STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION


STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS:

v. : A.A. 06-73

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :


DECISION

 

McLOUGHLIN, J.  This matter is before the Court on the complaint of the Department of Corrections, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Sheree Carter-Paulino was entitled to receive employment security benefits.

            The facts and travel of the case are as follows.  The claimant, Sheree Carter-Paulino was terminated from the employ of the Department of Corrections where she served as a correctional officer.  Subsequently, claimant filed for employment security benefits.  The Director issued a notice of determination which denied benefits to the claimant.  Claimant filed a timely appeal, and a hearing was held before the Referee.  The Referee held the claimant was entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant is not disqualified under Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act and was thus qualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-18.

            Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant upheld the Referee's decision.  Thereafter, the Department of Corrections filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.

            The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:

42-35-15.  Judicial review of contested cases.

(g)       The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

 

            (1)       In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

            (2)       In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

            (3)       Made upon unlawful procedure;

            (4)       Affected by other error of law;

            (5)       Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

                        probative, and substantial evidence on the

                        whole record; or

            (6)       Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse

                        of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

                        discretion.

 

  1. Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”  Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).  The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968).  Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result.  Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968).  See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
  2. The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
  3. . . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family.”  G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances.  Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act.  Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
  4.  
  5. The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.
  6.             The travel of the case is as follows:
  7.             “TRAVEL OF THE CASE:
  8.  
  9. The claimant had last worked on November 30, 2005. The claimant filed her new claim for benefits on December 9, 2005 with an effective date of December 4, 2005.  In a decision dated December 22, 2005, the Director determined that the claimant did not meet the availability requirements as cited under Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.  The claimant filed a timely appeal of this decision.  A hearing on this appeal was initially scheduled for January 17, 2005, [sic] but was postponed at the request of the claimant.  A subsequent hearing was scheduled and held on February 13, 2006, at which the claimant appeared and provided testimony.  The claimant was represented by an attorney at this hearing.  A representative of the employer appeared and provided testimony. The employer was represented by an attorney at the hearing.
  10.  
  11.             FINDINGS OF FACT:
  12.  
  13. The claimant is a full-time correctional officer and has been for the past fifteen years.  The claimant’s last day of work was November 30, 2005.  The claimant primarily works the third shift 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. at the correctional facility in Rhode Island.  The major parts of the claimant’s duty are to engage in a count of inmates on a regular basis throughout her shift.  She is also required to climb up and down three flights of stairs on a regular basis throughout her shift and perform other duties as required of a correctional officer, which on occasion can be strenuous.  The claimant is suffering from a disability concerning her right ankle.  The claimant finds it difficult to perform her normal job duties as indicated. Prior to he [sic] reporting for her shift on December 3rd she submitted a medical from her doctor indicating she is available for light duty, full time employment.  Light duty is not readily available with this employer.  The claimant remained out of work for the three weeks ending December 24, 2005. The claimant returned to work on December 24, 2005 and remained employed through January 4, 2006 when she underwent surgery for said medical condition.  The claimant presented documentation that she was able and available for other type work during this period of time and submitted a work search for said other work.  The claimant is requesting benefits for the three weeks ending December 24, 2005.”
  14.  
  15. The Referee concluded:
  16.  
  17. “The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant is subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.”
  18.  
  19. Section 28-44-12 reads as follows:
  20.  
  21. '28-44-12.  Availability and registration for work. -  (a) An individual is not eligible for benefits for any week of his or her partial or total unemployment unless during that week he or she is physically able to work and available for work.  To prove availability for work, every individual partially or totally unemployed registers for work and:
  22.  
  23. (1)  Files a claim for benefits within the time limits and with the frequency and in such manner, in person or in writing, as the director may prescribe;
  24.            
  25.             (2) Responds whenever called for work through the         employment office; and
  26.  

(3)  Makes an active, independent search for suitable work.

 

  1. (b)  If an unemployed individual has been determined to be likely to exhaust regular benefits and to need reemployment services pursuant to a profiling system established by the director, the individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the individual participates in reemployment services, such as job search assistance services, unless the director determines that:
  2.  
  3. (1)    The individual has completed those services; or
  4.  
  5. (2)    There is justifiable cause for the individual's failure to participate in those services.
  6.  
  7. (c) No individual shall be eligible for any benefits for any week in which he or she fails, without good cause, to comply with the requirements as set forth above.’
  8.  
  9. In the instant case, the claimant last worked on November 30, 2005.  The claimant presented medical documentation to her employer at that time that she was not able and available to perform her normal job duties but was able to work at her position on light duty.  Light duty work was not available to the claimant at that time from this employer.  I find the testimony presented by both parties in this matter to be credible.  Based upon this testimony and documentation provided, I find the claimant to be fully able and available for employment and has met the work search requirements as cited under Section 28-44-12 of the Act.  She does demonstrate a full attachment to the local labor market.  Therefore, the claimant cannot be denied benefits in this matter.”
  10.  
  11. THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW WAS ON APPEAL
  12.  
  13. “This matter came on to be heard before the Board of Review on April 17, 2006, in connection with the employer’s appeal dated February 28, 2006, from a decision of a Referee dated February 15, 2006, allowing the claimant benefits under Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
  14.  
  15. The Board of Review has carefully reviewed the evidence and testimony contained in the record together with the evidence and testimony presented at this hearing.
  16.  
  17. It is our opinion that the decision of the Referee is a proper adjudication of the facts in this case and the law applicable thereto.  Accordingly, the decision of the Referee is approved and confirmed and incorporated by reference herein.”
  18.  
  19. A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.
  20.             On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
  21.             The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:
  22.             28-44-54.  Scope of  judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.
  23.  
  24.             Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record,” and that said decision was not “arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”  Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
            Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.