IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Jeffrey D. Cottrell, : 
Appellant-Appellant, : 
v. : 
Director, Ohio Department of Job & :
Family Services et al., 
Appellees-Appellees. 
: 

O P I N I O N 

Rendered on February 23, 2006 
John T. Ryerson, for appellant. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Patria V. Hoskins, for 
appellee, Director, Ohio Department of Job & Family 
Services. 
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 
BRYANT, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Jeffrey D. Cottrell, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas that affirmed the decision of the Unemployment 
Compensation Review Commission ("commission") upholding the denial of appellant's 
application for unemployment compensation benefits. Appellant assigns a single error: 
The decision of the court below affirming the decision of the 
[commission] was unlawful, unreasonable and against the 
manifest weight of the evidence. 
 
Because the commission's conclusion that appellant was discharged for just cause is not 
unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm. 

{¶2} Appellant was employed by Wolfking, Inc. as a warehouse clerk from 
October 1997 through June 11, 1999, when he was discharged for threatening another 
employee, Matthew Bonnes, and for excessive tardiness. Following his discharge, 
appellant applied for unemployment compensation benefits. 

{¶3} On July 21, 1999, the Director of the then Ohio Bureau of Employment 
Services, now the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, initially determined 
appellant was ineligible for benefits because appellant was discharged for just cause; 
appellant appealed to the commission. A hearing was held on August 20, 1999, and both 
appellant and his immediate supervisor, Larry Woodruff, testified. The hearing officer 
affirmed the director's initial determination, and appellant requested review by the full 
commission; the commission denied appellant's request. 

{¶4} Appellant appealed to the Knox County Court of Common Pleas. The court 
held that appellant was not provided a fair hearing because he was not permitted to call 
any witnesses other than himself. The Knox County Court of Appeals affirmed and 
remanded the case to the commission for another hearing. A second hearing was held on 
February 10, 2004 where testimony was taken from appellant, Woodruff, and the shop 
manager, Bonnes. On February 26, 2004, the commission issued its decision denying 
benefits because appellant was discharged for just cause. Appellant appealed to the 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas; the court affirmed the commission. Appellant 
appeals, contending the evidence does not support the commission's determination. 

{¶5} Pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), an employee is ineligible to receive 
unemployment compensation benefits if he or she was discharged for "just cause." Just 
cause is conduct that would lead a person of ordinary intelligence to conclude the 
surrounding circumstances justified the employee's discharge. Cooper v. Ohio Dept. of 
Job and Family Servs. (Jan. 15, 2002), Scioto App. No. 01CA2783, citing Durgan v. Ohio 
Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 545. In determining an application for 
unemployment compensation, the commission considers whether an award of benefits 
will further the underlying purpose of unemployment compensation: to provide financial 
assistance to those who become unemployed through no fault of their own. Tzangas 
Plakas v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 694. 

{¶6} The determination of whether just cause exists depends upon the factual 
circumstances of each case. Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev. Comm. (1985), 19 Ohio 
St.3d 15. Purely factual determinations are primarily within the province of the hearing 
officer and commission. Id. The claimant has the burden of proving his or her entitlement 
to unemployment compensation benefits under the law. Id. 

{¶7} Upon appeal to the court of common pleas, "[t]he court shall hear the 
appeal on the certified record provided by the commission. If the court finds that the 
decision of the commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of 
the evidence, it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to the 
commission. Otherwise, the court shall affirm the decision of the commission." R.C. 
4141.282(H). A reviewing court applies the same standard of review as the common 
pleas court. Tzangas, supra. 

{¶8} The court's scope of review thus is limited. A court may not make factual 
determinations or substitute its judgment for that of the commission. Irvine, supra. Where 
the commission might reasonably decide either way, the courts have no authority to upset 
the commission's decision. Id. While appellate courts are not permitted to make factual 
findings or determine the credibility of witnesses, they have the duty to determine whether 
the record contains evidence to support the commission's decision. Tzangas, supra. 

