STATE
OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
PAUL
A. DION
V.
: A.A. 03-25
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND
TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW
D E C I S I O
N
The travel of the case is as follows.
The claimant last worked on June 18, 2002.
The claimant filed his new claim for Employment Security benefits on
October 28, 2002. In a decision
dated November 13, 2002, the Director determined the claimant voluntarily left
the job without good cause, as provided for under Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode
Island Employment Security Act. The
claimant filed a late appeal of this decision.
A hearing on this appeal was held on January 8, 2003, at which the
claimant appeared and provided testimony. A
representative of the employer appeared and provided testimony at the hearing.
The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment
security benefits, based on the determination that claimant filed an appeal out
of time and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-39(b).
Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the
Board of Review. The Board
determined that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts,
and upheld the Referee's decision. Thereafter,
Paul A. Dion filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of
the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island
General Laws § 28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which
provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g)
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In
excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made
upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected
by other error of law;
(5) Clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary
or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
Thus,
on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”
Guarino v. Department of
Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island
General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
Cahoone v. Board
of Review of the Department of Employment
Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld
even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See
also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department
of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The
Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
.
. . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of
liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as
broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the
circumstances. Of course,
compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of
eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the
legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this
court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on
eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of
Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that
the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the
claimant filed an appeal out of time was supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.
A majority of the Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact
of the Referee:
“The
notice of disqualification was mailed to the claimant on November 13, 2002 at
his address of record. The decision
clearly reads, ‘If you disagree with this determination, you must file a
written appeal within 15 days of the mailing date indicated on this decision or
it WILL BECOME FINAL.’
The claimant indicated he received the decision in a timely fashion, but
did not offer a valid explanation as to why he filed his appeal out of time.
The claimant filed his appeal, faxing it to the Department on December 5,
2002, seven days late."
A majority of the Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of
the Referee:
“The
issue in this case is whether or not the claimant filed an appeal out of time
with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-39(b) of the Rhode Island
Employment Security Act.
The
15-day appeal period provided for under the provisions of Section 28-44-39(b)
can be extended if the individual who filed out of time had good cause for being
late.
Section
28-44-39(b) reads, in part, as follows:
(b)
'Unless the claimant or any other interested party who is entitled to notice
shall request a hearing within fifteen (15) days after the notice of
determination has been mailed by the director to the last known address of the
claimant and of any other interested party, the determination shall be final;
provided, however, that for good cause
shown the fifteen (15) day period may be extended; and provided, further,
however, that the director, on his or her own
motion, may at any time within one year from the date of the
determination set forth in subsection (a)(1) reconsider the determination, if he
or she finds that an error has occurred in connection therewith, or that the
determination was made as a result of a mistake, or the nondisclosure or
misrepresentation of a material fact.'
In
the instant case the claimant had received this notice of disqualification on
November 13, 2002. The claimant was
aware of the appeal rights provided and cited in this decision. The claimant filed his appeal seven days late, but was unable
to offer a valid reason as to why the appeal was filed out of time.
Based upon the credible testimony presented, I find that the claimant’s
late appeal is without good cause and cannot be granted at this time."
In a review of the record, this Court finds that the reasoning and analysis of the majority of the Board of Review is a correct determination of the facts and conclusion which has been adopted and incorporated in the Board of Review’s decision. In its analysis, the Board indicated that:
“This section requires an appeal from a decision of the Director to be filed within fifteen (15) days of the decision. The claimant was required to file his appeal on or before November 28, 2002. The claimant’s appeal was filed on December 5, 2002. Under Section 28-44-39(b) of the Act the Referee has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal unless the appealing party shows good cause for filing the appeal late. On January 9, 2003 the Referee concluded the claimant had failed to show good cause for filing his appeal late.
On January 29, 2003 the claimant and his spouse appeared before the Board and provided testimony and argument. Before the Board the claimant testified that he was in Canada to tend to the passing of family member, an aunt. The claimant returned to Rhode Island on or about November 22, 2002. During this time a number of personal and family matters had backed up which he had to resolve. The decision from the Director had become intermingled with other mail during his absence, and the claimant did not locate it until after the filing period. As a result, the claimant was prevented from filing his appeal until December 5, 2002, when he faxed it to the Department.
The Board has carefully reviewed the evidence and testimony contained in the record together with the evidence and testimony presented before the Board.
The claimant has failed to establish good cause. A telephone call to the Board or a fax after his arrival would have preserved his appeal rights. The claimant had six days to take such action. The Board concedes that the claimant was busy with other matters but the act of filing of an appeal by fax or telephone takes minutes, not hours. The Board concludes that the decision of Referee is a proper determination of the facts and conclusion of law. The Board affirms the Referee’s findings and conclusions and incorporates the decision of the Referee into this decision.
The decision of Referee is affirmed and the claimant’s appeal is dismissed.”
A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54.
Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of
proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the
reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of
fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial
evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.