IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 Consol PA Coal Company, 
 : 
 Petitioner 
 : : 
 v. 
 : : 
 Unemployment Compensation 
 : 
 Board of Review, 
 : 
 No. 1836 C.D. 2001 
 Respondent 
 : 
 Submitted:  January 7, 2002 
 BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge 
 HONORABLE MARY H. LEAVITT, Judge 
 HONORABLE JOSEPH T. DOYLE, Senior Judge 
 OPINION NOT REPORTED 
 MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 BY JUDGE McGINLEY 
 FILED:  February 12, 2002 

 Consol PA Coal Company (Employer) petitions for review from the 
 order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review that reversed the 
 referee's denial of benefits pursuant to Section 402(e) of the Unemployment 
 Compensation Law (Law) and awarded benefits to Michael Black (Claimant). 

 The facts, as found by the Board, are as follows: 
	 1.  The claimant was last employed as a coal miner by Consol Pa. Coal Company from May 16, 2000 . . . .  his last day of work was March 6, 2001. 
	 2.  On his last day of work the claimant's shift was scheduled to end at 8:00 am [sic] but because of a scheduled test of the ventilation fan the miners were all instructed to leave the mine by 7:30 am [sic]. 
	 3.  At approximately 5:40 am [sic], while the claimant was out of site [sic] of the rest of his work crew, the crew took the two available man trips (transport cars) stranding the claimant over two miles from the exit portal of the mine. 
	 4.  Unable to get any response on the telephone system the claimant walked out of the mine arriving on the surface at 7:15 am [sic]. 
	 5.  The claimant found his other workers showering and getting ready to prepare to leave the area. 
	 6.  The claimant proceeded consistent with accepted past practice when a ventilation fan test was run and exited the premises. 
	 7.  The claimant through past practice believed that he was permitted to leave when he did. 
	 8.  The claimant was discharged for leaving the work site without permission. 
	 9.  The claimant was subjected to disparate treatment as other similarly situated employees, who performed the same action which caused claimant's discharge, were not discharged or otherwise disciplined. 
 Board Decision (Decision), July 9, 2001, Findings of Fact Nos. 1-9 at 1-2; 
 Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 74a-75a. 

 The Board determined that Claimant's actions did not rise to the level 
 of willful misconduct because Claimant "demonstrated both good cause for the 
 actions which caused his separation and also that he was subjected to disparate 
 treatment."  Decision at 2; R.R. at 75a. 

 Employer contends that the Board committed an error of law when it 
 concluded that Claimant did not commit willful misconduct. 

 Whether a claimant's conduct rises to the level of willful misconduct 
 is a question of law subject to our review.  Lee Hospital v. Unemployment 
 Compensation Board of Review, 589 A.2d 297 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).  Willful 
 misconduct is defined as conduct that represents a wanton and willful disregard of 
 an employer's interest, deliberate violation of rules, disregard of standards of 
 behavior which an employee can rightfully expect from the employee, or 
 negligence which manifests culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional 
 and substantial disregard for the employer's interest or employee's duties and 
 obligations.  Frick v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 375 A.2d 
 879 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977).  The employer bears the burden of proving that it 
 discharged an employee for willful misconduct.  City of Beaver Falls v. 
 Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 441 A.2d 510 (Pa. Cmwlth. 
 1982).  The employer bears the burden of proving the existence of the work rule 
 and its violation.  Once the employer establishes that, the burden then shifts to the 
 claimant to prove that the violation was for good cause.  Peak v. Unemployment 
 Compensation Board of Review, 509 Pa. 267, 501 A.2d 1383 (1985). 
 It is undisputed that Employer had a rule against an employee leaving 
 the workplace without permission from his supervisor, except in circumstances 
 which prevent the giving of such notice.  It is equally undisputed that Claimant 
 violated this rule when he left the workplace before the end of his shift on March 6, 
 2001.  Employer therefore met its burden of proving that it had a work rule which 
 Claimant violated. 

 The burden then shifted to Claimant to establish he had good cause for 
 the violation.  The Board found credible Claimant's testimony regarding the 
 circumstances of his last day at work as found in Findings of Fact Nos. 2-7, 
 including Claimant's explanation that, when a fan check is scheduled, employees 
 routinely leave early. 

 Claimant was left alone in the mine when the other members of his 
 crew left him.  He attempted to contact a supervisor and inform him about the 
 situation.  Unable to do so, Claimant walked out of the mine, arriving at the exit 
 fifteen minutes before his shift was over.  Given that employees were permitted to 
 leave early when a fan check was scheduled and that Claimant heard fellow 
 employees in the locker room and shower room, the Board did not err when it 
 determined that Claimant established good cause for his violation of Employer's                                         
 work rule. 

   Simply, the Board found Claimant credible.  In unemployment 
 compensation proceedings, the Board is the ultimate fact-finding body empowered 
 to resolve conflicts in evidence, to determine the credibility of witnesses, and to 
 determine the weight to be accorded to evidence.  Unemployment Compensation 
 Board of Review v. Wright, 347 A.2d 328 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975). 

 Accordingly, we affirm. 

 ____________________________ BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge 
                                         









Notes
   
 The referee questioned Claimant regarding what typically occurs when a fan 
 check is scheduled: 
 Q:  . . . . There was some place where you stated that other people have left early. . . . . Q:  Because they ­ the mine ­ or a fan check. 
 A:  Yes.  Guys love it when there's fan checks because they know they can come out early.  If the company didn't approve of it, they would keep you in there until ­ like your normal hours.  They would just keep you there that whole time. 
 Notes of Testimony, May 2, 2001, at 19; R.R. at 55a.