STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

DEROBBIO, C. J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Becky Ellsworth, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Becky Ellsworth was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.

The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant was employed as a cook for Hamilton House. The claimant was employed until September 20, 1997. She filed a claim for Employment Security benefits on September 24, 1997. The Director determined that the claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. On November 2, 1997 the claimant filed a timely appeal of this decision. A hearing on the appeal was held on November 13, 1997. The claimant appeared and testified. An employer representative appeared and testified at the hearing.

The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-17.

Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision. Thereafter, Becky Ellsworth filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.

The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:

42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of

fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or

remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse

or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant

have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

 

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence on the

whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse

of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion.

 

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court " . . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).

The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:

. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant voluntarily left work without good cause was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.

The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:

"The claimant was employed as a cook for Hamilton House. The claimant missed work on September 1, 1997. The claimant called the Executive Director at home and said that she should be fired; that she was going back to school. The claimant was told that she was needed until a replacement was hired. The claimant agreed to return to work until a replacement was hired if a letter of recommendation was written on her behalf. The claimant's last day of work was September 20, 1997."

The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:

"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17.

In order to establish that she had good cause for leaving her job, the claimant must show that the work had become unsuitable, or that she was faced with the situation that left her no reasonable alternative but to terminate her employment. There has been no evidence presented to establish that the work itself had become unsuitable. Further, there has been no evidence presented to establish that the claimant was faced with the situation that left her no reasonable alternative but to terminate her employment with no other job to go to. The claimant made the independent determination that she wanted to return to school to finish her education. The claimant voluntarily terminated her employment and agreed to stay on until a replacement was hired if a letter of recommendation was written on her behalf. A replacement was hired. Unfortunately, the claimant was not able to receive the necessary financial aide that would enable her to return to school. While the claimant left her employment for a bonafide reason, the claimant's choice of returning to school does not meet the criteria for good cause as defined under the Law.

From the credible testimony solicited at the hearing, it must be determined that the claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient evidence to establish good cause, it must be held that the claimant's leaving is not with good cause and benefits must be denied on this issue."

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17, which provides:

28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. -- On and after July 2, 1978, an individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits until he establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he has subsequent to that leaving had at least four weeks of work, and in each of those four weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 42 of this title; . . . For purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. (Emphasis added.)

The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:

To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.

In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.

The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be "under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling nature."

A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.

On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:

28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.