STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION


SAMUEL CURRIA 

V. : A.A. 02-06

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :

D E C I S I O N

DEROBBIO, C.J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Samuel Curria, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Samuel Curria was not entitled to receive Temporary Disability Insurance benefits.

The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant had been in receipt of Temporary Disability Insurance benefits through the week ending October 13, 2001. At that time the claimant had exhausted his benefit credits, under the provisions of Section 28-41-7 of the Rhode Island Temporary Disability Insurance Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal. A hearing on the appeal was scheduled. A Notice of Hearing was sent to all interested parties. The hearing was held on November 19, 2001. The claimant appeared and testified.

The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive Temporary Disability Insurance benefits, based on the determination that claimant had exhausted all funds in his account and that there is no statutory provision for the extension of benefits and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 28-41-7.

Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review. The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts, and upheld the Referee’s decision. Thereafter, Samuel Curria filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.

The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:

42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of

fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or

remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse

or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant

have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

 

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence on the

whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse

of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of

discretion.

 

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).

The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act:

. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant was not entitled to extended benefits was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.

The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the Referee:

"The claimant had filed for Temporary Disability Insurance benefits. He was determined to be eligible to receive $9720 total benefit credits. The claimant did receive all benefit credits due with his final payment being issued on October 13, 2001. The claimant’s basis for appeal is that he is seeking an extension of benefit credits."

The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:

"The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant is entitled to additional Temporary Disability Insurance benefits under the provisions of Section 28-41-7 of the Temporary Disability Insurance Act.

Neither the General Laws of Rhode Island or [sic] the specific laws governing the Temporary Disability Insurance Act, Sections 28 - 39 through Sections 28 - 41, provide for an extension of benefits.

The claimant’s appeal, therefore, cannot be granted, as the claimant did, in fact, receive all monies due on this claim."

This Court reviewed the entire record and finds no statutory provision that could cause the Board of Review to provide for additional extended Temporary Disability Insurance benefits. See Section 28 - 41 section 28 - 39.

Section 28-41-7 of the General Laws of Rhode Island provides:

28-41-7. Total amount of benefits. - The total amount of benefits payable during a benefit year to any eligible individual is an amount equal to thirty-six percent (36%) of the individual’s total wages for employment by employers subject to chapters 39 - 41 of this title during his or her base period; provided, that no individual will be paid total benefits in any benefit year which exceed thirty (30) times his or her weekly benefit rate; provided further, that dependents’ allowances to which he or she might be entitled under § 28-41-5 will be in addition to these total benefits. If the total amount of benefits is not an exact multiple of one dollar ($1.00), it is raised to the next higher multiple of one dollar ($1.00).

A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.

On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:

28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.