** SEE: Okl., 788 P.2d 969 (1989)
Appeal from the District Court of Latimer County; Robert W. Moore, Trial Judge.
Robert T. Hardcastle, Wilburton, for appellant.
David T. Hopper, Oklahoma City, for appellee.
SUMMARY OPINION
( MEANS )
Plaintiff appeals from the order of the trial court which affirmed the Commission's denial of unemployment benefits. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we reverse.
Plaintiff was employed by Cove Industries in Wilburton when she resigned from work because of allergies caused by lint and dye. Her initial application for unemployment compensation was granted with the following explanation:
"The claimant quit her last work based on the medical advise sic of her physician. The claimant states she did ask to be laid off work for awhile and was told by Frankie Thacker her average was too high and could not do this. The claimant states she did not ask to be transferred to another department as the lint and dyes inside the building was sic affecting her allergies. Therefore, based on the available inforamtion sic the claimant did take all the necessary steps to resolve the situation prior to her quitting."
Employer appealed from the decision, solely on "the fact that we do not agree with the Deputy's Decision."
The Appeal Tribunal held a telephone hearing concerning the claim in which Employer's attorney, its witnesses, the referee, and Plaintiff took part in the conference call. In his order of decision, the referee found that "claimant told her employer she was quitting because of family problems and due to her illness. She did not present a medical statement to her employer showing job working conditions caused her illness, nor did she request a leave of absence." In denying unemployment benefits, the referee found:
"THAT in order to escape disqualification on a separation issue when one leaves employment due to a temporary disability or illness, one must show by competent medical evidence, if possible, that it was necessary to cease work and attempt to maintain an employment status by requesting a leave of absence. If granted, one must return to work when released by one's physician. One who follows this procedure and is not rehired is deemed to be involuntarily separated. One who does not follow this procedure is deemed to have voluntarily left employment without good cause. The claimant did not follow the above procedure. Therefore, the claimant is disqualified for benefits."
Plaintiff appealed from the denial to the Board of Review, which affirmed the denial and adopted the findings of the hearing officer. Plaintiff's appeal to the district court resulted in a similar affirmance, with a finding that she did not follow the proper procedure "in those situations when there is a temporary disability or illness. That procedure is that it is necessary to show by medical evidence that it is necessary to c ease work and attempt to maintain employment status by requesting a leave of absence." The court thus found that Plaintiff left work voluntarily and without good cause.
On appeal to this court, Plaintiff argues that the court's order which affirmed the Commission's denial of benefits is unsupported by the evidence and contrary to law. This court agrees.
In examining the record below, it appears that none of the adjudicators considered the statement from Plaintiff's doctor affirming that her allergies developed while working at Cove Industries. The doctor also stated that her condition was due to the work environment and that "I advised patient to seek other employment as it was an impossible situation to do anything with medically both physically and mentally." Clearly the letter from Dr. Duffey shows that he told Plaintiff to quit her job.
Plaintiff further argues that the Commission has no basis on which to require her to request a leave of absence prior to quitting. As her testimony shows, she requested to be "laid off" and this request was denied. Unskilled in the law and unaware of the Commission's internal procedures, she stated: "I believe that there was nothing further that I knew to do at that time."
The Commission counters this argument with a statement that the procedures outlined in the order denying benefits are a "proper exercise of its administration of the Employment Security Act." Although