STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION
JOHN
S. CHIRILLO :
:
:
V. : A.A. 04-78
:
:
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW AND FITNESS CONCEPTS
D E C I S I O N
LaFAZIA,
J. This matter
is before the Court on the complaint of John S. Chirillo, filed pursuant to
Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final
decision rendered by respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training,
which affirmed the decision of the Referee, dismissing and denying the appeal
as it was filed in an untimely manner. The Decision is affirmed for the reasons
set forth below.
TRAVEL OF THE CASE
The claimant was employed for fifteen months. His last day of work was February
27, 2004. The claimant refiled for Employment Security benefits on March 1,
2004. In a decision dated March 29, 2004, the Director determined that the claimant
left his job without good cause and further determined that the claimant was
overpaid the sum of $662.00. The claimant was required to make restitution.
The claimant filed his appeal out of time on May 5, 2004. A telephonic hearing
on the appeal was held on June 1, 2004, at which time, the claimant and a representative
of the employer were present. On June 1, 2004, the Referee issued a decision
in which he denied and dismissed the appeal.
Thereafter, the matter was appealed and came before the Board of Review. On
June 11, 2004, the Board of Review determined that the Referee's decision constituted
a proper adjudication of facts and that the conclusions were correct and proper.
The Board affirmed the decision of the Referee. The claimant filed a complaint
for judicial review; jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is
vested in the District Court by Rhode Island General Laws § 28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g),
a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which provides as follows:
42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision
of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus, on questions
of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency unless its findings
are clearly erroneous." Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I.
583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of fact. Cahoone v. Board of Review of the Department
of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968). Stated differently,
the findings of the agency will be upheld even though a reasonable mind might
have reached a contrary result. Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of
Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See also D'Ambra
v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I.
1986).
The Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
. . . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family." G.L. 1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared
a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek
to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may
in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does
not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class
of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act;
but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of
expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions
of the act. Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's
decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the claimant was supported
by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or
not it was clearly erroneous.
The Board of Review made the following findings of fact as incorporated from
the decision of the Referee:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The claimant refiled for Employment Security benefits on March 1, 2004. The
claimant had quit in order to move to Florida. During the claimant's adjudication
on March 17, 2004 he indicated he was laid off due to lack of work. He was provided
benefits for the weeks ending March 6 and March 13, 2004. On March 26, 2004,
he advised that he was residing in Florida since the previous week. The decision
of March 29, 2004 was sent to his Florida address, which decision included instructions
regarding his right of appeal. The claimant filed his appeal out of time on
May 5, 2004 after receiving notice in a timely manner that his benefits had
been denied.
DISCUSSION
Claimant maintains that he made an effort to file his appeal by fax in a timely
manner. He further claims that his telephone calls, made in an attempt to confirm
receipt of his appeal, were not returned in a timely manner. He claims he then
refaxed the appeal on March 5, 2005. The claimant provided no documents confirming
that he sent the alleged fax. Claimant did not offer any specific information
as to the date or the location from which he allegedly faxed the appeal. The
telephone records provided by claimant offer no documentation in support of
his claim that he faxed this appeal in a timely manner.
CONCLUSIONS
The issue in this case is whether or not the claimant filed an appeal out of
time with good cause within the meaning of § 28-44-39(b) of the Rhode Island
Employment Security Act.
A review of the entire record in this matter demonstrates that there is substantial,
probative and reliable evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions
and decision of the Board of Review. Upon careful review of the evidence, this
Court finds that the decision of the Board was not "clearly erroneous in
view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence" on the whole
reason and that said decision was not arbitrary, capricious or characterized
by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. Rhode
Island General Laws 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the
decision of the Board of Review is hereby affirmed.