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required
to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work
assignment to seek additional work.
The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964
in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I.
197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading
of good cause would be adopted:
To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he
terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination
thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion,
amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not
contemplate at the time of its enactment.
In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate
their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public
interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion
by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However,
the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently
liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees
who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions
thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous
reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.
The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be
"under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling
nature."
After a review of the record this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence
to establish good cause for leaving the employment.