STATE
OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE,
SC DISTRICT COURT
MARYANNE
ALEGRIA
V.
: A.A. 02-41
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND TRAINING, BOARD OF
REVIEW :
D E C I
S I O N
DEROBBIO,
C.J.
This matter is before the Court on the complaint of MaryAnne Alegria,
filed pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15, seeking judicial review of a final decision rendered by the
respondent, Board of Review, Department of Labor and Training, which upheld the
finding of the Referee that the claimant, MaryAnne Alegria was not entitled to
receive employment security benefits.
The travel of the case is as follows.
The claimant was employed for one year.
Her last day of work was December 4, 2001.
In a Director’s decision dated December 31, 2001 it was determined that
the claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause within the meaning of
Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. The claimant filed a timely appeal of that decision.
A hearing on the appeal was held on January 17, 2002, at which time the
claimant and two employer representatives appeared and testified.
The Referee held the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment
security benefits, based on the determination that claimant left her employment
voluntarily without good cause and was thus disqualified pursuant to Rhode
Island General laws §
28-44-17.
Thereafter, a timely appeal was filed and the matter was heard by the
Board of Review. The Board
determined that the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts,
and upheld the Referee’s decision. Thereafter,
MaryAnne Alegria filed a complaint for judicial review; jurisdiction for review
of the decisions of the Board is vested in the District Court by Rhode Island
General Laws §
28-44-52.
The standard of review is provided by Rhode Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g), a section of the state Administrative Procedures Act, which
provides as follows:
42-35-15.
Judicial review of contested cases.
(g) The
court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse
or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In
excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made
upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected
by other error of law;
(5) Clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6)
Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Thus,
on questions of fact, the District Court ". . . may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency and must affirm the decision of the agency
unless its findings are clearly erroneous.”
Guarino v. Department of
Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 584, 410 A.2d 425 (1980) citing Rhode Island
General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5). The Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the Board as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact. Cahoone
v. Board of Review of the
Department of Employment Security, 104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213 (1968).
Stated differently, the findings of the agency will be upheld even though
a reasonable mind might have reached a contrary result.
Cahoone v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security,
104 R.I. 503, 246 A.2d 213, 215 (1968). See
also D'Ambra v. Board of Review, Department
of Employment Security, 517 A.2d 1039, 1041 (R.I. 1986).
The
Court has recognized that a liberal interpretation shall be utilized in
construing and applying the Employment Security Act:
.
. . eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed
legislative policy that "Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall
be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose
is to lighten the burden which now falls upon the unemployed worker and his
family.” G.L.1956, §
28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction,
this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its
humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances.
Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an
extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not
intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither
does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed
restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the
act. Harraka v. Board of Review
of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200 A.2d 595, 597
(1964).
The issue before the Court is whether the Board’s determination that
the Referee’s decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the
claimant left work voluntarily without good cause was supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was
clearly erroneous.
The Board of Review adopted the following findings of fact of the
Referee:
“The
claimant was employed for one year as a customer service representative.
On December 4, 2001 the claimant was called into a meeting with the Human
Resource Manager, at which time two issues were discussed.
The claimant was counseled concerning the use of foul language in the
workplace in accordance with the sexual harassment prevention policy.
The second issue discussed was the claimant’s concerns concerning her
discomfort in operating within the company’s procedures.
At no time during the meeting was the claimant threatened with
termination and the employer had no intent to so terminate her.
The claimant felt threatened and intimidated during the discussion
advising the Human Resource Manager that she was giving her two weeks’ notice
and at that time the meeting ceased. The
Human Resource Manager directed the claimant to submit her resignation in
writing if that was her choice, as the company preferred to have resignations in
writing. In accordance with the
request of the Human Resource Manager the claimant did, in fact, submit a
written resignation.”
The Board of Review adopted the following conclusions of the Referee:
“The
issue in this case is whether or not the claimant left work voluntarily with
good cause within the meaning of Section 28-44-17 of the Rhode Island Employment
Security Act.
An
individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for taking that
action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions of Section
28-44-17.
In
order to show good cause for leaving one’s employment an individual must
either show the job was unsuitable, or that she was placed in a situation which
left her no reasonable alternative. Based
on the credible testimony and findings of fact in this case, it is determined
that neither of these situations was in existence when the claimant decided to
leave her employment. The fact that
she became upset during a meeting discussing certain issues which had arisen did
not render her job unsuitable. The
claimant was merely being counseled regarding one issue and asked to discuss
another issue concerning company procedures.
At no time was the claimant threatened with termination nor was it the
intent of the employer to terminate her. Because
of her frustration she preferred to announce that she was quitting and giving
her two-week notice rather than make any effort to continue in her job.
The claimant placed herself among the unemployed voluntarily and without
good cause. It is determined,
therefore, that since the claimant voluntarily left her job without good cause
within the meaning of the above Section of the Act, she is not entitled to
benefits.”
An individual who leaves work voluntarily must establish good cause for
taking that action or else be subject to disqualification under the provisions
of Section 28-44-17, which provides:
‘28-44-17.
