STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

DEROBBIO, C.J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Kimberly Daniels, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Kimberly Daniels was not entitled to receive employment security benefits.

The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant last worked on August 4, 2000. She filed a claim for Employment Security benefits on October 23, 2000. In a decision dated December 6, 2000 the Director determined the claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause, within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal. A hearing on this appeal was held on January 9, 2001, at which time the claimant and her witness appeared and testified.

The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the determination that claimant voluntarily left work without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-17.

Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision. Thereafter, Kimberly Daniels filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.

The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:

42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of

fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or

remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse

or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant

have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

 

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence on the

whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse

of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion.

 

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court " . . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).

The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:

. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L. 1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.

The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:

"The claimant was employed as a machine operator for approximately two years. The claimant reported to the police station on the evening of August 4 for her Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) check. She had been on probation and was unaware of the fact that she was responsible for an outstanding ticket and that there was a warrant for her arrest. The claimant was allowed one telephone call, which she made to her mother. She did not request her mother contact the employer. The claimant was with a friend when she was arrested, but did not want the friend to contact anyone, since she was embarrassed. The claimant also felt she would not be allowed to continue her assignment, due to the results of her BCI check. Since she did not report to work as scheduled on August 5 and made no contact with the employer until after she was released on August 8, the claimant was considered to have abandoned her job."

The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:

"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17.

In order to show good cause for voluntarily leaving one's employment, an individual must either prove the work unsuitable, or show that she was placed in a situation that left her no reasonable alternative but to leave her job. In the instant case there is no evidence of job unsuitability. Additionally, the claimant failed to show she was placed in a situation that left her no reasonable alternative but to leave her employment. The claimant was unaware of an outstanding ticket and was arrested on the evening of August 4. However, she had the alternative of either asking her mother or the friend who was with her at the time, to notify the employer of her absence. While the employer may not have been able to place her in the same assignment due to the results of the claimant's BCI check, there may have been other assignments to which she could have been sent. Therefore, I find the claimant's leaving to be without good cause, within the meaning of the above Section of the Act."

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17, which provides:

28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. -- On and after July 2, 1978, an individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits until he establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he has subsequent to that leaving had at least four weeks of work, and in each of those four weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 42 of this title; . . . For purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. (Emphasis added.)

The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:

To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.

In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.

The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be "under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling nature."

The facts presented to the agency are uncontradicted. The only witnesses who testified at the Referee's hearing were the claimant and her witness. The claimant did not appear at her place of employment as scheduled on Saturday, August 5, 2000 because she was incarcerated as a result of the issuance of a court warrant. She was released on August 8, 2000. The record is clear that she made a phone call to her mother. Her employer was not notified that she would not be at work due to this detention.

It is a reasonable expectation that the employer has a right to be notified of her inability to be in attendance at work when scheduled and expected. Any incarceration was as a result of the claimant's own conduct. The record is clear that there is no evidence that the job became unsuitable. There is no evidence that the claimant had no other alternative but to leave her employment.

The burden of proof in this case was upon the claimant, and she failed in her efforts.

A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.

On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:

28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.