STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, SC   DISTRICT COURT ,  SIXTH DIVISION

NADINE COSTA 

V. : A.A. 02-98 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND : TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :

D E C I S I O N

DEROBBIO, C.J. This matter is before the Court on the complaint of Nadine Costa, filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which reversed the finding of the Referee that the claimant, Nadine Costa was entitled to receive employment security benefits. The travel of the case is as follows. The claimant had been employed for the Preservation Society a period of three years. Her last actual day of work was April 3, 2002. She subsequently left the job as of May 1, 2002. The Director determined that the claimant voluntarily left the job without good cause under the provisions of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal. A hearing on the appeal was scheduled. A notice of hearing was sent to all interested parties. A hearing was held before a Referee on June 20, 2002. The claimant testified by telephone. The employer representative testified by telephone. On June 26, 2002 the Referee issued a decision in which he reversed the determination of the Director. The employer appealed to the Board of Review. A hearing was held before the full Board of Review on August 19, 2002 at which time the claimant, an employer representative and counsel for the employer appeared at the hearing. The Board determined that the Referee's decision was not a proper adjudication of the facts, and reversed the Referee's decision. Thereafter, Nadine Costa filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52. The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows: 42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases. (g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; (4) Affected by other error of law; (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Thus, on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986). The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in construing and applying the Employment Security Act: . . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his family." G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).

The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's decision was not a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous. A majority of the Board of Review made the following findings of fact: "The claimant had worked for this employer a period of three years through April 3, 2002, at which time the claimant went out on a medical leave of absence. She was on a leave of absence status until May 1, 2002 when she resigned. She stated that she resigned because she was medically advised not to return to work for this employer due to stress and anxiety factors.

Prior to her resignation the claimant had been offered by her employer to be put on family medial leave act leave [sic]. The claimant was also notified by the human relations director that there are other positions available for her within the employer organization. The claimant chose not to accept FLMA leave and chose not to pursue any alternative positions with the employer."

A majority of the Board of Review made the following conclusions: "The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17.

Because of the fact that the claimant had reasonable alternatives available to her including FLMA leave and the option of securing different positions within the employer's organization, we conclude that she did not have good cause to leave her job under these circumstances."

Respondent, Preservation Society of Newport County, filed a motion to dismiss, in that the claimant failed to file her brief in a timely fashion. The Court's function, in its review of administrative appeals, is to permit the parties to file memoranda of law. This Court will review the record of an administrative appeal if the record and notice were complied with in a timely manner. This Court is not statutorily bound to permit parties an opportunity to file briefs, and it has ruled that a late filing of a memorandum of law in not a fatal defect. Rule 80 of the Rhode Island District Court Civil Rules provides in its pertinent part: ". . . No responsive pleading need be filed unless required by statute or by order of the court."

Therefore, the claimant's motion to dismiss is hereby denied.

An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section 28-44-17, which provides: '28-44-17. Voluntary leaving without good cause. -- An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the voluntarily quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight (8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to chapters 42 - 44 of this title. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall include sexual harassment against members of either sex. For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work unless good cause is shown for said failure; provided, that the temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment to seek additional work.'

The approach to be taken in defining "good cause" was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted: To view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act. This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.

In excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer. However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.

The court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be "under compulsion" or that the reason therefor must be of a "compelling nature." A review of the record demonstrates, and it is uncontradicted, that the claimant had been on medical leave until she resigned her position because she was medically advised not to work for this employer due to stress and anxiety factors. The Board of Review, in its decision, relies upon the fact that the claimant had reasonable alternatives, including Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The FMLA does not provide for any benefits; in fact, it provides for thirteen weeks of unpaid leave. This Court finds that FMLA is not an alternative to either employment or benefits. A review of the record demonstrates that the evidence provided by the claimant established that she was directed by her physician not to return to work at her present employment. The record further demonstrates that there is evidence on the record that the employer recognized that the claimant had a medical problem by their offer and the advising of the Family Medical Leave Act. The evidence presented on the issue of the claimant's medical concerns is uncontradicted. The Court further adopts the reasoning of the Referee. A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is not substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review. On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides: 28-44-54. Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.

Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was "arbitrary and capricious and characterized by abuse of discretion and clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6). 

Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby reversed.