STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
RICHARD
E. DOWNES
V.
: A.A. 03-48
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW
D
E C I
S I O N
DEROBBIO,
C.J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Richard E. Downes,
filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the
respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the
finding of the Referee that the claimant, Richard E. Downes was not entitled to
receive employment security benefits.
The travel of the case is as follows.
The claimant was employed for approximately ten months.
His last day of work was February 6, 2003. He filed a claim for
Employment Security benefits on February 6, 2003.
In a Director’s decision dated February 24, 2003, it was determined
that the claimant voluntarily left his job without good cause within the meaning
of Section 28-44-17 and was denied benefits.
The claimant filed a timely appeal of that decision. A hearing on the appeal was held on March 17, 2003, at which
time the claimant and two employer representatives appeared and testified. The
claimant was represented by legal counsel.
The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment
security benefits, based on the determination that claimant voluntarily left
work without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island
General Laws §
28-44-17.
Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the
Board of Review. The Board
determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts,
and upheld the Referee’s decision. Thereafter,
Richard E. Downes filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review
of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island
General Laws §
28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which
provides as follows:
42-35-15.
Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The
court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have
been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(1)
In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2)
In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3)
Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4)
Affected by other error of law;
(5)
Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6)
Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus,
on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”
Guarino v. Department of
Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island
General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact. Cahoone
v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503,
246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated
differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable
mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See
also D’Ambra v. Board of Review,
Department of Employment Security,
517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The
Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
.
. . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” G.L.1956, §
28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction,
this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its
humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances.
Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an
extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not
intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither
does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed
restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the
act. Harraka v. Board of Review
of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597
(1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that
the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the
claimant voluntarily left his employment without good cause was supported by
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not
it was clearly erroneous.
The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the
Referee:
“The
claimant was employed for approximately 10 months as a manager at a convenience
store. His last day of work was
February 6, 2003, at which time he was asked to turn in his keys in accordance
with the resignation previously submitted by the claimant to the employer’s
area sales manager on January 24, 2003. The
claimant notified his employer that he was leaving his position at that time
because he was dissatisfied with the necessity of having to work weekends due to
the termination of one of his employees. The
employer was unable to allow the claimant to borrow an employee from another
store in the meantime, but the claimant had the authority to hire additional
help. All managers are required at times to work weekends as the
needs of those individuals’ stores demand.
Based on his perception that he would be required to work weekends for a
long period of time, the claimant submitted a two-week resignation notice to the
area sales manager. The claimant
subsequently reconsidered the situation and made a personal decision to stay on
in his position. The employer did
not accept the claimant’s rescission, but on February 6, 2003 the area sales
manager appeared at the claimant’s location and asked him to turn in his keys
and leave in accordance with the resignation.”
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:
“An
individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that
action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section
28-44-17.
In
order to show good cause for leaving one’s employment an individual must show
the job was unsuitable, or that he was placed in a situation in which he had no
reasonable alternative. The burden of proof to show good cause rests solely upon
the claimant. Although there was
conflicting testimony concerning facts and circumstances which led to the
claimant’s separation from his job, I find based on the most credible
testimony presented that the claimant did resign his position.
There was no evidence to indicate that the claimant’s job became
unsuitable by the mere termination of one of his employees.
The fact that he would be required to work weekends until such time as
further help was provided did not cause his job to become unsuitable.
The fact that he reconsidered his resignation does suggest that his job
was not unsuitable. While the
claimant may have acted hastily in resigning his position, the facts indicate
that he did submit his notice of resignation which was accepted by the employer. Under the circumstances of this case, I find that the
claimant did voluntarily leave his job without good cause within the meaning of
Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act and is, therefore,
not entitled to benefits.”
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for
taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions
of Section 28-44-17, which provides:
“28-44-17.
Voluntary leaving without good cause. --
An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be
ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits until he or she establishes to
the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving
had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has
had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in
chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more
employers subject to chapters 42 -- 44, of this title.
For the purposes of this section, voluntary leaving work with good cause
shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex.
For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good
cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join
or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement
of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the
temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek
additional work unless good cause
is shown for said failure; provided, however, that the temporary help agency
gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact
the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment
to seek additional work.”
The approach to be taken in defining “good cause” was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:
To
view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he
terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination
thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act.
This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision
that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.
In
excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate
their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public
interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion
by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer.
However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation
sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to
employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the
conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or
aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.
The
court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be
“under compulsion” or that the reason therefor must be of a “compelling
nature.”
The
Court, in its review of the entire case finds that the issue in this case is a
factual one. The Court finds that
there is substantial and reliable evidence that the fact finders could conclude
that the claimant intended to resign and in fact gave a two (2) week oral
resignation, which was accepted by the employer.
On page 44 of Referee transcript:
“Q.
So, on the Friday before, you say Mr. Platt, contrary to what he said,
you said Mr. Platt indicate that while you were giving a two-week notice, and
you’re telling me you gave a two-week notice at that time?
A.
That’s correct.
Q.
You did give one?
A.
Yup.”
On
page 45 of Referee transcript:
“Q.
(INAUDIBLE) he said he was accepting your resignation?
What did he say?
A.
Uh, I’m accepting the two-week no -- notice.
Q.
Hand in the keys; two weeks is up? So,
you work from Monday, and ask Mr. Platt, he -- he considered, according to his
testimony, you were working out your notice.
As far as you were concerned on -- Monday, you’re telling me –“
On
page 31 of Referee transcript:
“MR.
CAPOZZA: -- there’s going to be additional help, and you said no?
A.
Right, correct.
Q.
And Mr. Downes then had stated to you that if it continued, he may have to look
elsewhere; isn’t that correct?
A.
No, he told me he was giving me his two-weeks’ notice.
Q.
Okay. So, you claim that
during that discussion he gave you the two-weeks notice?
A.
He did give me the two weeks’ notice.”
Page
43 of transcript:
“Q.
If things didn’t change, I was giving -- did you mean you were giving a
two-weeks’ notice at that time
A.
I believe so.
Q.
Do you -- do you understand the question?
A.
When I -- when I raised concern --
Q.
Did you say if things don’t change, I’m giving a --
A.
I would have to give my two-weeks’ notice.
Q.
I would have to give my two weeks --
A.
Yes.
Q.
My -- point of my question, were you providing a two-weeks’ notice,
unequivocal, at that time to Mr. Platt that you were giving --
A.
At that specific --
Q.
-- a two-weeks’ notice, and you were leaving approximately January
(INAUDIBLE)?
A.
At that specific moment, yes, I did, but he asked me to reconsider over
the weekend.”
From a review of the record, it is clear that after a review of all of
the testimony, the hearing officer could conclude that there was a resignation
by the claimant and an acceptance by the employer.
A
review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative
and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision
of the Board of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall
not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The
scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in
its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54.
Scope of judicial review -
Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings.
- The jurisdiction of the reviewing
court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the
findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence
regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision
of the Board was not “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record,” and that said decision was not
“arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.” Rhode
Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.