STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
RICHARD
CASTO
:
V.
: A.A. 02-84
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND TRAINING,
BOARD OF REVIEW
D
E C I S I O N
The travel of the case is as
follows. The claimant last worked
on April 11, 2002. He filed for
Employment Security benefits on April 15, 2002.
On May 6, 2002, the Director determined that the claimant had voluntarily
quit his job without good cause and that benefits would be denied him under the
provisions of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act.
The claimant filed a timely appeal on May 8, 2002.
A hearing was set down on this appeal on May 30, 2002, at which the
claimant appeared and testified. One witness appeared and testified on behalf of
the claimant. One witness appeared
and testified on behalf of the employer.
The Referee held the claimant was
not entitled to receive unemployment security benefits, based on the
determination that claimant left work voluntarily without good cause and was
thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
28-44-17.
Thereafter, a timely appeal was
filed and the matter was heard by the Board of Review.
The Board determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper
adjudication of the facts and that the claimant left work voluntarily without
good cause pursuant to the provisions of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island
Employment Security Act, and upheld the Referee’s decision.
Thereafter, Richard Casto filed a complaint for judicial review;
jurisdiction for review of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District
Court by Rhode Island General Laws §
28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided
by Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which
provides as follows:
42-35-15.
Judicial review of contested cases.
(g)
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand the case for further
proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if
substantial rights of the appellant
have
been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(1)
In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2)
In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3)
Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4)
Affected by other error of law;
(5)
Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence
on the
whole record; or
(6)
Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus,
on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”
Guarino v. Department of
Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island
General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact. Cahoone
v. Board of Review of the
Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968).
Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though
a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See
also D’Ambra v. Board of Review,
Department of Employment Security,
517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The
Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
.
. . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” G.L.1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature
having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing
the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it
reasonably may in the circumstances. Of
course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of
eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the
legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this
court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on
eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act.
Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597 (1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that
the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the
claimant voluntarily left work without good cause was supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was
clearly erroneous.
The Board of Review adopted the
following findings of fact of the Referee:
“The
claimant had worked as a driver/stock person for approximately three years and
last worked on April 11, 2002. The
claimant quit his job because his employer had threatened to fire him if he
didn’t do a certain thing or didn’t perform his job duties to the
satisfaction of the employer. The
other reason that the claimant quit was because he felt he was being required to
perform job functions that were not part of his job description, i.e. pick up
and deliver coffees, clean toilets, sweep floors and empty garbage.
Other employees in a similar position to the claimant also performed the
same additional job functions.”
The
Board in its decision stated:
“The
Board has carefully reviewed the evidence and testimony contained in the record
together with the evidence, testimony, and argument presented before the Board.
The
record testimonial and documentary evidence supports the Referee’s conclusion
that the claimant had the alternative of securing other employment before
leaving his employment. Before the
Referee the claimant was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that he had good cause to leave his job.”
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:
“The
issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with
good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment
Security Act.
An
individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that
action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section
28-44-17.
In
order to show good cause for voluntarily leaving one’s employment, an
individual must either prove the work unsuitable, or show that he was placed in
a situation that left him no reasonable alternative but to terminate his
employment. In the instant case,
there is no evidence of job unsuitability.
The claimant was upset that the employer threatened to fire him and for
having to perform job functions that he did not think were part of his job
description; however, being offended by those actions of the employer does not
constitute good cause for leaving one’s employment.
The claimant had the alternative of securing other employment before
leaving this position. I find that
the claimant was not placed in a situation that left him no reasonable
alternative but to terminate his employment.
Therefore, I must hold that the claimant left his job without good cause,
within the meaning of the above Section of the Act.
Benefits must be denied him.”
The
Board of Review in its decision stated:
“However,
before the Board the issue is whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the Referee’s findings and conclusions.
Even
though we may disagree with the Referee’s decision, if there is sufficient
evidence in the record to support the Referee’s decision, the Board will not
reverse the Referee.
The
Board concludes that the decision of the Referee is a proper determination of
the facts and conclusion of law. The
Board affirms the Referee’s findings and conclusions and incorporates the
decision of the Referee into this decision.”
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for
taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions
of Section 28-44-17, which provides:
28-44-17.
Voluntary leaving without good cause. --
An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be
ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the
voluntary quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of
the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight
(8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at
least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this
title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to
chapters 42 – 44, of this title. For
the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall
include sexual harassment against members of either sex.
For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good
cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join
or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement
of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the
temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek
additional work unless good cause
is shown for said failure; provided, however, that the temporary help agency
gave written notice to the individual that the individual is required to contact
the temporary help agency at the completion of the most recent work assignment
to seek additional work.
The approach to be taken in defining “good cause” was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:
To
view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he
terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination
thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act.
This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision
that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.
In
excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate
their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public
interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion
by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer.
However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation
sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to
employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the
conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or
aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.
The
court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be
“under compulsion” or that the reason therefor must be of a “compelling
nature.”
A review of the entire record shows
that the claimant voluntarily left his employment.
The claimant alleges that the reason for leaving the job was that the
employer threatened to fire him on many occasions, stating, “I will get rid of
you if you don’t do things my way.” The
record also shows that the claimant indicates that “. . . he made me go get
coffees, lunch, fill their own personal cars, clean bathrooms.
That wasn’t my job title.” There
is evidence on the record to demonstrate that employees in the same
classification performed the same additional functions.
The review of the
record, based upon evidence presented, demonstrates that the Board of Review
could conclude that the job did not become unsuitable and that the claimant was
not placed in a position that left him no other reasonable alternative but to
terminate his employment. Being
upset and offended over an employer threatening to fire an employee, who is
required to perform such functions that the claimant believed were not part of
his job description, does not constitute good cause for leaving his job.
A review of the
entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable
evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board
of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the
weight of the evidence, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of
the administrative agency.
The scope of judicial
review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in its pertinent part
provides:
28-44-54.
Scope of judicial review -
Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. -
The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law,
and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if
supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules,
shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision
of the Board was not “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record,” and that said decision was not
“arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.” Rhode
Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.