STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

DARCEE A. ETCHELLS :

V. : A.A. 05-20

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :

D E C I S I O N

DEROBBIO, C.J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Darcee A. Etchells, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Darcee A. Etchells was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.

The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant was employed for six years as an office clerk. Her last day of work was October 22, 2004. She filed a claim for Employment Security benefits on October 29, 2004. A Director's decision dated November 17, 2004 determined that the claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal of that decision. A hearing on the appeal was held on December 15, 2004 at which time the claimant and a witness for the employer appeared and testified. An agent for the employer was also present.
The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-17.

Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The Board determined that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee's decision. Thereafter, Darcee A. Etchells filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.

The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).

The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L. 1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant left her employment voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.
The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:
"The claimant last worked as a clerk on October 22, 2004. Prior to that date the claimant became concerned with regard to treatment by other workers. The co-worker who was a heavy set woman was viewed on video by those co-workers removing candy which was glued to a dish in the cash room and eating the same. The worker had no knowledge that she was being viewed. However the claimant became upset concerning the matter, following her last day of work and reported to the Groton, Connecticut home office controller concerning the matter. She was advised that it would be taken care of. Prior complaints and concerns by the claimant had in the past been addressed. Regarding the incident in question, the supervisor had also observed the situation and immediately addressed the matter. The claimant who continued to be upset about the situation decided she would no longer work in that environment and left her job."

The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:
"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17.

The credible testimony facts and circumstances of this case support a finding that the claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause. In order to be eligible for benefits she must establish that her job was unsuitable or she had no reasonable alternative. The evidence provided established that neither of these situations existed and that the claimant left her job because of her concerns for another co-worker. Her responsibility, if any, for the co-worker ended when she reported the situation to her superiors who indicated they would address the situation. After consideration of all the facts and circumstances in this case, I find that the claimant left her job without good cause within the meaning of the above Section of the Act and, therefore, not entitled to benefits."

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17, which provides:
"28-44-17 - Voluntary leaving without good cause. - An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 -- 44, of this title. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work unless good cause is shown for said failure; provided, however, that the temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work."

The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:
To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.

In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.

The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be "under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling nature."
The Court, in reviewing the entire record, finds that there is evidence on the record that is reliable, substantial and probative that the Board of Review relied upon to make its finding, conclusions and decision. There is no evidence to demonstrate that the job became unsuitable or there was no other reasonable alternative. Her concern for a fellow worker was admirable. These concerns were relayed to the employer, and past history has shown that her complaints were addressed.
A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.