IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
  Thomas Comadena,    Petitioner  
                v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
Respondent

No. 737 C.D. 2004 
Submitted: August 13, 2004    :     
BEFORE:  
HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, President Judge  
HONORABLE ROCHELLE  S. FRIEDMAN, Judge    
HONORABLE JESS S. JIULIANTE, Senior Judge   
OPINION NOT REPORTED   
MEMORANDUM OPINION  BY JUDGE FRIEDMAN     
FILED:  October 18, 2004     

Thomas Comadena (Cla imant) petitions for review of the March 10,  2004, 
order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (UCBR), which  
affirmed a referee's determ ination that Claimant is ineligible for 
compensation  under Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law.

  We affirm.      

Claimant was employed by Whee ling Pittsburgh Steel (Employer) for  forty 
years and last worked as a tractor  driver.  On February 27, 2002, Claimant  
signed a Last Chance Agreement, acknowle dging that failure to maintain an  
exemplary attendance record would re sult in his immediate discharge from 
employment.  (R.R. at 3-4.)  On February 13, 2003, having accumulated numerous  
additional absences, Clai mant met  wit h Em ployer's superintendent of hum an  
resources.  Clai mant was informed that he  m ust report  off only t o his 
supervisor,  disclose the nature of his absence a nd provi de medical 
documentation for any  absence d ue to illness.  Claimant also  was placed 
on notice that his job was in   jeopardy.  (UCBR's Findings of Fact, Nos. 1-7.)       

Thereafter, Claimant reported off work on February 18 th and March  12th, 
15 th, 30 th and 31 st, and he failed to provi de  medical documentation 
for the  dates he called off sick.  On April 7, 2 003, Claimant called off 
work to await a  plumber.  (UCBR's Findings of Fact, Nos. 8-10.)      

On April 11, 2003, Em ployer placed  Claimant on  suspension status  for 
five days pendi ng an investigation.   Employer and Claimant 's union 
scheduled  two hearings t o i nvestigate and address Cl aimant's  
violation  of  the  Last  Chance  Agreement.  Th e record does not 
establis h that Clai mant recei ved notice of these  hearings, and he 
did not appear at either  proceeding.  (UCBR's Findings of Fact,  Nos. 11-13.)  
Thereafter, Em ployer disc harged Clai mant for absenteeis m in  
violation of the terms of his Last Chance  Agreement.  (UCBR's Findings 
of Fact,  No. 15.)  By letter dated May 2, 2003, Clai mant was advised 
that, "Your failure t o  appear [at the hearings]  has resulted in  
your suspension being converted into a  discharge effective May 1, 
2003."  (R.R. at 1.)                                               

The local job center determined  that Claimant was eligible for  benefits, 
and Em ployer appealed.  At a  hearing before t he referee, Em ployer  
presented the testim ony of Sam uel J.  D'Accione, superintendent  of 
human  relations.  In perti nent part, D'Accione tes tified that Claimant 
missed work at least  eleven times in the eleven mon ths after he signed 
the Last Chance Agr eement and  accumulated eight unexcused absences 
after the February 13, 2003, meeting.  (N.T.  at 5-7.)  While Claimant's 
counsel sugg ested that Em ployer actually discharged  Claimant for his 
failure to attend the hear ings, D'Accione repeatedly  stated that   
Claimant was discharged for e xcessive absenteeism in violation of t he 
terms of the  Last Chance Agreement.  (N.T. at 9-14.)      Claimant 
testified that he understood  the discharge letter as stating he  was 
fired for failing to attend the hearings  on hi s suspension, and 
Claimant stated  that he did not receiv e notice of  either h earing.  
With respect t o specific absences,  Claimant testified as follows:  
 
	 I never reported off just pe rsonal busi ness.  I say like
	 snow fall 30 inches, funeral leav e, stuff like that.  I never
	 just call off and say personal  business.  I don't m iss all
	 those days.  I didn't  m iss all those tim es.  I m issed one
	 week sick.  One week that's all.  I reported off every day that
	 I was sick.  Th e rest of the times, it was like I told  you,
	 30 inches of snow and I  couldn't get out of my back street,
	 they didn't plow until the second day.  My Aunt  Jerry died. 
	 You get three days  funeral leave, that's in the contract rules. 
	 I took 4 days  because s he was real clos e  to me.  And my wife
	 is on eye medication and sometimes I have to take off work because
	 of her because she gets,  like, dizzy.  We have nobody  for her
	 to be home with. We are alone. We don't have anybody. So I have
	 to take off for her too. Then the plumber came and I had to
	 take off for him.    
(N.T. at 18.)      

Following the hearing, the refe ree concluded that Claimant's  
excessive absenteeism rose to the level  of willful m isconduct and 
reversed the job  center's deter mination.  Clai mant appeal ed, and 
th e UCBR affirmed the refer ee's  decision that Claimant's absenteeism  
c onstituted willful m isconduct.  The UCB R  determined that Claimant 
offered no justification for failing to provide the requisite  medical 
documentation and  offered no testim ony suggesting that there was an   
emergency situation requiring Claimant to stay home to await a plumber.        

On appeal to this court, 3 Clai mant argues that the UCBR erred in  
determining that Em ployer discharged Cl aimant due to unexcused absences.

Noting that Em ployer's May 2003 term ination letter contains no reference 
to  absenteeism, Clai mant asserts that the  real reason Em ployer fired him 
was his  failure to appear at the April 2003 hearings on his suspension.  
After careful review  of the record, however, we conclude  that the testimony 
of Em ployer's witness  supports t he UCBR's finding t hat Em ployer 
discharged Claimant for absenteeism  in violation of the Last Chance Agreement. 
 
 
 
       Accordingly, we affirm.  
 
  _____________________________         ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Judge