( Bell )
( Tulsa County - Jefferson D. Sellers )
AFFIRMED
Paul Royse, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Pro Se Claimant/Appellant
Teresa Thomas Keller, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, For Respondent/Appellee Oklahoma Employment Security Commission
Wayne L. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, For Respondent/Appellee Office Juvenile Affairs
OPINION
1/ Paul Royse, Claimant/Appellant, appeals from the trial court's order sustaining the decision to deny unemployment benefits issued by Respondent/Appellee Board of Review of the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
2/ Royse worked as a police officer at the L.E. Rader Center in Sand Springs, a juvenile detention facility operated by Respondent/Appellee Office of Juvenile Affairs. When Royse was hired on July 12, 2004, he signed the following statement with which he agreed to comply:
"I Paul Royse understand that this facility operates (24) twenty four hours a day, (7) seven days a week and I could be asked to work any shift, any day, and on any Unit. I understand that my days off can be changed for the betterment of the Institution. I also understand I can be called in to work when there is a shortage of staff to provide coverage or an emergency or disturbance within the Institution."
The supervisor who interviewed Royse testified he stressed to Royse several times the importance of being available to work any shift.
3/ Under his initial schedule, Royse worked the night shift, leaving him free to attend both morning and evening Sunday worship services at his church. Royse testified his personal religious beliefs required him to attend both Sunday worship services every week, adding "that's how I was raised." Royse explained that when he signed the agreement to work any shift, he thought he could possibly work on a Sunday under "special circumstances." However, through "spiritual maturity or divine revelation," Royse thereafter came to the belief he could never miss a Sunday worship service because of work.
4/ On February 28, 2005, Royse was informed by his administrative programs officer (APO) that, "Due to institutional needs, effective Mar. 11, 2005 you are temporarily assigned to the 6 am to 2 pin shift." Two of Royse's immediate supervisors testified the temporary reassignment was to last approximately two weeks. The APO testified he stressed to Royse that the reassignment was temporary. The APO added the reassignment was necessitated by a day shift staff shortage.
5/ By letter dated March 3, 2005, Royse advised the APO that his religious beliefs precluded him from working on Sundays and that the new work schedule would prevent him from attending Sunday morning worship services. Royse added that he had previously discussed this issue with his supervisors. Royse requested the APO reconsider the reassignment and stated, "If this schedule will not change please accept this letter as my resignation effective March 23rd, 2005." Royse's letter was accepted by his superiors as a letter of resignation, the temporary work schedule was not changed and Royse called in sick both Sundays he was slated to work.
6/ Royse applied for and was initially granted unemployment benefits from Respondent/Appellee Oklahoma Employment Security Commission. However, the Appeal Tribunal of the Commission reversed that decision and denied benefits. The Board of Review upheld the denial, ruling Royse voluntarily left employment without good cause connected to the work. See 40 O.S. 2-404 (2001). On Royse's petition for review, the district court sustained the Board of Review's decision. From said judgment, Royse appeals.
7/ In Tulsa Area Hosp. Council, Inc. v. Oral Roberts Univ., 1981 OK 29, 626 P.2d 316, the Supreme Court held:
"Great weight is to be accorded the expertise of an administrative agency, and a presumption of validity attaches to the exercise of expertise when the administrative agency is reviewed by the judiciary. A court of review may not substitute its own judgment for that of an agency, particularly in the area of expertise which the agency supervises . . . . If the facts determined by the administrative agency are supported by substantial evidence, and the order is otherwise free of error, the decision of the agency must be affirmed."
Id. at 10, 626 P .2d at 320 (citations omitted). Accord R&R Eng'g Co. v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n, Bd. of Review, 1987 OK 36, 7-8, 737 P.2d 118, 119.
8/ On appeal, Royse contends the denial of unemployment benefits violates his constitutional rights to freely exercise his religion under the First Amendment. Specifically, Royse takes issue with the Appeal Tribunal's holdings that (1) Royse waived any requirement that he not work on Sundays because of the agreement he signed at hire, and (2) the schedule change did not conflict with Royse's religious practices because his church does not require him to attend both Sunday services. Those two legal conclusions were adopted by the Board of Review and, it appears, by the district court. We agree with Royse that such conclusions were erroneous.
9/ In the context of free exercise rights under the Constitution, Royse first correctly asserts that it is irrelevant whether one holds a particular belief at the time of hire or adopts that tenet at some later date. As made clear in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1051, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987), "The First Amendment protects the free exercise rights of employees who adopt religious beliefs or convert from one faith to another after they are hired. The timing of the conversion is immaterial . . . ." (Citations omitted). Royse also accurately states a person's particular religious belief does not have to be shared by other members of his church in order to be protected. The Supreme Court has "rejected the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization." Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834, 109 S.Ct. 1514, 151'7-8, 103 L.Ed.2d 914 (1989).
10/ Notwithstanding the above discussion, we do not find Royse was wrongfully denied unemployment benefits. If supported by law and evidence, a judgment will be affirmed even where the lower tribunal applied an incorrect theory or reasoning in arriving at its conclusion. Harvey v. City of Okla. City, 2005 OK 20, 12, 111 P.3d 239, 243; Akin v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 1998 OK 102, 35, 977 P.2d 1040, 1054.
11/ Title 40 O.S. 2-404 (2001) states, "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits for leaving his last work voluntarily without good cause connected to the work, if so found by the Commission." Section 2-405 (Supp. 2006) provides in relevant part:
"DETERMINING GOOD CAUSE.
"Good cause for voluntarily leaving work under Section 2-404 of this title may include, among other factors, the following:
"1. A job working condition that had changed to such a degree it was so harmful, detrimental, or adverse to the individual's health, safety, or morals, that leaving the work was justified; . . ."1
12/ "The stated purpose of unemployment compensation legislation . . . is to provide some form of relief to those unemployed through no fault of their own." Fester v. Board of Review of Okla. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1985 OK 21, 14, 697 P.2d 533, 537 (emphasis added). In the present case, the Commission found Royse voluntarily left his position without good cause connected to his employment. We conclude such finding is supported by substantial record evidence.
13/ Royse was employed as a police officer in a residential juvenile detention facility - essentially a prison for youthful offenders - which requires around-the-clock security to ensure the safety of its residents, employees and the general public. When the facility experienced a temporary shortage in available staff members to work the day shift, Royse's APO sought volunteers to work that shift. Because no volunteers came forward, the APO decided to assign officers to the day shift on a temporary, rotating basis for the duration of the staff shortage. Royse was the second officer temporarily assigned to the shift. All of his superior officers testified Royse was informed of the temporary nature of the assignment. Royse thereupon submitted his resignation and used sick leave to avoid the two Sundays he was scheduled to work. As noted by Appellees, Royse was not threatened with discipline or termination because of his refusal to work on Sundays. Furthermore, Royse apparently took no steps to trade work days with any other officer during his temporary assignment, nor did Royse seek a replacement to work during the approximately two hours it would have taken him to attend his church's Sunday morning worship service.
14/ On the basis of the foregoing, we hold Royse voluntarily terminated his employment without good cause connected to his work. Accordingly., he was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
15/ AFFIRMED.
HANSEN, P .J., and BUETTNER, J., concur.
(FOOTNOTES):
1 The version of 40 O.S. 2-405 (1) in effect at the time of Royse's hearing is virtually identical to the current version.