{¶9} Appellant was terminated after a June 10, 1999 incident between himself 
and another employee, Bonnes. According to Bonnes and Woodruff, appellant's 
supervisor, appellant approached Bonnes at work regarding a situation with appellant's 
wife and other male co-workers. Bonnes told appellant he did not know anything because 
he was not close with the individuals appellant mentioned. According to Bonnes, 
appellant then threatened him, stating "that he could really fuck up my life if I didn't tell 
him what he wanted to know." (Tr. Vol. II, 13.) Feeling physically threatened by appellant, 
Bonnes told appellant the conversation was over and reported the incident to Woodruff. 

{¶10} In his testimony, appellant admitted approaching Bonnes but claimed he 
initiated the conversation because he wanted to know if Bonnes ever threatened to kick 
appellant's "ass." (Tr. Vol. I, 50.) The conversation then turned to the topic of appellant's 
wife. Appellant testified he did not intend to threaten Bonnes, but admitted stating to 
Bonnes, "I don't want anything to mess you and your family's life up." Appellant argues 
that Bonnes simply misinterpreted appellant's statements to him. 

{¶11} In addition to the Bonnes incident, Woodruff testified that appellant had two 
prior heated confrontations with another employee, Morton Parmo. Appellant was given a 
warning for the confrontations with Parmo in February 1999 and May 1999. Based on 
appellant's prior history and the incident between appellant and Bonnes, the company 
decided to discharge appellant. In addition, Woodruff testified, and records demonstrated 
that appellant was excessively tardy. 

{¶12} Because the commission could properly believe Woodruff's and Bonnes' 
testimony, in whole or in part, and could properly disbelieve appellant, the evidence 
supports the commission's determination that appellant was discharged for just cause. 
The commission's decision thus is not unreasonable, unlawful, or against the manifest 
weight of the evidence. 

{¶13} Appellant has a history of confrontations with employees. Most recently, 
appellant directly threatened physical harm to Bonnes if Bonnes did not tell appellant 
what appellant wanted to know about his wife and other male co-workers. An employee's 
act or threat of physical harm to another employee may constitute just cause for 
discharge. Opara v. Carnegie Textile Co. (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 103. The commission's 
application of the rule is particularly fitting here because appellant was warned about his 
inappropriate, aggressive behavior on prior occasions, to no apparent avail. See Opara; 
Cooper, supra; Lombardo v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 217 
(concluding employees were discharged with just cause where the employees used 
profanity toward another employee that disrupted the work environment or was likely to 
provoke a violent response). 

{¶14} Appellant argues Bonnes' testimony should not be believed over appellant's 
testimony because Bonnes did not testify until 2004, nearly five years after the incident. 
Appellant also maintains that Woodruff's testimony should be disregarded because 
Woodruff relied on both excessive tardiness and the confrontation with Bonnes as 
reasons for discharge in the first hearing, but mainly relied on the confrontation with 
Bonnes in the second hearing. Appellant contends Woodruff's "inconsistencies" at the two 
hearings render Woodruff's testimony incredible. 

{¶15} Where conflicting testimony exists, the commission, not the court, resolves 
the conflicts and determines the credibility of the witnesses. The commission thus could 
weigh Bonnes' testimony, considering the lapse of time from the events giving rise to 
appellant's discharge and the second hearing before the commission. Further, even if 
Woodruff focused on the June 10, 1999 incident as the basis for appellant's discharge, 
the record and hearing testimony corroborate that appellant's threatening confrontation 
with his co-worker Bonnes most immediately prompted appellant's discharge. In light of 
appellant's prior warnings, we cannot say the commission's determination is 
unreasonable, unlawful, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, as the Bonnes 
incident is sufficient to constitute just cause for discharge. Accordingly, appellant's 
assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶16} Having overruled appellant's single assignment of error, we affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Judgment affirmed. 

PETREE and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
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