IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
            Adam Baldwin, : 
               Petitioner : 
                          : 
                       v. : No. 1132 C.D. 2004 
                          : Submitted: October 1, 2004 
Unemployment Compensation : 
         Board of Review, : 
               Respondent : 

         BEFORE: HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, President Judge 
                 HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge 
                 HONORABLE JAMES R. KELLEY, Senior Judge 

          OPINION NOT REPORTED 
          MEMORANDUM OPINION 
          BY JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: December 15, 2004 

Adam Baldwin (Claimant), pro se, petitions for review of an adjudication of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) finding that Claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), thereby affirming the decision of the Referee.1 The Board determined that Claimant failed to prove his voluntary termination of his position with The Medical Services Association of Pennsylvania2 (Employer) was for cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. Claimant contends that, in making that determination, the Board erred by not taking into consideration all the facts presented.

The background to this case is as follows. Claimant was employed full-time as a claims processor for Employer from October 28, 2002, through December 3, 2003. He did not find the experience to be a positive one. At the hearing before the Referee, Baldwin described the work environment as hostile caused, he believed, by the fact he is a young male with a college education. Because of his education, Claimant’s supervisors he did not give him the training he needed. Claimant testified:

[T]here’s numerous times I went for help and I was told just to figure it out because I have a college degree. I went to my supervisor while I was still on training time and told her I was having problems. And she told me that people didn’t have time to help me out, that I was a smart young man and that I should figure it out myself.

In October 2003,3 Claimant was "written up" for not meeting Employer’s performance standards. He was given two months to improve his performance. After one month, Claimant had shown improvement, but he left the company before the second month passed. Claimant also was "written up" for using Employer’s computer system to invite co-workers to his house for a party.4 N.T. 7-8.

In late October or early November 2003, Employer held a meeting to discuss the possibility of company-wide layoffs the following spring; according to Claimant, Employer asked employees at the meeting to apply for other positions. N.T. 6. When Claimant inquired about applying for another position, his supervisor told him that because of his disciplinary and performance problems for which he had been written up, his odds of finding a job within the company were "slim to none." N.T. 8.

At the end of November 2003, Claimant met with a member of Employee Relations. Claimant testified that the first thing said to him was, "[L]et’s make a deal. What will it take for you to leave? And he made -- they made an offer towards me to leave." N.T. 4. Claimant also testified that the person discussed his job performance:

He mentioned my performance and said that he recommended me to leave with the offer because within a month there was a possibility that they could fire me, or when March rolled around there was a very good possibility that they would lay me off anyway, and that it would benefit [m]e more to leave with the offer that they made.

On November 23, 2003, Employer sent Claimant a memo regarding his resignation. Certified Record at Item 5 (C.R. at ___). The memo provided that if Claimant was to submit his voluntary resignation on or before December 1, 2003, he would receive a four-week lump sum payment based upon his current hourly wage of $11.00. The memo also included statements regarding a recommendation for termination, noting

We have discussed the fact that although there is not currently a recommendation for termination, your current performance level, if it continues to decline, will prompt such a recommendation. Your resignation would be taken as an attempt to avoid such action.

Following his resignation, Claimant promptly filed for unemployment compensation benefits.5 The UC Center determined that Claimant had not exhausted all alternatives prior to voluntarily leaving his job and was therefore ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law.6 Claimant appealed, and a hearing was held before a Referee. The Referee affirmed the denial of benefits, finding that Claimant had not demonstrated necessitous and compelling reasons for leaving his employment within the meaning of Section 402(b) of the Law.

Without taking additional evidence, the Board issued an order affirming the Referee’s decision. The Board specifically emphasized the Referee’s conclusion that Claimant failed to present credible evidence of necessitous and compelling reasons to end his employment. Claimant then petitioned for this Court’s review.

On appeal, Claimant raises three questions for our review. They are:

1. Why under Section 402(b) of the law was I denied compensation?
2. Why were the issues of a "hostile" working environment not addressed?
3. How could a decision be made on this case when the findings of fact are not correct?

Initially, we note that in an unemployment compensation case, the Board is the ultimate factfinder and has the authority to make credibility determinations. McCarthy v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 829 A.2d 1266, 1269-70 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). In making those determinations, the Board may accept of reject testimony of any witness in whole or in part. Id. Further, the Board’s findings of fact are conclusive upon appeal; however, the legal conclusions drawn by the Board from its findings of fact are subject to judicial review. Id. Moreover, our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence8 or whether an error of law has been committed. Criswell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 393 A.2d 1071, 1072 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978).

We consider first whether the Board capriciously disregarded the evidence when it determined that Claimant did not demonstrate necessitous and compelling reasons for voluntarily terminating his employment. In voluntary termination cases, the claimant has the burden to show that the termination was for necessitous and compelling cause that "results from circumstances which produce pressure to terminate employment that is both real and substantial, and which would compel a reasonable person under the circumstances to act in the same manner." Taylor, 474 Pa. at 359, 378 A.2d at 832-833.

