STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION

DEANNA AYANYAN :

V. : A.A. 05-99

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF REVIEW :

D E C I S I O N

GORMAN, J. In this appeal from a decision of the Department of Labor and Training Board of Review, plaintiff seeks reversal of a decision finding her ineligible for unemployment benefits because it found she did not meet the availability requirements of Section 28-44-12 of the Rhode Island General Laws.

The record reflects that plaintiff worked for twenty-three months as a sales person for Cox Communications and was terminated after she was unable to work her normal hours because of her mother's illness and child care demands. Following a ruling of ineligibility by the Director of the Department of Labor and Training, Ms. Ayanyan appealed and a hearing was held before a referee, who affirmed the decision of the director. That determination was appealed to the board of review which adopted the referee's findings and conclusions. This petition pursuant to § 42-35-15, was then filed by Ms. Ayanyan acting pro se.

Under the relevant portion of § 28-44-12, an out-of-work person may receive unemployment benefits if the individual meets certain criteria. One of the requirements is that claimant be "available for work." The statute goes on to say that "[n]o individual shall be eligible for benefits for any week in which he fails, without good cause, to comply with the requirements" of this section. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has explained that cases being considered under these provisions should be subjected to a two part analysis: first, the court must decide whether the person is unavailable for a good reason; and if that test is satisfied, whether the restrictions "substantially impair the claimant's attachment to the labor market" Huntley v. Department of Employment Security, 397 S.2d 902, 903 (R.I. 1979).

When this standard is applied to plaintiff's circumstances, it is clear that she satisfies the "good cause" element. Her availability for work is limited because she must care for her children as well as a sick mother, and the referee found in her favor on this issue. However, the court must also find that the restriction of being able to work only between the hours of 4:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. does not "substantially impair" her ability to secure employment. Id. at 907.

Plaintiff had just left a job where she was a sales representative for a communication company. She also had experience in the banking sector, and had done billing work for a hospital and in the restaurant industry. While no specific findings were made by the referee, work in this segment of the economy seems most likely to be conducted between 9:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. This assumption is buttressed by the fact that Ms. Ayanyan had applied and been rejected for a position by fifteen employers.

There is no cut-off point in terms of the number of hours a claimant must be available for work in order to qualify under § 28-44-12, and each type of work would have its own natural parameters, but the court said in Huntley, ibid.,
If a claimant placed such restrictions upon availability that he would be available 2 or 3 hours out of 24 for work of a nature which he was able to perform, however good the cause or compelling the reason, he would have in effect removed himself from the labor market and could not, therefore, be eligible for employment benefits.

Given our supreme court's statement and plaintiff's availability for only four and one half hours each day, the court finds that there is substantial, probative evidence in the record to support the decision of the referee and board.

Thus, the decision of the board is affirmed.