STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
JOANN
CONGDON
V.
: A.A. 03-133
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW
D
E C I S I O N
DEROBBIO,
C.J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of JoAnn Congdon, filed
pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the
respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the
finding of the Referee that the claimant, JoAnn Congdon, was not entitled to
receive employment security benefits.
The travel of the case is as follows.
The claimant last worked on March 4, 2003.
The claimant filed for Employment Security benefits on January 21, 2003. In a decision dated June 10, 2003 the Director determined
that the claimant failed to meet the availability requirements under the
provisions of Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
The Director further determined that the claimant was overpaid $71.00 in
benefits paid for the weeks ending March 8, 2003 because those weeks were paid
during a period of disqualification. The
claimant was found at fault for the overpayment and required to make restitution
under the provisions of Section 28-42-68 of the Rhode Island Employment Security
Act.
The
claimant refiled for Employment Security benefits on March 17, 2003.
In a decision dated June 10, 2003, the Director determined that the
claimant left her job without good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17
of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
The Director further determined that the claimant was overpaid $2,070.00
in benefits for the weeks ending March 15, 2003 through May 10, 2003, because
those weeks were paid during a period of disqualification.
The claimant filed an appeal out of time on July 30, 2003.
A hearing on the appeal was held on August 27, 2003, at which time the
claimant appeared and testified. The
claimant was represented by counsel during the hearing.
The claimant was accompanied by one observer. The employer, with proper notice, failed to participate.
The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment
security benefits, based on the determination that claimant filed an appeal out
of time, and was found at fault for overpayment of benefits and was thus
disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws Section 28-44-39(b).
Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the
Board of Review. The Board
determined that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts,
and upheld the Referee's decision. Thereafter,
JoAnn Congdon filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of
the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island
General Laws § 28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which
provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g)
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In
excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made
upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected
by other error of law;
(5) Clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary
or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
Thus,
on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”
Guarino v. Department of
Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island
General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
Cahoone v. Board
of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503,
246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated
differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable
mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See
also D'Ambra v. Board of Review,
Department of Employment Security,
517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The
Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
.
. . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of
liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as
broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the
circumstances. Of course,
compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of
eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the
legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this
court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on
eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of
Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that
the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the
claimant filed an appeal out of time without good cause was supported by
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not
it was clearly erroneous.
The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the
Referee:
“I
find by preponderance of credible testimony and evidence the following findings
of facts: On June 10, 2003 the
Rhode Island Department of Labor & Training mailed the claimant three
determinations at her address of record. All
three determinations were received by the claimant and read.
The first determination was a notice of decision indicating that the
claimant was found to have unreported wages during a period she received
Employment Security benefits. The claimant was found to be overpaid and subject to make
restitution of $12.00. The second
notice of disqualification found that the claimant was not laid off from her
position at Job Pro but that she had resigned without good cause, that resulting
in an overpayment of $2,070.00 subject to restitution.
The third determination, found that the claimant was absent from work due
to illness and therefore failed to meet the availability requirements causing an
overpayment of $71.00 subject to restitution.
Approximately one month later, on or about July 11, 2003 the claimant
mailed a $12.00 check to the Department of Labor & Training Overpayment Unit
satisfying one of the three determinations.
On July 17, 2003, the Department of Labor & Training mailed the
claimant another overpayment due notice indicating the receipt of payment for
the $12.00 and the balance due of $2,141.00.
In
a letter dated July 21, 2003 and post marked July 30, 2003 the claimant mailed a
letter to the Overpayment Unit causing a telephone call by that Division to
establish intent. The claimant was
asked at that time whether that letter should be applied as an appeal on the
remaining two decisions. It was
affirmed at that time and the letter was forwarded to the Central Adjudication
Unit.”
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of law of the
Referee:
“The
first issue in this case is, the 15-day appeal period provided for under the
provisions of Section 28-44-39(b) can be extended if the individual who filed
out of time had good cause for being late.
Section
28-44-39(b) reads, in part, as follows:
(b)
'Unless the claimant or any other interested party who is entitled to notice
shall request a hearing within fifteen (15) days after the notice of
determination has been mailed by the director to the last known address of the
claimant and of any other interested party, the determination shall be final;
provided, however, that for good cause
shown the fifteen (15) day period may be extended; and provided, further,
however, that the director, on his or her own
motion, may at any time within one year from the date of the
determination set forth in subsection (a)(1) reconsider the determination, if he
or she finds that an error has occurred in connection therewith, or that the
determination was made as a result of a mistake, or the nondisclosure or
misrepresentation of a material fact.'
In
the instant case, no credible testimony has been provided for the filing of a
late appeal. The claimant received the proper information from the Department of
Labor & Training relative to the filing for benefits and eligibility.
The claimant used that information to properly access the Tele-Serve
system. After an audit occurred the
claimant received three separate decisions in one mailing.
For unknown reasons the claimant failed to appeal any of the three
decisions within the allowable 15-day period.
The claimant eventually decided react to one of the three overpayments
she was required to make restitution on. In
the instant case the required restitution was for $12.00, $71.00, and $2,070.00.
Having read each of the determinations she failed to make any efforts to
contact the Department of Labor & Training to ask for explanations if in
fact she was confused. The claimant did however decide to react to the one
determination after the Overpayment Unit sent a payment due notice. She chose the one with the least restitution.
The claimant’s July 30, 2003 letter to the Overpayment Unit following a
notice of overpayment due made no indication of appeal and was mailed to the
address noted on the overpayment due notice and not the address clearly printed
on all three decisions received by the claimant.
Therefore,
absent any credible testimony or evidence to the contrary of the claimant’s
late appeal is found to be without good cause.”
The claimant argues the factual issue that the temporary agency misled her with false information. However, this Court reviews the entire record to determine, in this case, whether there is sufficient evidence on the record to demonstrate that the Board of Review could substantiate its decision that the claimant failed to show good cause for filing a late appeal pursuant to 28-44-39(b).
A review of the entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54.
Scope of judicial review - Additional evidence - Precedence of
proceedings. - The jurisdiction of the
reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law, and, in the absence of
fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if supported by substantial
evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules, shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," and that said decision was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.