Voluntary leaving without good cause. --
An individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be
ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits for the week in which the
voluntarily quit occurred and until he or she establishes to the satisfaction of
the director that he or she has subsequent to that leaving had at least eight
(8) weeks of work, and in each of those eight (8) weeks has had earnings of at
least twenty (20) times the minimum hourly wage as defined in chapter 12 of this
title for performing services in employment for one or more employers subject to
chapters 42 – 44 of this title. For
the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work with good cause shall
include sexual harassment against members of either sex.
For the purposes of this section, voluntarily leaving work without good
cause shall include voluntarily leaving work with an employer to accompany, join
or follow his or her spouse in a new locality in connection with the retirement
of his or her spouse, or failure by a temporary employee to contact the
temporary help agency upon completion of the most recent work assignment to seek
additional work unless good cause is shown for said failure; provided, that the
temporary help agency gave written notice to the individual that the individual
is required to contact the temporary help agency at the completion of the most
recent work assignment to seek additional work.’
The approach to be
taken in defining “good cause” was stated in 1964 in Harraka v. Board of
Review of Department of Employment Security, 98 R.I. 197, 201, 200
A.2d 595, 597-98 (1964). The court
noted that a liberal reading of good cause would be adopted:
To
view the statutory language as requiring an employee to establish that he
terminated his employment under compulsion is to make any voluntary termination
thereof work a forfeiture of his eligibility under the act.
This, in our opinion, amounts to reading into the statute a provision
that the legislature did not contemplate at the time of its enactment.
In
excluding from eligibility for benefit payments those who voluntarily terminate
their employment without good cause, the legislature intended in the public
interest to secure the fund from which the payments are made against depletion
by payment of benefits to the shirker, the indolent, or the malingerer.
However, the same public interest demands of this court an interpretation
sufficiently liberal to permit the benefits of the act to be made available to
employees who in good faith voluntarily leave their employment because the
conditions thereof are such that continued exposure thereto would cause or
aggravate nervous reactions or otherwise produce psychological trauma.
The
court, as stated above, rejected the notion that the termination must be
“under compulsion” or that the reason therefor must be of a “compelling
nature.”
The claimant argues that her position became unsuitable and that she took
every reasonable step to maintain her employment under exceedingly difficult
circumstances and was left with no reasonable alternative but to resign.
A
review of the record shows that there is evidence that the employer’s
supervisor called the claimant in for a conference.
Page 13, Referee Transcript.
“EMPL1: Ah, MaryAnne was called in on two reasons.
Um, one was her use of foul language.
And we were calling her in to counsel her about using foul language in
the workplace. And that it was
prohibited under our sexual harassment policy.
And just to bring that to her attention.
And she was, um, upset about a company policy.
And we were talking about that. I
wanted to find out why she was upset about the policy.
And during the course of the meeting, she said, well, I’m just giving
my two weeks notice. So after she
said that, um, I told her that we always request that resignations be put in
writing. And that I’d like it on
my desk by noon. Which she did. She gave me her letter of resignation. And, um, you know, she left without incident. Because we made
a business decision that rather than have her stay for the two weeks we would
let her go then and just pay out her two weeks notice. Which she was paid out her two weeks notice.”
The claimant testified that there was a confrontation.
The testimony showed on page 11 of Referee transcript.
“CLT:
I had wanted to know why she was disregarding my, escalating that to a
administrator when it had initially gone to an administrator.
And the fact that the participant was not going to have a further call
back, was that she had told me. And
she told me to go get a life.
REF:
Nothing else occurred after that?
CLT:
Um, yes. I had some heated
words with her.
REF:
Um-hum. So you weren’t disciplined at that time?
CLT:
No.”
The claimant further testified.
“CLT:
Um, could I go backwards a little bit and ask about the policy on.
Um, as far as what happened in this department and with, with myself, was
my having words with the supervisor. And
I did indeed. I am guilty. I
definitely was not happy. And I did
probably swear at her. I’m sure.
I was very, very upset at that time.
Um, in particular, about this particular supervisor’s, um,
professionalism I’ll call it. Or
lack of. Um, as far as policy and,
um, that type of an environment, that was an everyday environment. While
I sat and did my job, and I had discussed this a few times with MaryEllen
because in that department there, I know for sure that there’s probably six to
eight other people just as dissatisfied as I was.”
There
is evidence on the record that the Board could reach the conclusion that the
issues raised did not render the job unsuitable. There
is no evidence on the record to demonstrate that the claimant was threatened
with termination or that it was the intent of the employer to terminate her. The
testimony of the claimant demonstrates that her frustration caused her to give a
two week notice in resigning.
A review of the
entire record demonstrates that there is substantial, probative and reliable
evidence to support the findings of fact, conclusions and decision of the Board
of Review.
On findings of fact, as to the weight of the evidence, this Court shall
not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The
scope of judicial review by the Court is limited by Section 28-44-54 which in
its pertinent part provides:
28-44-54.
Scope of judicial review -
Additional evidence - Precedence of proceedings. -
The jurisdiction of the reviewing court shall be confined to questions of law,
and, in the absence of fraud, the findings of fact by the board of review, if
supported by substantial evidence regardless of statutory or common law rules,
shall be conclusive.
Upon careful review of the evidence, this Court finds that the decision
of the Board was not “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record,” and that said decision was not
“arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.” Rhode
Island General Laws §
42-35-15(g)(5)(6).
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is hereby affirmed.