IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
Abigail V. Brown, : 
Petitioner ::
v. : No. 1368 C.D. 2000 
: Submitted: February 16, 2001 
Unemployment Compensation Board : 
of Review, : 
Respondent : 
BEFORE: HONORABLE DORIS A. SMITH, Judge 
HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Judge 
HONORABLE JOSEPH F. McCLOSKEY, Senior Judge 
OPINION BY JUDGE SMITH FILED:July 23, 2001 

Abigail Brown petitions pro se for review of an order of the 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that affirmed the decision 
of an Interstate Claims Office referee denying benefits to Brown after finding that 
she voluntarily quit work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature 
pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), Act 
of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. 
§802(b). Section 402(b) of the Law provides that an employee shall be ineligible 
for compensation for any week in which the employee’s unemployment is due to 
voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. 
Brown questions whether the Board erred in determining that she did not have 
cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for voluntarily leaving her 
employment.

I 
Brown was employed as a conciliation specialist (GS-11) with the 
United States Department of Justice Community Relations Service (CRS) from 
July 5, 1998 to November 20, 1999. A conciliation specialist mediates incidents in 
the community involving race or national origin. Brown began her position in the 
CRS San Francisco office. Brown was transferred in October 1998 to the 
Philadelphia office against her wishes and was relocated pursuant to an authorized 
relocation voucher for payment of her relocation expenses. Because Brown failed 
in her efforts to resolve the racial discrimination and hostile work environment 
complaints regarding her own employment in Philadelphia, including the financial 
hardship forced upon her due to the agency's refusal to fully reimburse her 
relocation expenses, Brown quit her job effective November 20, 1999. The 
Interstate Claims Office denied Brown's claim for unemployment benefits on 
January 18, 2000 pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Law. 

Brown appealed to the referee. She testified before the referee, 
among other facts, that her supervisor made constant racially derogatory statements 
to her concerning the reasons for bringing her into the Philadelphia office and that 
her co-worker refused to assist Brown and made repeated outbursts in the office. 
On one occasion the co-worker ran from the office slamming the door and caused 
office damage. She also testified that the CRS failed to give her required 
performance evaluations; failed to reimburse her entire relocation expenses 
previously authorized, which caused financial burdens; and refused to transfer her 
or to promote her as promised in San Francisco. The agency only reimbursed 
Brown $3,000 of her relocation debt, leaving $5,000 in unpaid relocation expenses, 
and it failed to pay the remainder. Brown also was required to advance her routine
work-related travel expenses, including airfare and hotel costs, despite the CRS' 
slow reimbursement to Brown of these expenses, causing further financial burdens. 

Brown made numerous efforts to resolve her situation, and beginning 
in March 1999 she began writing to her supervisor, to the agency head in 
Washington, D.C. and to the general counsel requesting intervention in securing 
her relocation reimbursements and in resolving her other complaints. She also 
participated in EEO counseling. Brown quit two weeks after again requesting help 
from her supervisor, inter alia, in securing payment of her relocation expenses and 
in resolving her discrimination complaints and the agency's failure to provide her 
the promised grade increase. The supervisor offered no assistance in resolving the 
matters. 

Brown was the only party to present evidence before the referee; the 
CRS received notice but did not participate. Brown testified that her work 
environment caused her to suffer internal bleeding and migraine headaches, 
requiring medical attention and medication. The referee stated that Brown's 
testimony was the only competent evidence of record. He concluded nonetheless 
that Brown did not have a necessitous and compelling reason for resigning because 
there were no changes in the terms and conditions of her employment, the coworker 
who created a hostile work environment resigned prior to Brown's leaving 
and there was no indication that the CRS's failure to evaluate Brown had a negative 
impact on her employment. The Board affirmed the referee, stating that Brown's 
testimony merely showed dissatisfaction with her job; she therefore failed to 
establish that she voluntarily quit her job for a necessitous and compelling reason.


II 
Ordinarily, the Court must affirm the Board's decision unless the 
Court finds that it is in violation of Brown's constitutional rights, is not in 
accordance with the law or if any of the necessary findings of fact are not 
supported by substantial evidence. Estate of McGovern v. State Employees' 
Retirement Board, 512 Pa. 377, 517 A.2d 523 (1986). This standard, however, 
applies to proceedings in which both parties present evidence as demonstrated in 
McGovern. If no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party, then 
there is no evidence upon which to apply the substantial evidence test; the 
appropriate scope of review therefore is whether the agency erred as a matter of 
law or capriciously disregarded competent evidence. Odgers v. Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 514 Pa. 378, 525 A.2d 359 (1987); Russell v. 
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Volkswagen of America), 550 A.2d 1364 
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). Accordingly, the capricious disregard test applies here. 

Whether an employee has cause of a necessitous and compelling 
nature to quit employment is a legal conclusion subject to appellate review. 
Anchor Darling Valve Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 598 
A.2d 647 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). In order to show necessitous and compelling cause, 
the claimant must establish that circumstances existed which produced real and 
substantial pressure to terminate the claimant's employment; like circumstances 
would compel a reasonable person to act in the same manner; the claimant acted 
with ordinary common sense; and the claimant made a reasonable effort to 
preserve his or her employment. Fitzgerald v. Unemployment Compensation 
Board of Review, 714 A.2d 1126, 1129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).

There is no question that harassment or racial discrimination may 
constitute necessitous and compelling cause to terminate one's employment. The 
Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
654 A.2d 264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995); Watts v. Unemployment Compensation Board 
of Review, 410 A.2d 976 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). Moreover, a substantial unilateral 
change in the terms and conditions of employment also may furnish cause of a 
necessitous and compelling nature to justify one's voluntary termination from 
employment. Shrum v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 690 A.2d 
796 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). 

Brown states that she clearly provided in her claimant's questionnaire 
and in her testimony those work conditions that forced her to quit her job, and they 
constituted necessitous and compelling cause for her to do so. Brown took 
numerous steps to resolve her dilemma and quit only after she believed that the 
CRS would not act on her complaints. After numerous contacts with her superiors, 
Brown never received reimbursement of her unpaid relocation expenses, a 
promotion or resolution of her discrimination complaints. Brown asserts that she 
used common sense in quitting her job, that she made a reasonable effort to 
preserve her employment and that she had no other choice but to leave. The Board 
asserts that it did not disregard competent evidence. The Board's contention, 
however, that it properly denied benefits to Brown simply lacks merit. 

Upon a review of the entire record in this case, the Court is convinced 
that the Board capriciously disregarded competent evidence, as well as case law, to 
find that Brown did not meet her burden of proof. The record documents Brown's 
numerous efforts to resolve her problems over several months but to no avail. 
Brown acted with ordinary common sense and prudence and quit months later only
after she found no resolution to her complaints. See Homan v. Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review, 527 A.2d 1109 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). The record 
supports the conclusion that Brown took reasonable steps to resolve her complaints 
and to remain employed with the agency. Because the Board capriciously 
disregarded the competent evidence in this record which establishes that Brown 
had necessitous and compelling cause to terminate her employment, the Court is 
compelled to reverse the order of the Board. 
DORIS A. SMITH, Judge

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
Abigail V. Brown, : 
Petitioner ::
v. : No. 1368 C.D. 2000 
: 
Unemployment Compensation Board : 
of Review, : 
Respondent : 
O R D E R 
AND NOW, this 23rd day of July, 2001, the order of the 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is reversed. 
DORIS A. SMITH, Judge