The Board adopted the Referee’s finding that Claimant separated from employment for reasons not related to the alleged hostile work environment. The Board did not capriciously disregard Claimant’s testimony about his work environment. The Board simply found that it was not the reason he left. Indeed, Claimant’s own testimony was that he stayed with Employer for many months after complaining to Employee Relations about his workplace environment. Whether or not Claimant did experience hostility, it was apparently not compelling. Claimant may have demonstrated discontent, but discontent with a job will not render a voluntary job termination involuntary and, therefore, compensable. Koman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 435 A.2d, 277, 280 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981).

Next, we consider Claimant’s argument that the Board did not correctly apply the Law to this record. A resignation will be found not voluntary if an employee is about to be fired. As we have explained, in such cases

the relevant inquiry is whether the surrounding circumstances at the time an employee voluntarily leaves indicate a likelihood that fears about his or her job security will otherwise materialize, that serious impending threats to the employee’s job will be realized and that the employee’s belief that his job is imminently threatened is well founded.

The Board found that Claimant was not about to be fired. In so holding, it focused on the November 23, 2003, memo wherein Employer indicated that there was not currently a recommendation for his termination. Further, Claimant was informed by Employer that continued employment would still be available to him if he chose not to resign from his job.

Speculation regarding future layoffs does not establish necessitous and compelling cause to terminate one’s employment. "[W]here at the time of retirement suitable continuing work is available, the employer states that a layoff is possible but not likely, and no other factors are found . . . that remove an employee’s beliefs from the realm of speculation, a claim for unemployment benefits fails despite the offer to leave."9 Here, Claimant was informed of the possibility of layoffs. He also knew that he was on probation for his poor job performance, but his performance had improved and he could have continued his employment. Employer’s memo regarding resignation was simply an offer rather than a threat of a layoff or termination for cause.

As acknowledged by the Board, Claimant may have had valid personal reasons for voluntarily leaving his job, but they did not amount to a necessitous and compelling cause for terminating his employment. As noted in Renda v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 837 A.2d 685 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), "necessitous and compelling cause results from circumstances which produce pressure to terminate employment that is both real and substantial, and which would compel a reasonable person under the circumstances to act in the same manner." Id. at 691. Claimant was in a period of probation, and feared losing his job because of the write-ups he received from one of his supervisors. Claimant’s fears fell in the realm of speculation and did constitute a compelling reason to terminate his employment. Thus, the Board did not err in finding that Claimant’s acceptance of Employer’s offer to resign was a voluntary termination.10 was voluntary, and Claimant does not assert that entering into this agreement was not of his own volition.

The record supports the Board’s conclusion that Claimant failed to meet his burden of showing necessitous and compelling reasons to leave his employment. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Board.

_____________________________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge

1. Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(b).
2. The Medical Services Association of Pennsylvania is now Highmark/Blue Shield, located in Camp Hill, PA.
3. 3 In the meantime, Claimant’s situation in the workplace appears to have worsened. For example, he recounted an incident with a supervisor:

   I had a supervisor pull me in her office and show me how much money she made a year and made the comment that it must really stink to be me because I went to college for four years and got a degree, and she was making three times the amount of money that I was with a GED.

4. At the hearing, Claimant stated that the e-mail had actually been the idea of his supervisor, who then proceeded to write him up for it after he sent it. N.T. 4. As Claimant testified, this supervisor apparently provided him with the e-mail addresses of the persons in his section and oversaw the transmittal of the emails. N.T. 9.
5. Claimant completed a Claimant Questionnaire on December 4, 2003. C.R. at Item 2. The mailing date of the Employer’s Notice of Application is December 5, 2003. C.R. at Item 3.
6. Section 402(b) provides in part that, "An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week . . . (b) In which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature . . . ." 43 P.S. §802(b).
7. Claimant contends that the Board’s determination is supported by false findings of fact. The Board is the ultimate factfinder and is empowered to make credibility determinations. Despite Claimant’s contention, "it is clear that the Board can reject even uncontradicted evidence if it deems such evidence to be incredible." Blackwell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 555 A.2d 279, 281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).
8. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind, without weighing the evidence or substituting its judgment for that of a factfinder, might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached. McCarthy, 829 A.2d at 1270 n.2. In a substantial evidence challenge, we must examine the testimony in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the Board has found, giving that party the benefit of all logical and reason inferences that can be drawn from the testimony. Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 474 Pa. 351, 355, 378 A.2d 829, 831 (1977).
9. Renda v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 837 A.2d 685, 692 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (citing Staub v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 673 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). While this language pertains to a retirement, as opposed to a separation, we believe that the language is applicable in this case.
10. Claimant argues that there was "false information" in the Referee’s Decision and Order that stated, "claimant informed the employer that he would resign if he was given four weeks of severance pay." Referee Decision/Order, dated February 25, 2004, at 1. Claimant testified that he did not make such an offer. Whether it was Claimant or Employer that initiated the offer it does not change the outcome of this case. The agreement provides that Claimant’s resignation